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INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS IN A WORLD OF SOVEREIGN STATES

THE structure and functions of international organs, to which some responsibility in one or another sector of post-war economic policy might be entrusted, have, as is fitting at the present stage of the war, a prominent place in current popular and official discussions of post-war problems. Mere expressions of platonic approval of new techniques and new institutional inventions do not, however, carry us very far, and a more concrete picture of what might be possible in the real world of today and tomorrow is therefore needed.

If we assume that national states will happily hand over to an international authority substantial responsibility for some of their more difficult problems, the elaboration of blueprints for a world order is easy enough; but any such assumptions would be unrealistic. There is no reason for regarding national sovereignty as sacrosanct, under no circumstances ever to be questioned; on the contrary, it can never be sufficiently emphasized that for even the most powerful states experience has shown the "independence" which many are so eager to maintain unimpaired to be an illusion. Today no single state, whether belligerent or neutral, is engaged in activities in any way resembling what it would freely have chosen for itself; those who a few years ago believed that they could freely make their own decisions for themselves should now know better. Nevertheless even the clearest understanding of this fact is an inadequate guide for showing what we can actually hope to do about it. Many of those who today talk about the limitation of

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national sovereignty appear to have much more in mind the imposition of discipline upon other people rather than its acceptance by themselves. The old Adam is not dead. This may be very wrong-headed and inconsistent, but within limits we must take the world as we find it. If we suppose that things are other than they are, we condemn our thinking to *futility and sterility.*

But even if we take the world as we find it, we are not obliged to assume that there has been no significant change in the thinking of either the ordinary man or the statesman on these subjects. To do so would be no less unrealistic than some of the dreams of the starry-eyed. Things have changed and are still changing; the main task is to seize the opportunities offered by these changes, so that, without alarming over-timid people, a modest start may be made in adapting our international institutional framework to the realities of the modern world. Experience does sometimes teach, and statesmen have often solemnly declared their intention to profit from it. If, as has been cynically suggested, "progress consists in living up to our hypocrisies", we should take them at their word, and examine the possibilities of constructing new international institutions with firmer foundations than have yet been known.

The first preliminary steps have already been taken for creating one new international organ. The United Nations Conference on Food and Agriculture authorized the creation of an Interim Food Commission to which was entrusted, *inter alia,* the task of formulating and recommending to governments for consideration "a specific plan for a permanent organization in the field of food and agriculture". Alongside the International Labour Organization and those sections of the League of Nations which are still at work we may therefore expect in due course to see a similar organ to deal with food and agriculture. International action in this field has been formally placed by governments upon the agenda for serious attention. We are dealing here with something which cannot be airily waved aside as a mere dream, and the general issues which arise can be more realistically appraised if they are examined with special reference to this proposed organization.

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It may be doubted whether a purely rational being would have chosen food and agriculture as the first problem for concrete experimentation of this kind. The appeal which better nutrition and the welfare of agriculturists naturally and properly make can far too easily be used in support of policies which, by ignoring the inescapable links between progress in these fields and progress in other sectors of the world economy, not only impede economic development in general, but also are likely to fail in reaching even the immediate objectives, better nutrition and more prosperous agriculture. For this reason it might well have been thought better to start somewhere else, where the necessity for a more balanced approach to world economic problems would have been so obvious that it would not have been necessary tediously and repetitiously to insist upon it. But we must take the world as we find it; we need not waste time in regrets that the start was not made somewhere else. Initiative in these matters needs the support of public opinion, and with the lively interest of public opinion in food and agriculture it may be easier to break through the crust of cynical conservatism if we hammer first there instead of waiting until a logically more correct starting point presents itself.

The prejudice in certain quarters against trying to revive anything too closely resembling the organs of the inter-war period should not deter us from examining for purposes of comparison the experience of the International Labour Office and the League of Nations. In so doing constitution builders, however, should bear in mind that for a considerable part of the inter-war period these organs were fighting rear-guard actions. Circumstances for which they were in no way to be blamed made it increasingly difficult for them to grapple directly with the main issues of the day, and their friends were often asked to take heart in the contemplation of the useful, if modest, work which was being unostentatiously performed in peripheral fields. The exhortation was not at the time without justification, for in an imperfect world one must often reconcile oneself to something far below one's hopes. The history of the period showed, however, very clearly that the quiet growth of activities of minor importance justifies only the most slender

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hopes for the subsequent development of strong and stable international organs. We have now at least an opportunity to construct new institutions to some extent free from the inhibitions which restrained the League and the International Labour Office. While soberly recognizing the strength of the enemies to be overcome, we should not weakly assume that it is a waste of time to think about launching new institutions with powers and influence more extensive than in 1919 anyone thought possible.

If anyone wishes to make an international institution sterile and ineffective, it may be better tactics not to launch a frontal attack against it, or openly to oppose its foundation, but instead to load it with tasks of third-rate importance. Those who are genuinely anxious to establish the prestige and increase the usefulness of international institutions must therefore be constantly on guard against the eagerness which would add to the tasks of such institutions a long list of functions, each one perhaps of some importance in itself, but the combined effect of which is likely to divert the attention of the institution from its main tasks. Some of this eagerness is based on the good faith of enthusiasts who do not wish to allow any opportunity for doing good, however trifling, to slip by, but they may be encouraged by others with less pure motives, who reckon that, by plunging the organization into numerous tasks of little intrinsic importance, it may be left with little time or energy for more constructive and disturbing activities. Unfortunately, enthusiasts are not always sufficiently on the alert to detect the real motives behind some of those who superficially appear to be in agreement with them. They are less likely to be led astray if they constantly ask themselves, is this a task which only an international authority backed by national governments could perform? The work of an international authority will in any event be difficult enough. It should not be hampered by being asked to engage in activities of a kind which might with little difficulty be undertaken in a more informal way by a body lacking the dignity and weight which should naturally attach to something formally created by agreement between sovereign states, and its task will be made unnecessarily difficult if we de

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not take precautions against cluttering up the machinery with nonessential trifles. We shall not grapple successfully with the intricate problems of the post-war world, unless we seek to penetrate to their heart, unless, that is to say, we are prepared to be "radical", in the true sense of the word. A radical organization, in this sense, will be unable to get down to its real work, if it is constantly being distracted by red herrings.

Whatever the functions allotted to any particular organization, some adjustments are clearly necessary in defining and delimiting spheres of influence between the bodies already in existence or thought likely to come into existence. Here the "blessed word" in which we are accustomed to seek comfort is "coördination". In itself coördination is obviously good, but unless the idea is carefully filled in, it may be left an empty and sterile concept. Two guiding principles need to be borne in mind. International organizations with specialized responsibilities should not be allowed to look at each other jealously as each fences off its own preserves with the primary intention of warning rivals off. But they should equally avoid imperialist ambitions which seek to bring under their own exclusive control regions in which other institutions are equally interested. Boundary disputes are nearly always a waste of time, and would be especially futile in the early stages of the development of these institutions, when they would run a grave danger of trying to insist on cessions of territory by their rivals before they had any occupying troops to administer the areas transferred to them.

A judicious application of the maxim, *solvitur ambulando,* will prevent some unnecessary waste of vital energy in dealing with issues such as these. Nearly all the important and knotty questions with which after the war any international organization will have to deal will refuse to be neatly classified under any of the obvious headings which come to mind when we seek a logical basis for classifying specialized international institutions. They will raise borderline issues overlapping the conventional boundaries, and we shall make little progress in regard to any of them, if our international organs, actual, embryonic, or still merely at the stage of speculation, fail to pay careful attention to both the principles referred to above.

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The types of activity in which a body such as the proposed Permanent Organization for Food and Agriculture might profitably engage can be easily set out under four main headings: (i) research, (ii) education and the dissemination of knowledge, (iii) advice and (iv) executive activity. The first two raise no serious difficulties of principle. But, for the reasons already mentioned, a wise internationalist will examine with some care proposals for elaborate programs of research or of the dissemination of knowledge, lest these should involve a wasteful dissipation of limited resources. Modest suggestions that an international food and agriculture organization should collect statistics and other information, engage in research, and assist in making knowledge more readily available are, however, unlikely to arouse the suspicions of jealous governments. They may complain about the cost of such work, but they will not object to it in principle.

The collection of statistics and other information is useful, but no more than the fringe of its usefulness is touched if collection does not lead to analysis and interpretation, and here we have an opportunity to explore new ground. The analysis of events and trends made before the war by the publications of the League of Nations and the International Labour Office was of the utmost value. No serious study of the problems of the period would be possible if these publications were ignored. But for reasons which at the time were no doubt sufficient, both bodies were as a rule obliged in their publications to maintain considerable restraint in suggesting or in hinting at mistakes, or even gross errors, in national policy. The servants of an international body can indeed probably never be in such a free position as an independent student, and no criticism is here implied of the able men who were responsible for these publications. The result was, however, sometimes a certain colorlessness and formality of tone, which left the reader with the impression that the picture was incomplete, and that some of the vital factors were not getting the attention they deserved. Is it utopian to suggest that in the future the publications of institutions such as the proposed organization for food and agriculture might be a little more " radical " in tone, in the sense

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in which we have already defined that word; that is, that they should aim at going to the root of the matter, and that suggestions that national policy has sometimes been mistaken may not be resented or thought inconsistent with canons of international propriety? An objective and critical continuous analysis of events and trends relevant to the field of operations allotted to the organization would be a service of first-rate value to the world. It should be unnecessary to add that the analysis should be presented soberly and sympathetically, but it may not be superfluous to register the point in view of the sensitiveness displayed by some people lest international organizations should be afflicted by a secret ambition to "pillory" the policy of their own country.

By accumulating and disseminating information about the practices and policies of different countries, such an organization would also from time to time bring to the notice of other countries ideas for parallel improvements in policy. Each government would thus be encouraged to profit from the experience of others, whether favorable or the reverse, and a habit of judicious imitation might be encouraged. The International Labour Office has already shown something of what can usefully be done along these lines, but its experience also showed the limitations of this method of approach, which too readily encourages the view that progress mainly consists in persuading everybody to do the same thing. It is regarded as something like the forward movement of a regiment where every man keeps in step and moves ahead on parallel lines. Such parallel movements have their value, but a much more useful analogy is that of a whole army, the various branches of which must for the attainment of the ultimate objective of victory engage in coördinated victory of widely divergent character. An international organization which forms the habit of regarding parallel studies of policies in different countries as its first task will certainly fail to get to the heart of the matter. Genuine international problems arise when the action or inaction of any country or group of countries affects the welfare of the development of other countries; it is with these genuine international problems that international organizations ought to be mainly concerned.

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Should an international organization be permitted to go further than implicit advice of this kind, and be entrusted with advisory functions of a more formal kind? This question raises more controversial issues. Must we assume that jealousy of outside interference is so deeply rooted in national governments as to rule out at once any suggestions that they might listen to disinterested advice from an international organization which had carefully examined the nature and implications of their problems?

The Hot Springs Conference on Food and Agriculture clearly contemplated advisory functions of this kind, for the Interim Commission which it set up for carrying out its recommendations was "in considering the functions and duties to be assigned to the permanent organization . . . [to] take into account . . . the submission to member governments and authorities of recommendations for action with regard to a varied list of problems which covers economic studies in the field of agriculture and food, including the study of the relation of agriculture to world economy." Are we to assume that the government representatives who voted for this resolution meant what they said, or should we rather take it for granted that on second thoughts they would be appalled by the prospect of criticism suggested to timid people by such a recommendation and would prefer the proposed organization again to follow the timid "safety first" line which has often been imposed on international organizations in the past?

Concerning "advice" of one type there is indeed no serious difficulty. If a state asks an international organization for advice or assistance in relation to the formulation or execution of any policy falling within the sphere of that organization's work, there can be no objection if it responds to the request within the limits set by the range of its knowledge and the size of its staff.

The problem of volunteering advice raises issues of another kind. Here too we are not altogether without precedents. As the work of the International Labour Office developed, the formulation of international conventions to be ratified by member states came to be one of its main activities, and some not

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insignificant successes were registered by the use of this technique. In general, however, the experience of the International Labour Office here should serve as a warning rather than as an example. In its case, indeed, the urge to formulate advice in terms generally applicable derived largely from the belief, itself not always well founded, that unfair competitive advantages would accrue to countries which refused to adopt reforms which were acceptable to their competitors. Fears of this kind may not be entirely absent when action affecting food and agriculture is in contemplation, but reforms can easily be thought of which would not raise the issue at all, and where a single country might improve its present practice without any risk that by so doing it would place itself at a competitive disadvantage. In certain directions, too, there is something to be said for laying down international standards of conduct, conformity with which might in time come to be regarded as a matter of prestige. But in general the effort to formulate international conventions theoretically regarded as capable of universal application meant a search for the lowest common denominator, and diversity in national background and development meant that an undue amount of time and effort had to be devoted to the search for ingenious devices for insuring a uniformity which in practice could often be little more than formal, or equally ingenious devices for formal registration of the effects of different stages of development.

To reproach the International Labour Office for having allowed this technique to occupy so much of its time would be unfair. In the circumstances of the time it probably had little choice in the matter. But in launching a new organization to work in another field, in different circumstances, and with the experience of the last twenty years as a guide, it would be a mistake merely to imitate the practices of the International Labour Office. The international convention technique should not be excluded, but it should not be assumed to be an obvious duty of the new organization regularly to turn out a series of such things. It would probably do more effective work during the first ten years of its existence if it refrained from attempting to draw up even a single international convention, concentrating instead all the energies of its staff (which on the most

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favorable hypothesis is not likely to be too large for the purpose) on other more vital and pressing work.

Without paying too much attention therefore to the international convention device, new international organizations, and especially the proposed organization for food and agriculture, should be permitted and encouraged to offer advice, after due consideration of all the relevant facts, on any matters falling within the range of their competence. This principle would entitle them, when their advice was formally requested, to indicate whether any policy for which their technical assistance had been asked might be detrimental to the welfare of other countries. This would represent a very substantial advance in international practice, an advance which indeed to some people would seem so bold as to be a little alarming.

Much of this alarm is based upon a misunderstanding of how the process is likely to work in practice. Sometimes it appears to be taken for granted that a group of doctrinaire fanatics would get together, shut themselves up secretly in a remote room in the international organization's building, cut off from any opportunity to understand the background of the national policies with which they proposed to deal and from the day to day life of the people affected by them, produce a cut and dried scheme worked out to the last detail, and post it off to innocent and unsuspecting governments, with a curt and peremptory covering note. Any international organization which allowed its staff to work in this way, or indeed which admitted to its staff people who had any inclination to work in this way, would obviously be looking for trouble. It would speedily be wound up, either by a formal act of the members of its governing body, or by a sudden drying up of the financial resources without which these offending officials would be unable to draw their salaries. One is entitled to assume that the staff of an international organization will be men with at least a normal allowance of common sense, and it might even be expected that their average standard would be somewhat above the normal. No international organization could survive which allowed its staff to ride their own hobby horses. The whole of their work must be based upon a solid foundation of knowledge and study.

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To provide such a foundation is indeed one of the purposes for which these organizations are created, though it should not be assumed that no one will know anything beforehand about the problems in hand, and that the organization must therefore painfully accumulate everything by its own efforts, starting off with a perfectly clean sheet and neglecting the knowledge and experience already available to its staff before ever there was any thought of setting up an international organization. Nor indeed in the normal case need there be any formal recommendation worked out in such detail as to deserve to be described as a "scheme". It is much more a matter of drawing attention to new ideas, or to unsuspected relationships between the different problems and policies of different countries. Many countries are already well aware of the effects upon themselves of the policies of other countries, but for a variety of reasons there is often some hesitation in attempting to initiate even discussions of these interrelations. An international organization should be in a favorable position for taking a tactful lead in such matters, leading up to fruitful discussions without offending national susceptibilities. Similarly it is an obvious guiding principle for every such organization to keep itself fully informed on every aspect of the background within which national policies are developed. If they are wise, national governments will actively assist in making this possible, and, through regional offices or other similar devices, the organization could collaborate with governments in insuring that all its work was done with the fullest knowledge of all the relevant facts.

In certain fields, where the problems are mainly technical, no great difficulty need be anticipated in connection with advisory work by an international organization. Any government would be ridiculously touchy if it resented tactfully worded suggestions for, to take one example, improvements in its statistical services, and many governments could be expected to be grateful. Suggestions affecting economic or social policy raise more delicate issues. We all know people, and some of them quite influential people, who would bitterly resent allowing ignorant foreigners, as they might elegantly phrase it, to

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poke their noses into their affairs. But have we not now reached a stage in the world's history where we can relegate these short-sighted people to the insignificant position which should properly be theirs? Governmental attitudes on these matters which may have been suitable to the conditions of several generations ago, but are now quite out of touch with realities, should no longer be maintained. It is a mistake to discuss this matter in terms which suggest that it has anything whatever to do with national sovereignty. By the means here suggested no nation will be compelled to do anything; it will still be as free as it ever was to make its own policy decisions for itself. We are merely asking that governments should be prepared to allow the servants of an international organization which is their creation and ultimately under their control to analyze national policies in their intricate interrelations, and to formulate suggestions, to which the attention of the governments concerned can be drawn in terms and by methods suitable to the circumstances of each particular case. If governments really think it worth while to create and maintain such organizations, they can scarcely have it in mind so jealously to circumscribe their powers as to preclude them from performing such useful duties. Why should they regard an institution created by themselves as an unwelcome intrusion, to be kept jealously at arm's length, or at best kept busy with work of little real importance?

Nor should we assume that in the performance of its advisory functions an international organization need differentiate between large and powerful states, and those who are small or undeveloped. In the nature of things weak states will be more in need of assistance, but strong states may be more in need of admonition. When we are being reminded, and no doubt properly reminded, of the special responsibilities of the Great Powers in the post-war world, it is proper to insist that these responsibilities cannot be adequately discharged unless the Great Powers are prepared to take the initiative in smoothing the way for the effective exercise of the functions which we have been describing. Nor need the Great Powers fear that advice will be particularly embarrassing to them. Their influence in any international institution must inevitably be great,

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and their professions of general good will would sound somewhat hollow if they were not prepared to back up protestations of virtue by a willingness to allow a competent international organization to check up on what they had been doing, from the point of view of the intricate interrelations between their policies and the well-being of other countries.

Bolder spirits may think that in asking for international organizations to offer advice on their own intiative we have not gone nearly far enough. What is the use, they will say, of mere advice? We want to get something done. An international institution, they will urge, can acquire prestige and authority only by producing concrete results, and not merely by offering advice.

The impatience which prompts such questions is natural enough. An international institution which could get a good running start with a positive job of work would be at a great advantage as compared with one which had, so to speak, to make its own way; and if nations can be persuaded to assign a positive job of work to the food and agriculture organization, that will be all to the good. But if impatience carries us so far as to decry the value of activities of the kind already suggested, we should thereby demonstrate that we did not comprehend the nature of the world in which we are living, and, in looking about for "practical" activities in which the international organ could busy itself, we should again be running the risk of dissipating its time and energies, and diverting the attention of its staff, when they could be better occupied in considering other more fundamental matters. It is not difficult to think of a number of "practical" but trivial things which governments might be persuaded to allow an international organization to handle. It is surely an illusion to suppose that governments could somehow inadvertently be engineered into a position where an international organization would be found to have got control of some sector of the world's economy without any formal decision by the governments concerned.

It is not altogether unfair to suggest that this illusion finds a place in the minds of many who, reluctant to grapple with the really thorny problems of international collaboration, persuade

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themselves that their difficulties can be evaded or sidestepped by tackling relatively simple practical issues one by one. We need not deny the theoretical possibility, or even the desirability, of creating international organizations which would themselves initiate and carry out programs for action. It is, however, surely unrealistic to suppose that such organizations can develop imperceptibly without governments taking a formal decision to entrust specific responsibilities to them. But when governments are prepared to take such formal steps, they will in effect be prepared to set up, in whole or in part, a world state. The creation of a world state may or may not be a desirable end for which long-sighted men will work. It would, however, be an understatement to say that the achievement of this end within any reasonably short period of time appears highly improbable. It would betray a high degree of irresponsibility in facing the manifold risks and dangers of the future if, in our impatience to realize this remote objective, we refused to take seriously the advantages which would accrue from efforts to build up international organizations with assured authority to criticize and advise national governments. International institutions which lacked this authority would not be entirely useless, though a cynic might think that they would represent little more than the carrying out of an elaborate program of work-creation for highly skilled personnel. The establishment of institutions with such authority would mean an innovation in human relations which might without exaggeration be described as revolutionary. Realists who dislike revolutions could still soberly accept it, because it would correspond accurately to the psychological and economic facts of the modern world, a world in which no state can live comfortably without taking account of the policy of its neighbors, but in which national pride is so strong that states are still determined to sacrifice as little as possible of the formal apparatus of sovereign power.

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DAKAR AND THE DESERT ROAD

FROM the French armistice to the fall of Tunisia, Americans anxiously looked toward Africa. It was a new experience, for many had been inclined to regard the great continent south of Europe as a region far removed from their daily concerns. It was not until the autumn of 1940, when the British were shelling the port of Dakar on the westernmost tip of Africa, that most Americans became fully conscious of how close the great western bulge of that continent came to their side of the world. Then, perhaps for the first time, and with some anxiety, they realized that the trip by airplane from Dakar to Natal in Brazil could be made in five hours. To be sure, they had known these facts before, but they had never been so conscious of what the proximity of Africa to South America might mean to them. Then in the spring of 1941, Secretary Stimson warned that the development of air power made it "necessary for us to command not only the reaches of ocean adjacent to our shores but the entire reach of the oceans surrounding the Western Continent." A little while later, the President pointed out specifically that the "Nazi threat extended to the Atlantic fortress of Dakar and to the island outposts of the new world—the Azores and Cape Verde Islands." [1]

Dakar, the city which had once concerned Americans so little, now loomed as a key location in a world-wide series of battlefields. It was the chief seaport for French West Africa. In fact, it was the best seaport on the west coast of Africa, with the finest natural harbor and the best equipment. It lay in a commanding position on the ocean lanes which the United Nations must keep clear in order to supply their battlefronts in North Africa and the East.[2] Furthermore, and most alarming

[1] *New York Times*, May 7, 1941; May 28, 1941.

[2] For descriptions of Dakar's strategic position see: Lengyel, Emil, *Dakar: Outpost of Two Hemispheres* (New York, 1941); Atkins, M., "Dakar and the Strategy of West Africa", *Foreign Affairs*, January 1942, pp. 359-366; Wasson, Thomas C., "The Mystery of Dakar: An Enigma Resolved", *The American Foreign Service Journal*, April 1943, p. 169.

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thought of all, Dakar's proximity to Brazil made the port an excellent spot for launching attacks on the Americas.

While the unpleasant rumors concerning German intrigue in Dakar and throughout West Africa[3] were largely without foundation, it could not be denied that the Germans wanted a firm hold on Dakar and that the officials of the Vichy government in France were well aware of the importance of the city and its hinterland. Indeed, their anxiety about an Anglo-American invasion of West Africa was fully as great as American fear of an invasion of the Americas.[4] During this period of tension over Dakar, the Vichy government set vigorously to work to reinforce the city's harbor and also to improve communications between West and North Africa; and, in the spring of 1941, they commenced laying the rails for a trans-Saharan railroad over the direct route between the Algerian and Moroccan ports and Dakar.[5]

In beginning the construction of this trans-Saharan railroad, the Vichy government was carrying out plans which had been in the minds of Frenchmen for over half a century, but the sudden start on the project in 1941 was in sharp contrast to the long period of discussion, investigation, study and more discussion which marked the development of the idea prior to the advent of the Vichy government. It may be helpful, therefore, to glance back over the period of delays and hesitations to see why the French people had taken so long to make up their

[3] The subject of German intrigue in Dakar and West Africa is discussed at length in Mr. Wasson's article. He does not believe that there was any specific German intrigue in either Dakar or West Africa during the months of his consulship there, from October 1, 1940 to February 1942, the period of the greatest tension over West Africa.

Mr. Wasson's point of view is further substantiated by that of Mr. W. O. Oliver, another resident in Dakar, in his article "Over Dakar the Vultures Wheel", *New York Times Magazine*, May 25, 1941.

[4] See various articles in *The New York Times* during the summer and fall of 1941.

[5] *Le Journal Officiel de l'Etat Français*, No. 1316, "Loi du 22 Mars 1941 rélative à la construction d'un chemin de fer reliant la Mediterranée au Niger", pp. 1278-1279.

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minds about a railroad which the Vichy government considered of such immediate urgency.[6]

The trans-Saharan project had deep roots reaching well back into the middle of the nineteenth century, when France had only a few footholds on the Mediterranean coast in North Africa, a few trading posts on the west coast and a very small colony back of Dakar in the Senegal. Vice-Admiral Machan is generally credited with the authorship of the trans-Saharan idea.[7] In 1847, he suggested exploring the vast stretches of unknown and forbidding country which lay between France's settlements in Senegal and Algiers. At the time it seemed almost fantastic to think of opening up the country between them. As early as 1860, however, Hanotaux went even further than Machan, when he prophesied that one day Algiers would be connected, by steam transportation, with the French outpost of Timbuktu in West Africa, thus putting the tropics within six days of Paris.[8]

[6] There is voluminous material in French on the subject of the trans-Saharan railroad: reports and documents of all descriptions, press articles and many monographs. There is, however, very little material in English.

Two French books are especially good guides through the mass of French material because of their carefully selected bibliographies. They also give useful and fairly impartial accounts of the history of the project. They are: Touaillon, Georges, "*L'Afrique Occidentale Française par l'Atlantique ou par le Sahara?*" Paris, 1936); Vidailhet, Jean, *Le Transsaharien, amorce du Transafricain* (Paris, 1934).

There are various older accounts by partisans of the trans-Saharan which are of special interest: Rolland, Georges, *La France en Afrique et le Transsaharien* (Paris, 1890); Captain E. L. Bonnefon, *Le Transsaharien par le main d'oeuvre militaire* (Paris, 1900); Leroy-Beaulieu, Paul, *Le Sahara, le Soudan et les chemins de fer transsahariens* (Paris, 1904); Souleyre, A., *Le Transsaharien, son utilité, ses conditions d'établissement et d'exploitation* (Paris, 1911); Roumens, Le Commandant, *L'Imperialisme français et les Chemins de fer transafricains* (Paris, 1914). There are two brief, but useful, accounts in English: *Handbook of Railways in Africa*, British Admiralty, vol. 1, chap. vii, 1919; Lengyel, *op. cit.*

[7] Vidailhet, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8, and Touaillon, *op. cit.*, p. 183.

[8] "Si un jour, reliant Alger à Tombouctou, la vapeur ne mettra pas les tropiques à six journées de Paris." Quoted in Touaillon, *op. cit.*, p. 183, and also in Vidailhet, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

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These early suggestions were mere dreams and prophecies. It would be many years before pioneer paths could be broken through the jungles and across the savannahs of West Africa, and it would be an equally long period before the wastes of the Sahara could be explored sufficiently to make serious plans for linking North and West Africa. Nevertheless, when most of the Sahara was still unexplored, as early as 1879, a definite trans-Saharan railroad project was drawn up by M. Duponchel, Head of Highways and Bridges. His plan seemed so attractive and reasonable that it was submitted by M. de Freycinet, Minister of Public Works, to a special commission for investigation. Under the auspices of this commission, four expeditions were sent from northern Algeria into the Sahara. All four encountered difficulties with the fierce tribes of the desert and one, led by Lieutenant-Colonel Flatters, was completely massacred.

The tragic fate of the Flatters mission discouraged the French government from sending any further exploring parties into the heart of Algeria until the hinterland was more effectively occupied. Nevertheless, it is interesting to note that the explorers who returned from the first three expeditions were convinced that there were no insuperable obstacles to building a railroad through the Sahara and that, as soon as the country was pacified, construction would become feasible.[9]

The idea of a trans-Saharan railroad, dormant for a while, was revived again late in the century. This was the period of the most rapid growth of the French Empire. In the decade of the nineties, intrepid explorers were pushing into the very heart of the Dark Continent both from the west coast and from the north. Military expeditions followed, and French influence and political control spread effectively over West, North and Equatorial Africa—from Algiers on the Mediterranean to Lake Chad in the center of the continent, and from Dakar on the Atlantic to the Upper Niger. The union of North, West and Equatorial Africa was no longer a dream but a reality.

Along with the rapid expansion of French influence, it was natural that new schemes for a trans-Saharan railroad would arise. In the early nineties, Georges Rolland, a member of a

[9] *Handbook of Railroads in Africa*, pp. 165-166.

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former mission into the Sahara, published a book urging the construction of a railroad across the desert to join Algeria with Lake Chad via Biskra and Wargla, two desert oases. Rolland and various other promoters then tried to form a chartered company to carry out their scheme. Their plans, however, fell into a bog of local Algerian politics. Each department in the colony wanted to possess the terminus of the line. The promoters of the project did succeed in having a law passed authorizing the building of a railroad from Biskra, south of the city of Constantine, to Onargla; but their plans for a chartered company failed.

Nevertheless, other schemes for a trans-Saharan railroad kept cropping up from time to time, and several exploring missions were sent out to investigate routes. At the same time, the old conception of a trans-Saharan railroad began to broaden. Frenchmen no longer envisaged just one road running between North and West Africa; they saw a line bifurcating into two main arteries at some point in the southern part of the desert. One branch would go toward French West Africa, while the other would run southeast through the Lake Chad region and French Equatorial Africa. Finally, it would cross the French frontier into the Belgian Congo where it would meet the British and Belgian railway systems in the Stanleyville region. Then, the French would share in the international trade in the rich Katanga copper belt and perhaps in the potentially rich, though still undeveloped, Kilo-Moto gold fields. The railroad, thus conceived, would no longer be just a trans-Saharan line running through French territory but would become an international trans-African line with through connections from Algerian cities on the Mediterranean to Cape Town on the southern tip of Africa.[10]

Projects for a trans-Saharan-trans-African railroad aroused considerable interest between 1900 and the outbreak of war in 1914. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, noted economist, who was one of its stanch supporters, wrote a series of persuasive articles for *L'Economiste Française,* and in 1904 he published a book en-

[10] See especially Roumens, *op. cit.*

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titled *Le Sahara, le Soudan et les chemins de fer transsahariens.* In 1912, a group of French bankers united to form *La Société d'Etudes du Transafricain.* Under the auspices of this organization, two important expeditions were dispatched into the desert. One of these expeditions, led by M. Maître-Devallon, studied the northern section of a trans-Saharan route, and a second, under Captains Nieger and Cortier, explored the southern end. Both expeditions reported that there were no serious physical obstacles. Indeed, M. Maître-Devallon and Captain Nieger thenceforth became firm advocates of a railroad across the desert.[11]

The first World War put an end to expeditions, but the idea was not forgotten. A feeling was growing, which was expressed by the French patriot, Marshal Joffre, that the trans-Saharan railroad should be built quickly to cement the unity of French Africa and to develop the commercial opportunities of the Sudan and the Niger.[12]

After the war, active investigation of a feasible route began again. The older expeditions had been made on camel back, but motors cars now supplanted the camel. Several motor expeditions were sent out between 1916 and 1927. Out of these explorations the idea grew that perhaps the motor truck rather than the steam locomotive was the answer to the commercial needs of the desert. Soon regular motor service was in operation over a network of routes from the cities in the north to the Niger region in West Africa and to the Lake Chad district in French Equatorial Africa.[13]

The idea of a railroad was not abandoned, however, in spite of the great progress made in the motor services. Indeed, the French government itself took a special interest in the scheme. In 1928, Parliament authorized the organization of an official

[11] *Handbook on Railways in Africa,* p. 166.

[12] Lengyel, *op. cit.,* p. 192. "'The Trans-Saharan must be built, and quickly at that,' said Marshal Joffre. 'We owe it to French Africa to assure her unity. Only the railway can accomplish that, only it can realize the full value of the immense territories of the Sudan and Niger, which can give us all the wealth we need.'"

[13] "Les Grands Réseaux Routiers de l'Empire", *L'Illustration,* May 11, 1940.

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committee to study the whole project and six years later the report of the committee was finally discussed at a congress of the Radical Party held at Vichy.[14] There, the railroad promoters met the determined opposition of those interested in the motor transport services. The trans-Saharan scheme was linked by its opponents with the steel trust interests, which were so unpopular with the Radicals that the project could not survive the opposition. Once more, plans for building the railroad were dropped, only to be taken up when the Vichy government came into power.[15]

Even this cursory survey of the history of the trans-Saharan railroad project shows how thoroughly the subject had been investigated and how little had been accomplished. To be sure, there were a few railroads running south from North African ports toward the desert. The longest line connected Oran with Colomb-Béchar near the Algerian-Moroccan frontier. Although this railroad was considered in the trans-Saharan projects, it was primarily a part of the North African railway system and had been built chiefly for local traffic. Its local character was clearly indicated by the fact that it was only a narrow gauge line. Again in French West Africa, a railroad ran east from Dakar a few hundred miles to Koulikoro on the Niger River in the French Sudan. Although this line was destined to become part of the trans-Saharan system, it had been constructed for local purposes, i. e., to tap the Niger region. Between the southernmost railhead at Colomb-Béchar in Algeria and the eastern terminus of the Nigerian line at Koulikoro in French West Africa there were more than a thousand miles of desert, unspanned as yet by rails. This gap remained in spite of the fact that numerous scientific expeditions had repeatedly reported the entire feasibility of building a railroad line through the desert, especially along the so-called western route. This route, starting from Colomb-Béchar and

14 "Jamais étude ne fut plus sérieusement, plus minutieusement conduite," Manue, Georges R., "Le Transsaharien au Service de l'Empire", *L'Illustration*, May 11, 1940; and also the report accompanying the decree authorizing railroad construction, *Le Journal Officiel de l'Etat Français*, March 22, 1941, p. 1278.

15 Manue, *loc. cit.*; Lengyel, *op. cit.*, p. 202.

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passing through Adrar to In Tassit in the French Sudan, ran over hard ground through mountainless country where very few engineering works were required. The old problem of supplying steam locomotives with water could be solved by using Diesel engines, although the coal from the Kenadsa mines near the Moroccan border was available for steam engines on the first section of the line.

In spite of these favorable reports and the fact that the railroad would enhance the prestige of the French Empire in Africa, the French hesitated about actually beginning work. Part of the delay is traceable to political difficulties both in Algeria and in France. There were jealousies between Algerian departments; and there was a growing rivalry between the motor transport interests and promoters of the railroad project. Behind the wrangling, however, a basic reason for the long delay was the fear that the railroad would not be a paying proposition for many years to come. To be sure, the railroad promoters were convinced that it would eventually become a profitable business. They pointed to the fact that West Africa, although largely undeveloped, was potentially rich in both agricultural products and minerals. Its full development was dependent upon better communication by rail. Furthermore, the railroad promoters argued that the products of North and West Africa were complementary in character. A brisk trade, they believed, could be developed between these two sections of their African empire. If the resources of North and West Africa were insufficient to make the railroad a commercial success along the line between North Africa and French West Africa, there was the other branch headed southeast for the center of the continent to tap the mineral wealth of the Belgian Congo.

The arguments of the railroad supporters were often convincing, but they were predicated on a more or less distant future. Immediate prospects were not so promising. The line would run for the major part of the way through a sterile desert and, beyond the actual desert, it would go through many miles of unproductive land before it reached the fertile, well-watered regions of West Africa. Some of this arid land, how-

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ever, on the edge of the desert had fertile soil and could be reclaimed by extensive irrigation works. Indeed, a great dam on the Niger River near Bamako was already near completion; but it was only the beginning of what needed to be done in that region to bring out its latent wealth.

The undeveloped state of French West Africa is shown conspicuously by its sparse population. In an area of 1,816,000 square miles, there was an estimated population of only 15,000,000. In other words, a country eight times the size of France had only one third of the population.[16] While the products of North and West Africa were undoubtedly complementary in nature, there was comparatively little exchange between the two regions. The products of North Africa found their natural outlets through the Mediterranean ports to Europe, while the produce from West Africa flowed out through the various Atlantic ports. It would take some time to direct trade from these traditional channels and to create a successful exchange. Furthermore, the climate was an enemy which was always wearing down the ambitions and strength of white settlers and entrepreneurs. The desert, itself, was an inferno, while in the coastal jungles and swamps malaria and the dreaded tsetse fly were prevalent. Almost everywhere throughout West Africa hot enervating winds wore down the last reserves of energy.

If the prospects of developing a paying commerce over the western branch of the trans-Saharan line were wholly dependent on future developments, the prospects were still more uncertain in regard to the line directed toward the heart of Africa. French Equatorial Africa was less developed and had an even smaller population than French West Africa. Although there was always the alluring prospect of the riches of the Belgian Congo, there were so many arrangements to be made before this section of the line could be constructed that commerce from the Congo seemed still only a speculative dream. Furthermore, the improved motor transport service and developing airlines were quite adequate to take care of whatever passenger and freight traffic existed. Improvements

[16] Lengyel, *op. cit.*, p. 101.

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were being made constantly in these services and they appeared to be sufficient for some time to come.[17]

Nevertheless, constructing a trans-Saharan railroad was bound up in the minds of Frenchmen with ideas of imperial prestige and development. It would provide an opportunity to invest abroad capital which was stagnant at home; and, therefore, some Frenchmen regarded it as a great revivifying force in the Empire.[18] Considerations of prestige, however, were subordinate to commercial calculations concerning the lucrative freight service, especially in the decade of the thirties. The careful French capitalists wanted more immediate returns on their investments than they could expect from the construction of a trans-Saharan railroad. They were content with the present system of transportation over the desert. Although they had not abandoned their long-cherished plans for the railroad, they could afford to wait until the need seemed more urgent.

Commercial prospects then were uppermost in the minds of Frenchmen in this period. Between the outbreak of the war in 1939 and the signing of the armistice, however, the prospective railroad assumed a new importance. Motor transport over the desert proved inadequate to meet wartime demands. Long trains pulled by strong locomotives were necessary for carrying heavy war materials and large numbers of soldiers. The French were justly proud of the fighting quality of their black troops from the Senegal, but they were handicapped by poor communications in rushing these troops to the European battlefronts. For example, a native soldier, after he had left his village, usually had to walk many miles until he reached some point on the Nigerian railroad route to Dakar. At Dakar, he took the boat. It was often a month between the time he left his home and arrived at his post.[19] Furthermore, transshipment by sea became more and more hazardous as the war progressed. Transportation by motor over the safer and more direct desert route was wholly inadequate for mass move-

[17] Manue, *loc. cit.*

[18] Roumens, *op. cit.*

[19] Lengyel, *op. cit.*, pp. 196-197.

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ments of troops. The need for better transportation facilities for imperial defense, said one writer for *L'Illustration* in the spring of 1940, was so great that this need alone would justify commencing work on the trans-Saharan railroad.[20] In the spring of 1940, however, Frenchmen were much too preoccupied with a life and death struggle in Europe to do anything about building a new railroad in Africa.

France was prostrate when the Vichy government came into power. Yet, the following spring when Frenchmen were desperately in need at home, the government set vigorously to work on the trans-Saharan railroad. In March 1941, the construction of a "Mediterranean-Nigerian Railway System" was authorized and an imposing decree was signed by Pétain himself; Admiral Darlan; Yves Bouthillier, Financial Secretary of State; Pierre Pucheu, Secretary of Industrial Production; Jean Berthelot, Secretary of Communications; Admiral Platon, Secretary for the Colonies.[21] It provided for the construction of a railroad of standard gauge beginning at Bou-Arfa in French Morocco, passing through or near Colomb-Béchar just over the border in Algeria. From there, the line would run southwest a short distance to Kenadsa, where an important coal field was located. From Kenadsa it would strike south to Beni Abbes, then due south through the desert to Adrar. From Adrar, it would proceed to In Tassit in the French Sudan, there dividing, with one branch running to Niamey in the French Niger. The other branch would go west to Segou on the Niger River in the French Sudan. From Segou there was only a short gap to Koulikoro, the present terminus of the line from Dakar. As soon as the trans-Saharan railroad was completed to Koulikoro, there would be direct through railroad connections between the North African ports and Dakar. We have already noted what this would mean in transporting Senegalese troops and heavy war materials through French-controlled territory instead of

[20] "La défense nationale a besoin du rail. Ce caractére impérial de l'oeuvre en justifie suffisamment l'ampleur et le prix. Si le rail, par surcroît, ajoute à la prospérité de notre bloc africain, c'est là une bonification accessoire. . . ." Manue, *loc. cit.*

[21] *Le Journal Officiel de l'Etat Français*, March 22, 1941, p. 1278.

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over the hazardous water routes. It might also serve as a quick method of transporting French troops from France or North Africa to Dakar to defend that port from invasion. It would be an excellent method of circumventing the British blockade. It might, if the German grasp on the Vichy government became tighter, facilitate greatly the transport of troops and materials to Dakar for launching attacks on South America.

To be sure, these were not the reasons given in the report justifying the decree.[22] Indeed, the report says nothing at all about the military or strategic importance of the line. It reiterates again the promises made in earlier studies on the railroad. It stresses the prospect of profitable commmerce in the Niger region; but that commerce could develop only if the Mediterranean area were bound to the Niger region by a railroad.

Finally, the report speaks in glowing, if somewhat vague, terms of the rewards to be reaped from the branch running toward Central Africa. Such a line would enhance the prestige of Europe by binding Africa to it.[23] (The emphasis is on Europe, not on France.) Furthermore, the trans-Saharan line, as a link in the international trans-African network, would have developments which could not be discerned at the moment but which would unfold as soon as the Sahara was spanned by rails.

This was the grandiose prospectus spread before the French people in the spring of 1941, when they were faced with starvation and privations of every kind at home! It would have seemed fantastic even in a time of peace and prosperity. The half-starved people were asked to engage in an undertaking in Africa the economic value of which they had always doubted. They were asked to do this partly for the sake of future commerce and partly to enhance the prestige, not of France, but of Europe.

[22] *Ibid.*

[23] " L'Europe doit, pour garder son rang dans le monde, se relier directement au continent Africain tout proche. Le transsaharien est le premier pas dans la voie de la constitution d'un réseau transafricain international dont il est difficile de discerner dès maintenant la contexture, mais qui se précisera, aussitôt le Sahara franchi par le rail." *Ibid.*

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If the words of the report are taken literally, it is hard to believe that the practical French people could have accepted them. Yet the Vichy-controlled press was enthusiastic about the project. Only as one reads between the lines of the report does the strategic importance of the trans-Saharan railroad become apparent.

The government had no difficulty, even in these times of stress, in procuring workers. Previously the problem of recruiting construction gangs had been one of the great stumbling blocks in the way of actually starting work. The climate in the Sahara is tremendously trying. In the daytime, the thermometer often mounts to 125°, but the nights can be bitterly cold. There are also hot winds blowing most of the time, which are debilitating. Then there is always the great problem of finding a sufficient water supply. Under the most favorable conditions, it would be difficult to entice laborers to work voluntarily in this inferno.

The Vichy government, however, drew its supply from new sources created by the war. It drew its railroad workers from the French Legionaires and from the French "half-legionaires". These "half-legionaire" squads were composed mainly of political refugees from Austria, Poland, Czecho-Slovakia, and Spain. Many of them were anti-Hitler refugees who had fled to France. Before the armistice, they voluntarily joined the French Legion to fight Germany. After the armistice, they expected to be demobilized but were changed instead into labor squads of "half-legionaires" and sent to the Sahara. The system worked quite simply. After the armistice, the Vichy government announced that only those refugees should be demobilized from the French Legion who could submit 5,000 francs as proof that they could support themselves after discharge. Since the possessions of most of the refugees had been confiscated before they fled from their homelands, very few could show the stipulated sum. Consequently most of them had to remain in the Legion and many of them were sent to Africa. Some of the workers, who had not previously been Legionaires, were Spanish refugees who had already received

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their visas for Mexico but were sent instead to work in the desert.[24]

Many stories have reached us about the intolerable conditions surrounding the work on the trans-Saharan railroad. The Governor of Algeria, in reply to inquiries made by *The New York Times,* claimed that the trans-Saharan railroad workers were treated just as well as, if not better than, other military detachments in the Sahara.[25] Even regarded from this angle, conditions were shocking. According to the Governor's own report, the ordinary railroad worker received, in addition to food and lodging, from 1 to 5 francs a day. For this mere pittance he was supposed to work from ten to twelve hours in the intolerable heat of the desert. Out of this, he must save whatever he could if he wished to procure the 5,000 francs necessary for his dismissal from the army and still more if he looked forward to earning passage to America.

There is some evidence that the Germans as well as the Vichy government were keeping a sharp watch over the construction of the railroad. Overseers of the work were many of them Germans who had enlisted in the Foreign Legion. More and more frequently, German commissions inspected the work.[26]

In this fashion, track laying progressed and the railroad was well on its way to Beni Abbes before the Anglo-American forces won the great battle for North Africa.[27] Thus, the Vichy government watched a steady advance on the railroad headed for Dakar. It was curious how neatly the whole scheme fitted into the period when the Vichy government and the Germans were most anxious about Dakar. Indeed, the circumstances surrounding this sudden zeal for constructing the trans-Saharan are sufficient in themselves to stir up speculation.

[24] Selke, Rudolf, "Trans-Saharan Inferno", *Free World,* February 1942, pp. 57-62; Pol, Heinz, "Vichy's Slave Battalions", *The Nation,* May 3, 1941, pp. 527-529; *New York Times,* Aug. 6, 1941, "Sahara Conditions Described"; *ibid.,* May 25, 1941, "Forced Labor Girding Dakar".

[25] *New York Times,* July 25, 1941, "Algerian Governor Replies to American Charges of Abuse of Refugee Workers".

[26] *New York Times,* Aug. 6, 1941; Pol, *loc. cit.,* p. 528.

[27] Selke, *loc. cit.,* pp. 59-60.

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How far was Germany involved in the railroad scheme? Did the Vichy government and the Germans fear an Anglo-American invasion of French West Africa? Did they see clearly that the desert railroad was one way of circumventing the British blockade; one way of drawing fresh supplies of raw materials and manpower from West and Central Africa? Finally, was there any long-range planning for the transportation of men and material from Europe over the direct route to Dakar for launching attacks on the Americas?

These questions cannot be answered now but they give food for thought. In America we have been aroused to the potential dangers lurking behind Dakar and its approaches. To be sure, the immediate threat has vanished, but the geographical facts remain. Dakar is strategically located. Its importance in this respect will increase greatly, when there is a trans-Saharan railroad connecting it with the Mediterranean ports. The whole route from Dakar to the Mediterranean can be a potential protection or a potential danger for us, because Dakar guards the gateway to a great inland route into central Europe. What this will mean for trade and commerce between South America and Europe, time alone will tell. Meanwhile, it is well for Americans to watch developments in this corner of Africa, which no longer lies outside the limits of their economic and strategic interests.

LOIS A. C. RAPHAEL *

* This is a posthumous article.

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THE HOUSE THAT PÉTAIN BUILT

"THE outlines of corporatism which have taken shape in certain sections of French economy . . . have found in the state an auxiliary without which the collective effort of the interested groups would not have achieved their goals. . . . Free contract retreats before legal regulation. . . . The spontaneous adaptation of supply and demand has been replaced by imperative orders. . . ."

These words were not uttered by French Pétainists. They constitute the sober judgment of two of France's most eminent, pre-war economists, Charles Rist and Gaëton Pirou. The statements are taken from the preface to *De la France d'avant guerre à la France d'aujord'hui*—a remarkable survey of the major trends in French economic life from 1911 to 1936.[1]

In no sense was the realization of the pre-war drift toward corporatism in France a "crack-pot" idea expressed by a potential Quisling. But what is this "corporatism" about which so much has been written in the last twenty years, which came to be adopted under one guise or another in many of the European states prior to World War II, and which has been foisted by Germany in varying degrees upon the victims of her aggression? Most concisely expressed, corporatism may be said to be the institution of some form of compulsory state organization along professional lines in order to discipline employers and employees in the social and economic fields and to control, regulate, or direct the most important aspects of production, distribution, and social, especially labor, relations.

The "house that Pétain built" for France has a framework of corporatism. To what degree the German conquerors served as architects and contractors for this structure is not clear. But it is certain that creators of the "new order" in France found something upon which to build and that the present French state is an important landmark in the history of corporatism in Europe.

[1] This volume was prepared by twenty-one of the ranking French economists and was published in 1939 as a supplement to the *Revue d'économie politique.*

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The French Labor Charter

On October 4, 1941 Henri Pétain issued the Labor Charter for France—a document which had been prepared by the Committee of Professional Organization. According to the terms of the Charter, all citizens of the state engaged in industrial, commercial, or professional pursuits were to be organized in such a fashion that "discipline" could be exercised in the social body. Strikes and lockouts were outlawed; the old trade unions were abolished; and the trade associations were swept away. A clear way was made for the juggernaut. It was given the task of effecting the collective settlement of all working conditions.

In February 1942 twenty-five "professional families" were designated as the fundamental organizational groups of the new order. These families were as follows: (1) Textiles, (2) Clothing, (3) Leather, (4) Furs, (5) Chemicals, (6) Glass, (7) Paper, (8) Construction, (9) Ceramics, (10) Mining, (11) Building Materials, (12) Hotels, Restaurants, Cafes, (13) Insurance, (14) Water, Gas, Electricity, (15) Banks and Stock Exchanges, (16) Transportation, (17) Wood, (18) Production of Metals, (19) Metal Working, (20) Art Objects, (21) Theatre, (22) Hygiene, (23) Law, (24) Teaching, Sports, Non-Lucrative Professions, (25) Public Health.

The members of each "family" were grouped according to their working status into five categories: (1) employers, (2) workers, (3) office workers, (4) foremen, and (5) technicians. The organization of each "professional family", beginning with the basic classification of its members as has just been mentioned, might take one of three forms. (See Chart I.) The most desirable of these from the Pétainist point of view and the one toward which all should evolve was the corporative; the second was that of mixed categories (representatives of all the work categories being grouped together); and the third was by social committees on professional trade or syndical lines. These choices were granted because of the realization that members of some "families" would not fit

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CHART I



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well into the corporative mold and that existing concepts of trade unions and trade associations would require the continuation of old patterns.

Under the corporative plan of organization, members of the five categories of a "professional family" would choose representatives, always screened by superior political authorities, to form the local corporation. Representatives of the local corporations would, in turn, select delegates to a regional corporation; and members of the regional corporation would finally select representatives to a national corporation. Thus there would be a national corporation for each "professional family" that chose this plan of organization.

In case a "professional family" preferred to organize itself upon a mixed worker-employer basis, representation would evolve along similar geographical lines, from the plant, to the local group, to the regional group, to the National Social Committee, and finally to the Superior Council of the Labor Charter.

If the syndical plan were followed, trade union and trade association members would form a social committee in a given plant. In a locality a local social committee would be created by representatives of local unions and trade associations and of plant social committees. In a region, regional social committees, composed of representatives of local social committees and of the syndicates, would be created; and on a national scale representatives of regional social committees or of national syndicates would form the National Social Committee.

The Superior Council of the Labor Charter [2] was to consist of Ministers or their representatives, the Secretary of State for National Economy and Finance, the Secretary of State for Labor, the Secretary of State for Industrial Production, the Secretary General of the Vice-Presidency of the Council, the Secretary General of Labor, the Director of the General Economy, the Director of the National Social Committee, and the representatives of the National Social Committee and of the National Corporations.

[2] Decree of November 13, 1941.

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Through this machinery collective contracts were to be negotiated; conciliation of all kinds was to be effected; and a new spirit instilled into employer-employee relationships. To facilitate this work, new labor courts were established and the duties of the Justices of the Peace and of the *Conseils des Prudhommes* were more clearly delineated. Moreover, committees were to be created to fix minimum wages, to control employment, and to improve social services. In essence, however, the French system was erected to provide a way for bringing "discipline" into the French scene—to provide a means whereby the dictator could effectively wield his authority.

Additional Agricultural and Industrial Organizations

While the structure which has just been described was the main part of the "house that Pétain built", that house had two important ells—one for agriculture and one for industry. The objectives sought in these additions were (1) to plan the economy of France, (2) to carry the plans into effect, and (3) to control the economy in order to meet the exigencies of the immediate emergency and eventually to realize improvements in French economy. These schemes easily obtained German approval (if they were not actually forced on France by Germany), for they provided a means whereby the occupying power could milk the conquered country.

According to the plans for agriculture, all Frenchmen engaged in providing the products of the soil were to be organized on corporative lines (see Chart II), while all existing agricultural societies, except coöperative and mutual aid organizations, were to be abolished. Farmers were to form local agricultural syndicates in each commune; these local syndicates were to name representatives to regional or departmental corporative unions; and the regional unions, in turn, were to propose candidates for the National Agricultural Corporative Council—the selection of persons being subject in every case to approval from above.

In addition to this herding of farmers into the "corporation of agriculturalists", Specialized Groups for Individual Prod-

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CHART II

Corporate Organization of French Agriculture


Ministry of Agriculture and Food Supply.
Minister of Agriculture
Direction of General Administration and Personnel
General Secretary for Peasant Questions and Rural Equipment
Commissioner to the Committee of Corporative Organization
Service of Price, Transportation, Study and Negotiations with the Occupying Power.
General Secretary for Agricultural Consumption
General Secretary for Agricultural Production
National Agricultural Corporative Council
Regional Agricultural Chambers for Scientific Aspects of Agriculture
Regional or Departmental Corporative Unions
Local Agricultural Syndicates
Corporative Federation of Agricultural Mutuality
Joint Committees for Milk, Horses and Mules Flowers, Sugar Beets, Meat, Forests National Grains Offices
Regional Specialized Groups for Individual Products
Local Specialized Groups for Individual Products

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ucts were created on local, regional and national lines. They were to be composed of delegates from the main, agricultural, corporative organization for the purpose of dealing with problems of production, consumption and pricing. Thus wheat farmers would be organized all the way along the line to handle special problems connected with wheat; and sugar beet growers, horse breeders, and the like would similarly be grouped for analogous purposes.

In order to plan and control industry, the pattern employed in agriculture was only slightly altered. The ground was cleared by abolishing such time-honored central trade associations as the *Comité des Forges* and such powerful peak associations as the *Confédération Générale de la Production Française*. In their place were established about sixty "committees of organization"—one each for such industries as metallurgy, coal mining, machinery, and so on. (See Chart III.) Their membership was composed entirely of entrepreneurs or their representatives, selected by political authorities. Their mandate was to take an industrial census, to fix industrial prices, and to control all aspects of production. On these matters, "Social Committees", in which, it will be remembered, labor was to be represented, could make recommendations.

In addition to the Committees of Organization for Industry, provision was made for a Committee of Organization for Commerce and for the extremely important Distribution Board for Raw Materials. The former body was to regulate commerce; the latter to ration, through its twelve sections for individual classes of goods, available raw products. Because of appalling shortages of goods, the Distribution Board held the fate of business concerns in the palm of its hand. Failure to collaborate meant a stoppage of supplies; and a stoppage of supplies meant, in turn, utter ruin.

Corporatism in Action

Information about the actual functioning of the French corporative state is extremely scanty, and what little has come to these shores is highly colored. On the basis of it, nevertheless, certain generalizations may be hazarded without great

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CHART III


French Corporative Organization for Industry
Ministry of Industrial Production and Labor
Minister
General Secretary for Power
General Secretary for Industry and Domestic Commerce
Secretary for the Distribution of Industrial Products
Central Distribution Board for Raw Materials (12 sections)
Regional Offices
General Committee of Organization for Commerce
Regional Offices
Local Offices
Committees of Organization for Metallurgy, Coal, Electricity, Machinery, etc. In all about 60.
Regional Offices
Local Offices
General Secretary of Manpower and Social Insurance
Commissioner for the Campaign against Unemployment

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danger of falsification. In considering these generalizations, however, sight should never be lost of the basic fact that this system of social and economic control has been used by the occupying power to keep France subservient to its will and acquiescent to its demands and by the French dictatorship for assuring the retention and augmentation of its power. Perhaps, as is argued by many, political dictatorship is an inherent aspect of corporatism, although this point has been hotly contested.

So far as the organization of employers and employees under the Labor Charter is concerned, some of the desired goals apparently have been reached. The corporative organization has been a means of helping to compel labor to endure enormous sacrifices with less disturbance than would have been imagined possible four years ago. But this does not mean that French labor has accepted its fate willingly. Leaders of several of the old trade unions have fought for and obtained positions of importance in the new organization, especially in the "Social Committees", but one of their reasons for doing so has been to facilitate a return to the *status quo ante* upon the conclusion of the war. In fact, the desire of labor for a restoration of free unions seems to be exceedingly powerful.

Although Vichy has attained a certain success in maintaining social peace by using force and the corporative organization, it has failed singularly in its agricultural program. Peasants, especially independent French farmers, are not easily dragooned into obeisance to a dictator when what is demanded is not to their liking. Although the Joint Committees or Allocation Boards for individual products ordered each farmer to put down a given amount of his land to specified crops and to deliver a certain amount of his produce to governmental collecting agencies, a myriad of ways has been devised to break the rules. Hoarding has been general and success in black market operations has been regarded as a virtue. Price inducements have been the government's best defense against these tendencies, but price increases defeat one of the basic reasons for control.

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In industry little of a really constructive character has been achieved, except possibly the development of hydroelectric power. In practice many leaders of the former peak trade associations have obtained important posts in the Committees of Organization and in the Distribution Board for Raw Materials and have perhaps accentuated their monopolistic practices as a result. They have obtained favored treatment for themselves and have willingly sacrificed anticollaborators. In the last analysis, French industrial corporatism has greatly facilitated German acquisition of French products and French plants.

An answer to the question of the future of French corporatism can only be a guess. Statements by De Gaulle, the policies pursued in North Africa by Giraud, the avowed policy of the Committee of National Liberation, the abrogation of Vichy institutions in Corsica, and the attitudes of the United States, Great Britain and Russia would indicate that the existing corporative organizations are doomed to extinction. Too hasty judgment on the basis of this evidence may not be sound. Vichy's corporative organization does aim to deal with fundamental problems of French society and may be employed out of sheer necessity in the disturbed period of liberation. If purged of its present personnel, if given a democratic character, and if directed toward socially desirable ends, it would have some merit. But those are big "ifs". Nevertheless, except in the case that the country becomes a socialist society, France may make use of corporatism as defined above. It may employ "some form of compulsory state organization along professional lines in order to discipline employers and employees in the social and economic fields and to control, regulate, or direct the most important aspects of production and distribution." At least the trend in pre-war France was in this direction.

SHEPARD B. CLOUGH

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THE OUTLOOK FOR "WAR GUILT" TRIALS

GREAT BRITAIN and the United States have now notified all neutrals that they would regard the granting of asylum to the Axis leaders and their "tools" as "inconsistent with the principles for which the United Nations are fighting." The Soviet Union has given similar notice to those neutrals with which it has diplomatic relations, and each of the three Powers has expressed the hope that no such asylum shall be granted. This would indicate a common intention to bring the Axis leaders before some joint or "world" tribunal, to be set up when the war ends.

This action by the most powerful of the United Nations gives official approval to a demand which is a compound of the primordial desire to punish evildoers, and the more civilized notion that punishment should be imposed by judicial tribunals rather than by the victors, with their own force and arms. Such a demand indicates a moderate advance in our ethical thinking, but only a moderate one. The proposed proceeding is not designed for the purpose of determining the guilt of the accused, except *pro forma,* but rather to impose the penalties, presumably the maximum ones. The demand for a trial is the modern form of the old cry, "Woe to the vanquished!"

But to send the Axis leaders to their death, the common fate of man, would not completely satisfy. Many would feel somehow let down if, for example, Hitler were killed in battle or died peacefully in his bed. Such a fate would not seem quite appropriate for the man so many have designated the foremost villain of the world. He must somehow be brought to judgment in the grand manner, preferably as the first offender to be haled before a World Court and tried with all the pomp and circumstance of a Moscow "purge" tribunal. Those who want to punish the Axis leaders also want the world to believe

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they were right in pressing their charges; and to give a feeling of righteousness nothing is so effective as vindication by a judicial tribunal, even if improvised for the occasion. The Apaches might be content with the scalp of a defeated enemy chief, but those who demand the punishment of the defeated Axis leaders want that punishment to mean something more than that they were inept and unlucky in war. It must be demonstrated that their punishment was deserved, and the decision of the God of Battles must be confirmed by the Goddess of Justice.[1]

The demand for the punishment of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo resembles in many ways the demand for the punishment of the late German Kaiser. The story of that frustrated demand will illuminate the problem which will face us with the collapse of the Axis. At the second session of the Peace Conference, held on January 25, 1919, it appointed a Commission on the Responsibility of the Authors of the War and on Enforcement of Penalties. Two members were to be named by each of the Great Powers, and the United States named Robert Lansing, then Secretary of State, and James Brown Scott, a distinguished scholar in the field of international law.

The Commission was directed to enquire into and report upon the following:

1. The responsibility of the authors of the war.
2. The facts as to breaches of the laws and customs of war committed by the forces of the German Empire and their Allies, on land, on sea, and in the air during the present war.
3. The degree of responsibility for these offences attaching to particular members of the enemy forces, including members of the General Staffs, and other individuals, however highly placed.
4. The constitution and procedure of a tribunal appropriate for the trial of these offences.

[1] It is interesting to recall that Bismarck toyed with the idea of setting up an international tribunal to try Napoleon III for provoking the Franco-Prussian War. Bismarck believed his plan to be "a lovely idea in connection with the conclusion of peace." See Moritz Busch, *Bismarck: Some Secret Pages of His History* (New York, 1898), vol. 1, p. 189.

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The Commission had no difficulty in reaching the unanimous conclusion that the war was premeditated by the Central Powers, and was the result of acts deliberately committed in order to make it unavoidable. However, disagreement soon developed over the majority's proposal that offenders against "the laws of humanity" were liable to criminal prosecution as well as offenders against the "laws and customs of war." The American delegation contended that they were not directed to report on violations of "the laws of humanity", and for that and other reasons they dissented from some of the final conclusions.

The American members, in their dissenting opinion, also stressed the difficulties in determining violations of the "laws of humanity". On this point they said:

> The laws and customs of war are a standard certain, to be found in books of authority and in the practice of nations. The laws and principles of humanity vary with the individual, which, if for no other reason, should exclude them from consideration in a court of justice, especially one charged with the administration of criminal law.[2]

The American members also dissented from the majority's conclusion that even "Chiefs of State" found guilty of violating the laws of war or the "laws of humanity" were liable to criminal prosecution. Of the liability of a Chief of State the American members said:

> . . . he is, and it is submitted that he should be, only responsible to his country, as otherwise to hold would be to subject to foreign countries, a chief executive, thus withdrawing him from the laws of his country, even its organic law, and subordinating him to foreign jurisdictions to which neither he nor his country owes allegiance or obedience, thus denying the very conception of sovereignty.

[2] This and all other citations of the Commission's Report are from *Violations of the Laws and Customs of War*, published as Pamphlet No. 32 of The Division of International Law of The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1919.

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With respect to the alleged immunity of a Chief of State, the majority argued as follows:

> . . . it would involve laying down the principle that the greatest outrages against the laws and customs of war and the "laws of humanity," if proved against him, could in no circumstances be punished. Such a conclusion would shock the conscience of civilized mankind.

In considering the alleged immunity of the heads and ex-heads of the Axis states there is little to be added to the arguments used with respect to the Kaiser in 1919. But if the heads of the Axis states are to be tried, with what shall they be charged? Are they to be tried for having started the war, or the manner in which they have conducted it? These identical questions were asked at the end of the first World War and, then as now, opinion was divided. The majority of the Commission answered them as follows:

Conclusions

1. The Acts which brought about the war should not be charged against their authors or made the subject of proceedings before a tribunal.
2. On the special head of the breaches of the neutrality of Luxembourg and Belgium, the gravity of these outrages upon the principles of the law of nations and upon international good faith is such that they should be made the subject of a formal condemnation by the Conference.
3. On the whole case, including both the acts which brought about the war and those which accompanied its inception, particularly the violation of the neutrality of Belgium and Luxembourg, it would be right for the Peace Conference, in a matter so unprecedented, to adopt special measures, and even to create a special organ in order to deal as they deserve with the authors of such acts.
4. It is desirable that for the future penal sanctions should be provided for such grave outrages against the elementary principles of international law.

The American members concurred in the first two of the foregoing conclusions, but they believed the third conclusion

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to be inconsistent with the first two, and they refused to give it their approval. They expressed themselves as being in "substantial accord" with the fourth conclusion, and contented themselves with pointing out some of the practical difficulties to be encountered in providing "penal sanctions" for the future violations of international law. This fourth conclusion, although of paramount importance, dealt with the future and therefore lacked the dramatic interest which attached to efforts to "hang the Kaiser." Our failure to act upon it made possible the careers of the three men who may soon stand where the Kaiser stood in 1919.

Outside the Commission, public opinion was even more divided on the propriety of trying the Kaiser. *The Nation,* in an editorial approving the American delegation's dissenting opinion, said:

> Until the Conference spoke, no civilized state failed to admit the righteous rule that crimes were somewhere to be defined, that the law was to be certain, that the court which tried an offender must have competent jurisdiction, and that men were not to be punished for acts which were not recognized offences when they were committed. The Peace Conference has thrown these principles to the winds. Although *ex post facto* laws and proceedings are hated and banned in every state, the Kaiser is to be tried by *ex post facto* procedure. Although no law is in existence under which he can be tried, he is to be tried under laws specially passed for the purpose, or, failing such, on general principles. . . . And over the whole mad business is to be thrown the sanctimonious mantle of a League of Nations, an organization which had no existence when the Kaiser's acts were committed . . . and of an alleged international morality . . . which would be discredited forever.[3]

The editors of *The New Republic* originally favored a trial, on the assumption that it would be a superaffair of cosmic significance, with judges from all nations participating, including representatives from the defeated Powers. But when it was decided to create a trial court composed of members from a

[3] *The Nation,* May 10, 1919, vol. 108, p. 724.

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few of the victorious nations, and to hold the trial in London rather than at Geneva, which latter was then the symbol of the more ebullient prophets of the new order, their enthusiasm cooled. They said:

> Instead of the justice demanded by the peoples, our statesmen are offering us a victim. Instead of a fair and searching trial, they are offering us a dramatic spectacle. . . . Democracy demands a real trial. If the statesmen dare not give it, then let them apply the sponge of oblivion.[4]

If we persist in trying the Axis leaders we may meet another difficulty encountered by the Kaiser's pursuers in 1920, to wit, the problem of persuading some neutral country to surrender them, after having offered them asylum as political refugees. That is the rock on which the pursuit of the Kaiser foundered in 1920, and any attempt to try the present Axis leaders may lead to the same dead end, unless we are willing to overpower or overawe whatever neutral nation is involved.

It will be useful to recall the efforts made to persuade Holland to turn the Kaiser over to his victors for trial and punishment. On January 15, 1920, the Supreme Council, representing the Allies, but not the United States which was an "associated" Power, officially demanded of Holland that she "deliver into their hands William of Hohenzollern, former Emperor of Germany, in order that he may be judged." The Council made it clear that this was no ordinary attempt to extradite an ordinary criminal. It claimed to be performing its duty in carrying out the provisions of Article 227 of the Treaty of Versailles, which specifically provided that such a request be made.

It has been said that the request was *pro forma* but there is nothing in the text which would support such a suspicion. The Council expressed its unwillingness "to be stopped by arguments, because it is not a question of a public accusation with juridical character as regards its basis, but an act of high international policy imposed by the universal conscience in which

[4] *The New Republic*, July 23, 1919, vol. 19, p. 377.

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legal forms have been provided solely to assure to the accused such guarantees as were never before recognizd in public law."[5]

The Dutch government in its reply called attention to the fact that it was not a party to the Treaty of Versailles, and that the treaty therefore imposed no duty upon it. Nor was it in any way bound "to associate itself with this act of high international policy of the powers." Their reply ended as follows:

> . . . neither the constituent laws of the kingdom, which are based upon the principles of law universally recognized, nor the age-long tradition which has made this country always a ground of refuge for the vanquished in international conflicts, permit the Government of Holland to defer to the desire of the powers by withdrawing from the former Emperor the benefit of its laws and this tradition.

In its note the Dutch government made a suggestion which, if acted upon, might well have dissuaded the present Axis leaders from their course of aggression. It said:

> If in the future there should be instituted by the society of nations an international jurisdiction, competent to judge in case of war deeds qualified as crimes and submitted to its jurisdiction by statute antedating the acts committed, it would be fit for Holland to associate herself with the new regime.[6]

It is unnecessary to say that the proposed action was never taken, and if we attempt to try Hitler and his associates we shall find ourselves just where the accusers of the Kaiser found themselves a quarter of a century ago. Despite a second demand, the Dutch government stood firm, and the ex-Kaiser lived out his days on Dutch soil.

An attempt to punish the Axis leaders at the end of the present war will encounter all the old difficulties and some new ones. In 1920 it would have been possible to have created a

[5] James Brown Scott, "The Trial of the Kaiser", in *What Really Happened at Paris*, edited by Edward Mandell House and Charles Seymour (New York, 1921), p. 243.

[6] *Ibid.*, p. 244.

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tribunal drawn from the countries of Western Europe and other nations with similar legal systems and methods of administering criminal justice. But if any such tribunal is created at the close of the present war it will be impossible to deny representation to the Soviet Union whose juridical procedures are viewed somewhat askance by Western jurists. Efforts to establish such a tribunal would offer many opportunities for discord among the United Nations.

Moreover, those nations which have suffered under the Nazi domination would demand representation on the tribunal, and it would be difficult for their representatives to try the case of The People *vs.* Hitler with that modicum of impartiality which we require of every judge if his opinions are to be respected. The difficulties to be encountered in the creation of an international court could of course be obviated if the accused were tried in the courts of the nation which first captured them, but no such court could have the prestige of an international one.

It must be remembered that it is not the mere death of the accused which is sought. If that were all, they could, when captured, be turned over to a sergeant with a firing squad, and the affair would be ended promptly. But neither a firing squad nor a trial before an ordinary state tribunal would suffice, when the demand is for the most impressive inquisition ever staged.

A serious objection to planning war-guilt trials is that such planning fosters the belief that world peace can be assured by the elimination of a few bad men. The assumption that the woes of this world are caused by devils, either spiritual or terrestrial, is a popular error that continually thwarts realistic analysis and intelligent action. It would be tragic if we ever believed that the creation of a special tribunal to judge the Axis leaders *ex post facto* would materially contribute to the preservation of peace.

Thus far all plans for the punishment of the leaders of aggressor nations have been faulty in their timing. They do not operate until the damage is done. If, for example, a World Court could have enforced its judgment on Mussolini when he

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was at the height of his career, Ethiopia, Greece and the Italian people too might have been saved many tragic years. But to drag him now from Germany, or from some neutral nation which is too weak to enforce its right to grant asylum, would have little deterrent value and would add nothing to a United Nations' triumph. To judge the Axis leaders after they are defeated and impotent would but serve as the unforgettable culmination of a policy derisively described as "too little and too late." Peace will be assured, if at all, by creating some international organization possessed with power to assure it. Its coming will not be facilitated by any attempt to usurp the function of the Lord in the matter of vengeance.

We must reconcile ourselves to the fact that the Axis leaders can never be *appropriately* punished because man's capacity for deviltry too far exceeds his capacity to absorb punishment. One man may destroy millions of lives over a series of years, but he can be made to die but a single death. On this earth there is no way to "make the punishment fit the crime", even for those who break the peace of the world. Efforts to find it must always end in confusion, frustration or remorse.

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN POLITICS *

ALTHOUGH the Indian National Congress has been the backbone of Indian nationalism and the greatest opponent of British imperialism, it has been supported by many Englishmen. Founded in 1885 by an Englishman, Allan O. Hume, an ex-official in the Indian civil service, in coöperation with a group of English-educated Indian leaders, its president in 1904 and 1910 was an Englishman. In 1917, an exceptionally gifted English woman, Annie Besant, served as president, and among its stanchest advocates has been an extraordinarily able English missionary, C. F. Andrews. While Hindus naturally compose the majority of its membership, it is open to all, and includes Moslems, Sikhs, Christians and Parsis regardless of caste or creed. Its present president is a distinguished Mohammedan, Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad. The prestige of the Congress has been enhanced by a long line of outstanding leaders including Dadabhai Naoroji, Sir P. M. Mehta, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Sir Surendranath Banerjea, and more recently Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and Jawaharlal Nehru.

The party was originally planned as a " loyal opposition " to the government, but soon became the organized expression of the aims and will of the Indian people.[1] Its nationalistic trend was accelerated by (1) the British attempt to keep the lucrative Indian civil service as their special preserve by imposing conditions of entry which were impossible for Indians to attain, (2) the unpopular Afghan War of 1878-79, (3) the 1878 Indian Arms Act (a result of the 1857 Sepoy Mutiny) which deprived all Indians (but not Europeans living in India) of

* The views expressed herein are those of the writer and do not reflect those of the Navy Department or the Naval Service at large.

[1] *Report of the Indian Statutory Commission* (Calcutta, 1930), vol. I, p. 248; Gunther, John, *Inside Asia* (New York, 1939), p. 426; Smith, William R., *Nationalism and Reform in India* (New Haven, 1938), pp. 42-61.

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the right to have arms in their possession, and (4) the Vernacular Press Act which effectively gagged Indian newspapers. The terrible famines of 1896, 1899 and 1900, and Lord Curzon's unfortunate attempt to partition Bengal in 1905, created more disaffected elements and made the movement truly nationalistic.[2]

India contains approximately 389 million people, three quarters of whom work on the land. Some 90 million live in the Indian States under the jurisdiction of 562 native princes, only about ten of whom are of real importance. The balance of the population resides in the eleven provinces of British India. Hindus number about 264 millions, Moslems 85 millions, and the remainder belong to such groups as Christians, Sikhs, Jains and Parsis.[3] Naturally many political organizations speak for the varied groups but the Congress is the strongest and most representative. Growing from an original attendance of only seventy-two, it now holds annual meetings of more than 6,000 delegates from every province in India. While it has three and a half million dues-paying members plus about the same number who cannot pay but act unofficially as party workers, its influence is far greater than its membership suggests.[4] It probably speaks for the majority of Hindus, but Orthodox Hindus are represented by the Hindu Mahasabha, the Moderates by the Non-Party Conference, and Dr. Ambedkar speaks for at least some of the fifty-three millions of the depressed classes.

The Moslems, most of whom are descendants of converted Hindus, also have several parties, the most vocal being the All India Moslem League under the leadership of Mohammed Ali

[2] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 42; Shridharani, Krishnalal, *Warning to the West* (New York, 1942), p. 222; Mitchell, Kate L., *India Without Fable* (New York, 1942), p. 129.

[3] According to the 1931 census, there were 352,837,778 people, 289,491,241 living in British India and 63,346,537 in the Indian States. *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1943 (New York, 1943), pp. 113-114. Nehru, Jawaharlal, "Can Indians Get Together?", *New York Times*, July 19, 1942. *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 83. Dutt, R. Palme, *India To-day* (London, 1940), p. 27.

[4] Duffett, W. E., Hicks, A. R., and Parkin, G. R., *India Today* (Toronto, 1941), p. 56; Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 43.

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Jinnah. It was founded in 1905 to resist Hindu political domination but coöperated with the Congress in the nationalist movement until 1921 and then was inactive for a little over ten years. In 1937, the Congress asserted that its own paid-up membership of some 300,000 Moslems exceeded that of the League itself. Today, while its claim to represent most of the 85 million Moslems is absurd, the League has greatly increased its influence and probably controls the government of several provinces including Bengal. But many of the Moslem priests belonging to the Jamaiat-ul-Ulema, the 40 million peasants and workers of the All-India Momin Conference, the Ahrars, a tenant-farmer organization in the Punjab, the Azad Independent Party in Sind, the Krishak Praja peasant party in Bengal, and millions of Moslems of the Shiah sect have repudiated the present League advocacy of a separate Moslem State of Pakistan and support the Congress demand for unity.[5]

Early British Rule

In 1858 when control over the government of India was transferred from the East India Company to the British Crown, it was vested in a Secretary of State for India. He was advised by a council but, as a member of the British Cabinet, he was responsible to Parliament. Since there was no popular check in India on the actions of the government in India, the Secretary theoretically could give orders to the Governor-General (the Viceroy) and was superior in authority to him. In practice, the latter often regarded the Secretary of State merely as a convenient mouthpiece for his policy in England. As the direct representative of the Crown, he ruled autocratically with the aid of his own executive council whose decisions he could overrule. The government of each of the provinces was likewise carried on by a governor assisted by a similar

[5] Pakistan is said to have been derived from the initial letters of the states of which it was to be composed: Punjab, Afghanistan (i.e., North-West Frontier Province), Kashmir and Sind. Mattusch, Kurt R., "The American Public and India", *Amerasia*, Oct. 25, 1942, p. 404. Singh, Anup, "Britain's Last Chance in India", *Harper's Magazine*, September 1941. Schuster, Sir George E., and Wint, Guy, *India & Democracy* (London, 1941), p. 178. Duffett, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 55.

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council, but these provincial governments had only delegated powers, were merely agents of the central government, and had to obey the orders of the Governor-General in Council. Concentration of authority at the center was the keynote of the Government of India.

The central and provincial executive councils exercised not only administrative but also legislative functions. Official and non-official members (whose numbers had been gradually increased) were appointed for the express purpose of passing new laws, subject to the assent of the Governor-General or the governor. This was the beginning of the Indian legislatures, but there was nothing like responsible government.[6]

The Morley-Minto Reforms

To enlist and strengthen support of British rule, the Morley-Minto Constitutional Reforms of 1909 were inaugurated. Although they were the first great advance in the history of Indian administration, they did not satisfy the longing of the Indians for a greater measure of self-government. They merely enlarged these "legislative" councils and extended their functions by authorizing them to adopt resolutions on matters of administrative and financial policy. In order to make them more responsive to Indian opinion, they increased the proportion of Indians therein, and majorities of non-officials were created in the provincial councils. The distribution of seats, however, was always so arranged as to assure a majority in the government.[7]

As the Governor-General in Council remained the supreme authority in which was concentrated responsibility for every act of civil as well as military government in British India, the reforms were but a short step toward democracy. At the instance of the Moslems, under the guidance of Aga Khan, the reforms introduced communal electorates so that in each community, Hindus, Moslems, Sikhs, etc., elected their own members in separate constituencies. Since this tended to perpetuate

[6] Pardasani, N. S., *How India Is Governed* (Bombay, 1942), pp. 11, 14, 16. *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, pp. 115-116. Schuster and Wint, *op cit.*, p. 72.

[7] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 117.

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the feeling of separation and to encourage the bigoted element of each group, the system was bitterly criticized by the Hindus when it was first put into action.[8]

India in World War I

The reunion of Bengal in 1911 failed miserably in quieting the popular demand for self-government, but when World War I came in 1914, India remained loyal to the British Empire. She sent 1,336,620 troops (178,000 more than were contributed jointly by Canada, South Africa, Australia and New Zealand) to the various fronts, and contributed $500,000,000 outright to the Allied war machine. Besides serving as an important source of food and raw materials, India shipped $1,250,000,000 worth of finished products to the Allies, and Indian factories became important arsenals.[9] Even Gandhi took part in the war effort and recruited men for the army.

In 1916 at Lucknow the Congress and the Moslem League jointly proposed a new plan of government The goal was dominion home rule. Four fifths of the various provincial legislatures were to be directly elected as well as a similar proportion of the elected members of the central legislature; and half of the members of the provincial executive councils were to be chosen by the elected members of the legislatures. This was designed to enable the Indians to control legislation and influence administration, but they were not to have the power to compel the resignation of officials or to interfere in the military affairs or political relations of India. An interesting point was that the Hindus reversed their hostile attitude toward communal electorates in order to present a united front to the British, and had agreed upon the allocation of seats in the central legislature and most of the provincial legislative councils. The plan was then considered unsound and was rejected by the British because the legislature and the executive would have derived their powers from, and would have been

[8] *Ibid.*, p. 118.

[9] Shridharani, Krishnalal, *My India, My America* (New York, 1941), p. 531. Nehru, Jawaharlal, "India's Demand and England's Answer", *Atlantic Monthly*, April 1940, p. 450. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, pp. 145-146.

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responsible to, different authorities, the former to the people of India and the latter to the Secretary of State and Parliament.

India was tremendously impressed by the declaration of the Allied and Associated Powers in favor of the principle of self-determination, and subsequently enjoyed the satisfaction of becoming the only non-self-governing member state of the League of Nations. But the Government of India still relied on repression—martial law in the Punjab, the famous "crawling" order under which Indians, passing through a street in which a disturbance had occurred, had to go on all fours, and the 1919 Rowlatt Act. The last-named measure made it possible to imprison a person, without an open trial, on evidence given by the police, and took away the privileges of free speech, free press and free assembly for three years. It was agitation against this legislation that led to the Amritsar massacre, when an open-air protest meeting of unarmed men and women, held in defiance of the law, was fired upon by order of General Dyer and several hundred were killed.[11]

The Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms

Out of repression and discontent was born Gandhi's non-violent, non-coöperation movement which quickly became involved with the government's next move to appease the Indian people—the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms. These reforms had been initiated in 1917 by Lord Montagu, then Secretary of State for India, who stated that the policy of His Majesty's Government was that "of the increasing association of Indians in every branch of the administration and the gradual development of self-governing institutions with a view to the progressive realization of responsible government in India as an integral part of the British Empire."[12] Such a policy was formulated in the 1919 Government of India Act, but it was not put into operation until February 1921. Representing a trend toward federalism, the Montagu-Chelmsford proposals distin-

[10] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 84.

[11] Nehru, "India's Demand and England's Answer", p. 450. Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 159.

[12] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 2.

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guished between central and provincial subjects in an effort to restrict the authority of the central government of India (which was *entirely under British control,* free from legislative interference) to intervene in the provincial field. The central government was given complete jurisdiction in all of India over such broad fields as foreign and Indian state relations, military and naval affairs, railways, waterways, coinage, banking and currency, commerce, shipping and navigation, the public debt, immigration and emigration, customs and excise duties on cotton, income and salt taxes; but in the narrower fields left to the provinces, a new principle of dyarchy was applied. "Reserved subjects" of vital importance, such as the police, administration of justice, and land revenues, were entrusted to the British governor and his executive council who were responsible only to the British Governor-General and the Secretary of State. On the other hand, "transferred subjects" of minor importance, such as public health, education, agriculture and local self-government, were put in charge of ministers, presumably Indian, who were appointed by the governor from among the elected members of the provincial legislative council and were responsible to it. The provincial governor, however, could veto legislation, and the provincial governments were still under the supervision, direction and control of the Governor-General in Council, and no act of a provincial legislature was valid without his approval. Although in relation to "transferred" subjects, the Governor-General's powers were supposed to be exercised only in "emergencies", he could take over their administration to (1) safeguard the administration of central subjects, (2) decide questions between provinces, (3) enforce the provisions of the Government of India Act in reference to contracts and liabilities, and the civil service in India. So also could the Secretary of State and Parliament who enjoyed the additional right, when necessary, to interfere to (4) safeguard imperial interests, or (5) determine the position of the Government of India regarding questions between India and other parts of the British Empire. In crises, not only could the governor of a province assume temporary administration of a transferred subject, but the Governor-General in

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Council could revoke or suspend the transfer of any subject in the province. Finally, at the end of ten years, a royal commission was to determine to what extent it was desirable to establish the principle of responsible government, or to extend, modify or restrict the degree of responsible government already in existence.[13] Hemmed in with such safeguards, Indian self-government, even in the provinces, was more illusion than fact.

In September 1920 at Calcutta, a special session of the Congress had approved the principle of non-coöperation and made specific recommendations regarding its application which had also been adopted by the Moslem League.[14] Yet in 1921, when the Satyagraha movement was at its height, Gandhi had declared that, if the Government of India would actively prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors and drugs and promote home spinning and weaving in the villages, he would find in this a basis of coöperation. Conditions, however, were such that if the revenue from drink and drugs had been wiped out, education would have suffered, since there was then no way of replacing that revenue. Furthermore, all real power was in British hands and imperial prestige would not allow anything that might be regarded as weakness;[15] so Gandhi's offer was ignored, and the non-coöperation movement was not relaxed until March 1922.[16]

The difficulties of the situation were recognized when the British Labor Government in 1924 authorized Lord Reading to name a committee "to investigate the feasibility and desirability of securing remedies consistent with the structure, policies and purposes of the Act." The Muddiman Reforms Inquiry Committee, so appointed and composed of three British and six Indian members, noted the financial handicaps imposed upon the provincial governments, the communal friction between Hindus and Moslems, the illiteracy of the electorate,

[13] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, pp. 124-131, 142-150; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-113.

[14] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 248. *Indian National Congress, 1920-1923* (Allahabad, 1924), p. 6.

[15] Andrews, C. F., *India and the Simon Report* (London, 1930), p. 67.

[16] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 249.

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and the lack of linguistic unity in some of the provinces, but its recommendations failed to influence favorably Indian public opinion, and the minority report of four Indian members suggested scrapping, not repairing, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms.[17]

The Congress had voted to boycott the first elections held in November-December 1920, and, as a result, the elective seats in the various legislative bodies were filled by Moderates and Independents. The reforms worked so smoothly that, during the period of the First Legislative Assembly, (1) the Press and Rowlatt Acts were repealed, (2) many of the racial discriminations in the administration of the criminal law were removed, (3) Indianization of the civil services and the Army was begun, (4) a tariff commission was created and protective duties on steel were imposed, and (5) a retrenchment program in public expenditures was adopted, together with a policy intended to bring about complete nationalization of the railways. Consequently, in 1923, the Congress modified its stand by authorizing each Congressman to decide for himself whether he would take part in the elections; and in the Second Legislative Assembly of 1924, out of a membership of 145, there were 40 nominated members, 45 Swarajists (Congress people) and 60 Independents.[18] Nevertheless, no political party of any standing in India was willing to accept the existing limitations on self-government. A resolution was therefore adopted, requesting the establishment of dominion home rule with full responsible government in the provinces along with Motilal Nehru's amendment calling for a round table conference to prepare the draft of a new constitution for India. This request was ignored.[19]

The Simon Commission

Under Gandhi's leadership, the masses were awakening and a new India was seeking self-expression. Realizing the nature of the unrest, on November 26, 1927 (two years ahead

[17] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 372.

[18] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 254; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 119-127.

[19] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

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of the time provided for in the 1919 Government of India Act, which was amended for this purpose) the British government appointed the Simon All British Statutory Commission to advise Parliament as to what the future constitution of India should be, and to what extent it was desirable to establish the principle of responsible government.[20] This was faulty psychology because, while there was no objection to Sir John Simon as chairman, it was insulting to intimate that no Indian could be found for membership on the commission whom the Indians themselves would trust.[21] As a result, the Congress late in 1927 voted to boycott the commission and at the same time proclaimed independence as the goal of the Indian people. A body called the All-Parties Conference, composed mainly of members of the central legislature, started work on a constitution at Delhi in February 1928, but its report was based on the theory that India was to remain in the empire as a self-governing dominion.[22] It contained a bill of rights, described the machinery of government, proposed the creation of a supreme court, suggested the redistribution of the provinces on a linguistic basis, and discussed relations between the dominion and the Indian States. Opposition to this report soon developed among those who advocated complete independence, and among Moslems who objected to the electoral provisions. A compromise was finally reached to the effect that a declaration of independence would be issued, if dominion status was not granted by the end of 1929; but when Parliament ignored this ultimatum, the entire report was scrapped.[23]

Sir John Simon, three days after his arrival in India, tried to correct the original blunder in the personnel of his commission by suggesting a method of procedure by joint free con-

[20] *International Conciliation*, #258, p. 130, Royal Proclamation Appointing the Members of the Statutory Commission.

[21] Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 32.

[22] All-Parties Conference, *Report of the Committee Appointed by the Conference to Determine the Principles of the Constitution for India*, published by the General Secretary of All India Congress Committee (Allahabad, 1928).

[23] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. 8; Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 373-374; Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 180.

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ference, in which Indians appointed by the central and provincial legislatures would collaborate on equal and honorable terms.[24] When the Legislative Assembly refused to coöperate, the Viceroy appointed a central committee, and finally all the local legislatures, except that of the United Provinces, did collaborate.[25]

The Simon Report was not published until June 1930 although its recommendations had been approved on October 25, 1929.[26] It was universally condemned in India, because it made no mention of dominion status as the goal to be attained. To clear up the situation, on October 31, 1929, Lord Irwin (now Lord Halifax) said in India: "I am authorized on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state clearly that in their judgment it is implicit in the declaration of 1917 [by Lord Montagu] that the natural issue of India's constitutional progress, as there contemplated, is the attainment of Dominion Status."[27] And two years earlier Prime Minister Stanley Baldwin had stated: "*In the fulness of time* we look forward to seeing her [India] in equal partnership with the Dominions."[28] While such statements were considered valueless by Indian leaders because no definite time limit was indicated, Winston Churchill thought they had "prejudiced and destroyed the whole vast work of the Commission."

Because the Commission believed in the principle of unitary cabinet responsibility, it criticized dyarchy and advocated complete provincial autonomy, the transfer of *all* subjects in the provinces, with the provincial executive being responsible to the provincial legislature. Indians considered this a great advance, but conservative elements in England saw no reason why all provincial administrative departments should be turned over to Indians to satisfy the Commission's predilection for unity.

[24] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, pp. xvii-xix; *Int. Conciliation*, #258, p. 185, letter of Sir John Simon to Viceroy, Feb. 6, 1928.

[25] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 378.

[26] *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. I, p. i.

[27] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 181; London *Times*, Nov. 1, 1929, p. 16.

[28] London *Times*, Nov. 5, 1929, p. 16, cited this earlier quotation, along with several others.

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On the other hand, the Commission also assumed that dyarchy was bad for the central government and that here *no* subjects should be transferred, with the central executive being responsible only to the Secretary of State and Parliament. Although not approving dyarchy, Indian leaders failed to comprehend why they should be excluded from a responsible share in the central administration because they were thought not to be prepared to assume full control over one or two subjects, and objected to the central government remaining autocratic and as irresponsible as ever.[29]

The evils of communal electorates were admitted, but their retention in the provinces where the Moslems were in a minority was advocated until such time as a two-thirds majority of the Moslem members of such legislatures agreed to their abolition, and the allocation of seats was based on the provisions of the 1916 Lucknow Pact which had given the Moslems weighted representation. Among the proposals were the extension of the franchise with an educational qualification as an alternative to a property test, the entrance of women into the political life of the country, and the separation of Burma from India.[30]

Despite many sound suggestions, the Simon Commission was not a real success because it failed to understand the Indian mind. It acknowledged the unifying power of the national movement but did not comprehend the significance of Gandhi, dismissing him as an administrative incident! It did realize, however, the mischief of the arbitrary rule of the Indian princes and suggested that it was impossible to consider the constitutional problems of India without taking into account the relations between British India and the Indian States.[31] This was the origin of the Round Table Conference.

India's Declaration of Independence

Dominion status not having been granted by the end of 1929, as demanded in the report of the All-Parties Conference, at

[29] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 387.

[30] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 392; *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. II, p. 188.

[31] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 379; *Report of Ind. Stat. Comm.*, vol. II, pp. 194-205.

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midnight of December 31, the Congress issued its declaration of independence, in part as follows:

> We believe that it is the inalienable right of the Indian people as of any other people to have freedom and to enjoy the fruits of their toil and have the necessities of life so that they may have full opportunities of growth. We believe also that if any government deprives a people of these rights and oppresses them the people have a further right to alter it or abolish it. The British Government in India has not only deprived the Indian people of their freedom, but has ruined India economically, politically, culturally, and spiritually. We believe therefore that India must sever the British connection and obtain Purna Swaraj or Complete Independence.[32]

Said Churchill: "Sooner or later you will have to crush Gandhi, the Indian Congress, and all they stand for." [33]

The Congress also voted against participation in the Round Table Conference because the British government undertook to select India's "representatives", and authorized Gandhi to inaugurate a campaign of non-violent civil disobedience. He did so on April 6, 1930, writing beforehand to the Viceroy:

> British rule is a curse because it has impoverished the dumb millions by a system of progressive exploitation and by the ruinous expensive military and civil administration which the country can never afford. It has reduced us politically to serfdom. It has sapped the foundations of our culture and by the policy of disarmament, it has degraded us spiritually. Lacking inward strength we have been reduced by all but universal disarmament to a state bordering on cowardly helplessness.[34]

Then came the famous salt march to the sea, and Gandhi's subsequent imprisonment along with thousands of his supporters.

Later, in 1931, the Congress passed the Karachi Resolution of Fundamental Rights and Duties guaranteeing to all citizens absolute freedom of religion as well as freedom of speech,

[32] *India To-Day*, Bulletin of India League of America, vol. 4, No. 10, January 1944.

[33] London *Times*, Dec. 12, 1930, p. 16; March 19, 1931, p. 9.

[34] Andrews, *op. cit.*, p. 177; Pardasani, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

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assembly, press, and equality of all citizens before the law, regardless of religion, caste or sex, and also guaranteeing state ownership or control of national industries.[35]

The Round Table Conference

Between November 1930 and December 1933 the Round Table Conference held three sessions; its report was published November 21, 1934 and its work translated into the 1935 Government of India Act, under which the provinces are being governed today.[36] A letter was sent to the Viceroy saying that the Indians understood the conference was to meet, not to discuss *when* dominion status was to be established, but to frame a dominion constitution for India. Lord Irwin corrected this impression, and the conference was informed by His Majesty's Government of its desire to "convert the present system of Government of India into a responsibly governed Federation of States and Provinces, on the understanding that the responsible Government so established must during the period of transition be qualified by limitations in certain directions."[37] To conciliate the Indians, it was agreed that the Simon Report would not be the *basis* of discussion; Lord Irwin was authorized to repeat his assurance on dominion status; and the Government of India wrote that while the central executive referred to in the Report would not be responsible to the legislature, it would "include an appreciable popular element consisting of the elected members of the Legislature," and this implied "a form of dualism within the Government."[38] Gandhi, Motilal Nehru and Jawarharlal Nehru refused to participate when the Viceroy rejected their demand for a guarantee (1) that the sole object of the conference was the framing of a dominion constitution, (2) that the *right of secession* from the British Empire be recognized, (3) that defense forces be placed completely under Indian control, and (4) that all British claims

[35] Gunther, Frances, "If India Loses, We Lose", *Common Sense*, vol. XI, No. 10, October 1942.

[36] *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1943, p. 107.

[37] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 382; London *Times*, Nov. 4, 1929, p. 11.

[38] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 400; Cmd. 3700.

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and concessions in India, including the public debt, which seemed "unjust" be submitted to arbitration.[39]

At the conclusion of the first session came the Irwin-Gandhi Agreement of March 4, 1931, under which certain minor concessions were made and Indian political prisoners were released. Civil disobedience was called off, and Gandhi came to London as the sole representative of the Congress.[40] It was at this time that Winston Churchill made statements which India never forgave nor forgot:

> It is alarming and nauseating to see Mr. Gandhi, a seditious Middle Temple lawyer, striding half naked up the steps of the Vice-Regal Palace to parley on equal terms with the representative of the King-Emperor.[41]
>
> I am against these conversations and agreements between Lord Irwin and Mr. Gandhi. . . . The truth is that Gandhism and all it stands for will sooner or later have to be grappled with and finally crushed. It is no use trying to satisfy a tiger by feeding him cat's meat. . . . The well meaning and high minded Viceroy has had to couple with his kindly speeches and sentiments a succession of repressive measures and restrictions of civil liberty without precedent in India since the mutiny—except in some days of the great war.[42]

During the discussions, the Hindu depressed classes, as well as the Moslems, demanded separate communal electorates, the latter insisting on weighted representation in the central legislature, in the provinces where they were a minority, and majorities in Bengal and the Punjab. Gandhi agreed to most of the Moslem demands on condition that they vote against giving separate representation to other minority groups, but the Moslems rejected this proposition. The Prime Minister then declared that if no agreement was reached on the communal problem, the government would make a provisional settlement; and

[39] Smith, *op. cit.*, p. 401.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 404.

[41] Shridharani, *My India, My America*, p. 369; *India To-Day*, vol. 3, No. 6, September 1942.

[42] London *Times*, Dec. 12, 1930, p. 16; March 19, 1931, p. 9; *India Today*, vol. 1, No. 11, February 1941.

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it did so on August 16, 1932, in respect of the provincial legislatures only. This was modified, however, by the Poona Pact of September 25 between the two sections of the Hindu community, under which the depressed classes gave up their separate electorates but were allotted more than double the number of seats originally reserved for them. The award was received unfavorably in India, since it extended separate electorates to new fields and made them more or less a permanent part of the Constitution. The Congress reverted to its policy of noncoöperation which continued until 1934, and stayed away from the third and final session of the Round Table Conference.[43]

The 1935 Constitution Act

The government's *Proposals for Indian Constitutional Reform* (which came as a result of the Round Table Conferences) were embodied in the Constitution Act of 1935.[44] This reduced India's territorial limits by excluding Burma and created a federation composed of (1) the eleven provinces which had *no right to secede* and (2) the Indian States which were to be admitted on a voluntary basis and allowed to withdraw if the fundamental character of the federation was ever changed. Their rulers could indicate what matters they would regard as federal in character so that the powers of the federation might vary from one state to another, but the government could refuse the accession of any state if it was sought on terms incompatible with the scheme of federation.

The provinces were autonomous, deriving their powers from the Crown rather than from the central government; they possessed a definite and exclusive field of governmental activity, but the provincial governors appointed by the British government in England had an absolute veto power. All the rights of the Crown in British India were divided between the provinces and the federation. Powers were designated as provincial, federal, and concurrent, and, in case of conflict in the last field, the central legislature was to prevail unless a more

[43] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 410-416; Bose, S. M., *The Working Constitution in India* (Bombay, London, etc., 1940), p. 2.

[44] Smith, *op. cit.*, pp. 420-449; Bose, *op. cit.*; 26 George 5, c. 2.

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recent provincial law, having been reserved for their consideration, had received the assent of the Governor-General or His Majesty.

The central executive was a dyarchy. The Governor-General, whose powers as a viceroy were to continue as to non-acceding states, was advised by a council of ministers, but he was responsible only to His Majesty's Government and Parliament for the exercise of his authority relating to the three reserved powers of defense (which allowed him to send troops outside India without legislative approval), foreign relations and ecclesiastical affairs. In all other fields of federal activity, the principle of responsible government was supposed to prevail, but in regard to *all* transferred subjects, the Governor-General (similarly, the governors in the provinces) had the special responsibility of (1) preventing any grave menace to the peace or tranquillity of India or any part thereof (a very broad and vague provision which would permit him to kill any bill he chose and thus extend his powers into the legislative as well as the executive field), (2) safeguarding the financial stability and credit of the federation, (3) safeguarding the legitimate interests of minorities (which would probably cover political as well as legal rights), (4) securing of rights to members of the public services, (5) preventing legislative discrimination against certain Burmese and British interests (Britain's five billion dollar investment in India being about one fourth of her foreign investments), (6) preventing actions which would subject goods imported from the United Kingdom or Burma to discriminatory or penal treatment, (7) protecting the rights of any Indian state and the rights and dignity of its ruler, and (8) making certain that the discharge of his functions in matters in which he acts in his discretion is not impeded by any course of action taken in regard to any other matter, and the Governor-General's own decision on this was *final*. Furthermore, in any situation in which the government of the federation could not be carried on, the Governor-General was authorized to proclaim that certain functions would be exercised by him in his discretion, or to assume all the powers vested in any federal body or authority. These proclamations were to be

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valid only for six months but could be renewed up to three years, after which time the government would presumably have to yield to any obstructive tactics which lasted that long. Because the incorporation of a bill of rights into the Constitution had been refused, it seemed that less emphasis had been placed on the powers transferred to the people of India than on safeguards; and these latter revolved around the person of the Governor-General, but the British even safeguarded themselves against a liberal Governor-General by providing that His Majesty could within twelve months disallow an act assented to by the Governor-General which would become void on the day of the official publication of the notification of disallowance.

The federal legislature was to be composed of two chambers, the upper, known as the Council of State, and the lower as the Federal Assembly to which would come the *elected* representatives of British India, and those of the states *appointed* by the rulers, and a few members appointed by the Governor-General. Caste Hindus were underrepresented in the Federal Assembly because, although they comprised 60 per cent of the population, they were to elect only 34.4 per cent of British Indian members, and less than 23 per cent of the total membership. Thus the Congress would in all likelihood remain in a minority as long as democratic representation from the Indian States was blocked by the conservative princes. But the legislature was forbidden to discuss the conduct of any judge of a high or federal court in the discharge of his duties, any matter connected with an Indian state unless in the opinion of the Governor-General it affected federal interests or a British subject and he consents, or *any* action the Governor-General takes in his discretion in relation to the affairs of a province, or the conduct of a ruler of an Indian state. The sanction of the Governor-General was even needed before any bill could be introduced which (1) was repugnant to an Act of Parliament extended to British India or to an act of the Governor-General or a governor promulgated in his discretion, (2) affected matters on which the Governor-General was to act in his discretion, (3) repealed or amended an act regarding the police force,

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(4) affected the procedure of criminal proceedings concerning European British subjects, or the grant of relief from federal taxation on incomes taxed in the United Kingdom, or coinage or currency of the federation. The Governor-General could withhold his assent from any bill or return it for reconsideration.

Most of the expenditures charged against revenues were fixed in the Constitution and non-votable, but, as to others, the Governor-General had the power to restore a demand refused or reduced, if it affected the discharge of his special responsibilities. He could make such ordinances as the circumstances seemed to require when the legislature was not in session and could exercise full legislative powers at any time in case of an emergency.

On January 29, 1935, Churchill said of the bill in Parliament: "If it was as luminous as it is voluminous, it would indeed command respect . . . It is a gigantic quilt of jumbled crochet work. There is no theme; there is no pattern; there is no agreement; there is no conviction; there is no simplicity; there is no courage. It is a monstrous monument of shame built by the pygmies." [45] And Nehru called it a "charter of slavery".[46]

The federal part of the Constitution never came into force because the princes who had proposed union lost their enthusiasm for it when they became dissatisfied with the financial arrangements. Therefore the central government of India continues to be controlled by the provisions relating to the transitional period,[47] but, speaking at Delhi on September 1, 1936, about provincial autonomy which was to become effective the following April, the Viceroy, Lord Linlithgow, said:

> There is about to be initiated in this country an experiment in representative self-government which for breadth of conception and boldness of design is without parallel in history; these the circumstances in which the British people and Parliament have seen fit to offer to India a constitution which by its liberal prin-

[45] London *Times*, Jan. 30, 1935, p. 14.

[46] *India To-Day*, vol. I, No. 10, January 1941.

[47] *Statesman's Year-Book*, 1943, p. 109.

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> ciples stands in such impressive contrast to those political tendencies which are evident over wide areas of the world . . . they [constitutional changes] involve nothing less than the discarding of the old ideas of imperialism for new ideals of partnership and cooperation.

Fortunately he tempered his enthusiasm by adding: "For such time as I may hold my present office it is my intention to interpret my duty with a liberal and sympathetic mind." [48]

The Congress refused to try to work the new Constitution, but when the British authorities gave assurance that the governors of the provinces would not use their veto power on measures passed by majorities of the legislatures, the Congress in 1937 entered into the government of the provinces, gained control of eight out of eleven, and participated in coalition governments in the other three. It won 711 out of a total number of 1,585 seats, the rest being divided among fifteen other groups including the Moslem League. The Moslems were entitled to 482 of these 1,585 seats but the League won only 108, less than one fourth of the Moslem electorate and less than one fifteenth of the total Indian electorate. It did not get a majority in a single province, not even in the predominantly Moslem northern provinces of North West Frontier (95 per cent Moslem), Sind, Punjab and Bengal, the first two of which elected Congress governments and the latter two, coalition ministries.[49]

Congress Foreign Policy

The Congress had consistently cultivated its foreign relations, denounced Japanese aggression in China, supported Abyssinia against Italy, advocated the cause of Spanish democracy, taken the side of the Czechs at Munich, and had made it abundantly clear that it disapproved of both Fascism and Nazism.[50] However, when the British government, through the Viceroy, on September 3, 1939, declared India a belligerent

[48] *Int. Conciliation*, #324, pp. 537, 539, Viceroy's speech to Indian Legislature.

[49] Mitchell, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

[50] Nehru, Jawaharlal, "India's Day of Reckoning", *Fortune*, April 1942, p. 67c.

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immediately upon the outbreak of World War II without consulting either the Indian Legislative Assembly or Indian political leaders, and sent Indian troops abroad without any reference to the central or provincial assemblies, the Congress disassociated itself from British foreign policy.[51] On September 14 a statement was issued by the Congress leaders that if the war was to defend the status quo, imperialist possessions, colonies, vested interests and privileges, then India would have nothing to do with it; but if the issue was democracy and a world order based thereon, then India was extremely interested, provided democracy functioned in India also. The British government was invited to declare its war aims in regard to democracy, imperialism and the new order that was envisaged, and in particular to state how these war aims were going to apply to India and be made effective in the present. This invitation was accompanied by the demand that Britain recognize the right of the Indian people to frame their own constitution through a constituent assembly without external influence and to guide their own policy, since a free and democratic India would gladly associate herself with other free nations for mutual defense against aggression and for economic coöperation.[52]

The British government refused to define its war or peace aims and on October 17 the Viceroy said:

> The intention and anxiety of His Majesty's Government is . . . that the partnership between India and the United Kingdom within our empire may be furthered to the end that India may attain its due place among our Dominions . . . [and] *at the end of the war* [His Majesty's Government] will be very willing to enter into consultation with representatives of the several communities, parties and interests in India and with the Indian princes with a view to securing their aid and cooperation in the framing of such modification as may seem desirable.[53]

Since both the Indian princes and British vested interests were opposed to the idea of Indian freedom, this meant that the

[51] Nehru, "India's Demand and England's Answer", p. 450.

[52] *Ibid.*, p. 451; Nehru, "India's Day of Reckoning", pp. 67C-67D; Duffett, *et al., op. cit.*, p. 80.

[53] Cmd. 6121; London *Times*, Oct. 18, 1939, p. 9.

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final decision about the liquidation of British imperialism was to rest with that imperialism itself. Consequently, in order to dissociate India from the war, to enforce its determination to free India from foreign domination, and to protest against the British refusal to proceed at once with further constitutional reform, the Congress called on the provincial governments to resign. This move many regarded as a mistake because, when eight ministries withdrew, the Constitution was thus suspended, the governors became autocrats, and there was a return to irresponsible government.

Amendment of the Constitution Act

With the increase of Axis power and its threat to world peace, the British government tried to amend the Constitution to concentrate still more power at the center, but this was strenuously resisted.[54] While the Governor-General's proclamation of a state of emergency endangering the security of India gave the central government the right to legislate on matters normally in the provincial list, this did not confer on the executive the authority to deal with them. A bill amending the Constitution was rushed through Parliament in ten minutes empowering the issuance of instructions by the central to the provincial governments as to the exercise of their own executive power, as well as conferring such authority on central government officials themselves. This gave the central government power to rule by decree, to prohibit meetings and to arrest without warrant; it meant the end of provincial autonomy for the duration of the war.[55] Actually, this was not a startling change since eight of the provinces by action of the elected members of their legislatures, at the instigation of the Congress, had just handed over the executive to non-popular government.

After the fall of France, on July 27, 1940, the Congress offered to participate in Britain's war effort and to abandon non-violence in case of external aggression provided a provisional national government representing all parties was im-

[54] Nehru, "India's Demand and England's Answer", p. 450.

[55] *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, vol. 351, p. 151, Sept. 1, 1939; vol. 357, p. 1083, Feb. 15, 1940.

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mediately set up and a definite pledge was made to grant India self-government within a specified time after the war's end. Congress President Azad said: "We are not able to take the grave responsibility of declaring that we completely eschew violence even when we have to deal with internal disorder or external aggression." [56] Gandhi opposed this offer to compromise on the issue of non-violence because of the implication that, if abandoned now, violence might later become the method to be used against Britain herself, but he was overruled. On August 8, the Viceroy replied by inviting a certain number of representative Indians into an enlarged executive council. He reaffirmed dominion status as India's goal and promised after the war a constitution drafted by a body representative of the principal elements in India's national life—again subject to the fulfillment of British obligations to the minorities and the princes.[57] The Congress considered the expansion of the council valueless because Indians would only act in an advisory capacity, and the reference to British obligations as an evasion of the real issue.

On September 17, the previous compromise resolution was rescinded, and Gandhi launched his civil disobedience campaign. This was done because it was felt that if the Congress took no action, it would become extinct as a political party. Gandhi, however, declared that he did not want to strike with full force while the British were engaged in a life and death struggle, since India did not seek its independence out of Britain's ruin; and he called for individual and not mass civil disobedience.[58] The movement was designed merely to challenge the British assertion that India was willingly in the war by having individuals defy the British ban on speeches against it. Nehru was one of the first to be arrested and imprisoned, and by the summer of 1941 some thousands of Congress men and women were in jail, including the present and three past presi-

[56] Singh, "Britain's Last Chance in India", p. 360.

[57] London *Times*, August 9, 1940, p. 4.

[58] *India To-Day*, vol. I, No. 11, February 1941, Text of All-India Congress Committee Resolution; Duffett *et al.*, *op. cit.*, p. 93; Singh, "Britain's Last Chance in India", p. 360.

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dents of the Congress, four former prime ministers of Indian provinces, five speakers of provincial legislatures, eight members of the Congress Working Committee, and over one hundred of the Congress Executive Committee.[59]

Nevertheless on July 22, 1941, there was created a National Defense Council of thirty-one Indians to associate Indian non-official opinion as fully as possible with the prosecution of war, and the Executive Council was expanded to twelve portfolios all of which were in Indian hands, except the four most important—Finance, External Affairs, Defense and Home Affairs. For the first time, there was a non-official majority, but the Council was not responsible to any elected body and the Viceroy retained his veto power. Yet through its influence, about five thousand political prisoners, including Nehru, were subsequently released.[60]

The Atlantic Charter

When President Roosevelt the same month changed the position of the American Consul-General at Calcutta to that of United States Commissioner to India with the rank of Minister, this indicated a change in the status of India, and great hopes were entertained with the proclamation on August 14 of the Atlantic Charter, which was regarded as an assurance that all peoples would be allowed to live their own lives and determine their own form of government. President Roosevelt said: "We are committed to full support of those resolute peoples *everywhere* who are resisting aggression . . . freedom means the supremacy of human rights everywhere. Our support goes to those who struggle to gain these rights and keep them." Statements that the charter provisions applied to all nations and all parts of the world were made by Vice-President Wallace, Secretary of State Hull, and Under-Secretary Welles.[61] But on September 19, in the House of Commons, Prime Minister Churchill said:

[59] *India To-Day*, vol. 2, No. 4, July 1941.

[60] Duffett, *et al.*, *op. cit.*, pp. 96-97; *India To-Day*, vol. 2, No. 5, August 1941.

[61] Secretary Hull's radio address, *New York Times*, July 24, 1942, p. 4; *India To-Day*, vol. 1, No. 10, January 1941; *Congressional Record*, vol. 87, Part 7, p. 7113, Atlantic Charter.

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> The Joint Declaration does not qualify in any way the various statements of policy which have been made from time to time about the development of constitutional government in India, Burma or other parts of the British Empire. . . . At the Atlantic meeting, we had in mind primarily the restoration of the sovereignty, self-government and national life of the States and nations of Europe now under the Nazi yoke and the principles governing any alterations in the territorial boundaries which may have to be made. So that is quite a separate problem from the progressive evolution of self-governing institutions in the regions and peoples which owe allegiance to the British Crown.[62]

Churchill did, however, reiterate Britain's pledge "to help India to obtain a free and equal partnership in the British Commonwealth subject of course to fulfillment of obligations arising from our long connections with India and our responsibilities to its creeds, races, and interests."[63] Remembering his 1931 declaration that he did not contemplate India attaining dominion status in any period which he could foresee,[64] Indians believed that no definite date for dominion status was to be expected and that racial imperialism was still a factor in British policy.

After the fall of Singapore, General Chiang Kai-shek realized that full coöperation of the Indian people would be necessary to check the Japanese in Southeast Asia, and so, after consultation with British and American officials, he went to India, visited the Viceroy, Gandhi, Nehru, Jinnah, and other leaders and publicly stated:

> I hope Britain, without waiting for any demand on the part of the Indian people as speedily as possible will give them real political power so that they will be in a position to develop further their spiritual and material strength and thus realize

[62] *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 1940-1941, vol. 374, p. 69; Das, Taraknath, "The Atlantic Charter and India", *Jewish Frontier*, February 1942; Nehru, "India's Day of Reckoning", p. 67D. *Cf.* speech by Lord Halifax, *New York Times*, Jan. 29, 1944, p. 4.

[63] *Parliamentary Debates*, Commons, 1940-1941, vol. 374, p. 69.

[64] London *Times*, Dec. 4, 1931, p. 14; Singh, Anup, "Storm Over India", *Far Eastern Survey*, March 22, 1943, p. 62.

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that their participation in the war is not merely an aid to the anti-aggression nations for the securing of victory, but also the turning point in their struggle for India's freedom.[65]

The Cripps Mission

This paved the way for the mission of Sir Stafford Cripps who in March 1942 brought to India the conclusions of the British War Cabinet in part as follows:

> His Majesty's Government, having considered the anxieties expressed . . . as to the fulfillment of the promises made in regard to the future of India, have decided to lay down in precise and clear terms the steps which they propose shall be taken for the earliest possible realization of self-government in India.
>
> The object is the creation of a new Indian Union which shall constitute a Dominion, associated with the United Kingdom and the other Dominions by a common allegiance to the Crown, but equal to them in every respect, in no way subordinate in any aspect of its domestic or external affairs.
>
> His Majesty's Government, therefore, made the following declaration:
>
> (a) Immediately upon the cessation of hostilities, steps shall be taken to set up in India . . . an elected body charged with the task of framing a new Constitution for India.
>
> (b) Provision shall be made . . . for participation of the Indian States in the constitution-making body.
>
> (c) His Majesty's Government undertake to accept and implement forthwith the Constitution so framed, subject only to:
>
> (i) the right of any Province of British India . . . to retain its present constitutional position, provision being made for its subsequent accession if it so decides. With such nonacceding Provinces . . . His Majesty's Government will be prepared to agree upon a new Constitution giving them the same full status as Indian Union. . . .
>
> (ii) the signing of a Treaty which . . . will cover all necessary matters arising out of the complete transfer of responsibility from British to Indian hands; it will make provision . . . for the protection of racial and religious

[65] *New York Times*, Feb. 22, 1942, p. 1; Shridharani, *Warning to the West*, p. 143.

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minorities; but will not impose any restriction on the power of the Indian Union to decide in future its relationship to the other Member States of the British Commonwealth.

(d) . . . the entire membership of the Lower Houses of the Provincial Legislatures shall, as a single electoral college, proceed to the election of a constitution-making body by the system of proportional representation. This new body shall be in number about one tenth of the number of the electoral college.

Indian States shall be invited to appoint representatives in the same proportion to their total population as in the case of the representatives of British India as a whole and with the same powers as the British Indian members.

(e) . . . until the new Constitution can be framed His Majesty's Government must inevitably bear the responsibility for and retain control and direction of the defense of India as a part of their world war effort, but the task of organizing to the full the military, moral, and material resources of India must be the responsibility of the Government of India with the cooperation of the peoples of India. His Majesty's Government desire and invite the immediate and effective participation of the leaders of the principal sections of the Indian people in the counsels of their country, of the Commonwealth and of the United Nations. . . .[66]

In explaining this document, Cripps said:

. . . we wanted to make it quite clear . . . that the British Government and the British people desire the Indian peoples to have full self-government, with a constitution as free in every respect as our own in Great Britain, or as of any of the great Dominion members of the British Commonwealth of Nations. . . .

In the past we have waited for the different Indian communities to come to a common decision as to how a new constitution for a self-government of India should be framed. And because there has been no agreement among the Indian leaders the British Government has been accused by some of using this fact to delay the granting of freedom to India. We are now giving the lead that has been asked for, and it is in the hands of the Indians, and the Indians *only,* whether they will accept that

[66] *Int. Conciliation,* #381, pp. 309-310, Draft Declaration for Discussion with Indian Leaders, March 30, 1942; White Paper, Cmd. 6350.

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> lead and so attain their own freedom . . . the Government of India must also have an effective share in the defense councils. And so we have decided that the Commander-in-Chief should retain his position as a member of the executive council.
>
> In order that India will have her voice in this central control of strategy—defensive and offensive . . . we have invited the appointment of a representative Indian to the War Cabinet and to the Pacific Council of the United Nations.
>
> . . . And when it comes to the making of the peace, India will appoint her own representatives to the peace conference, side by side with those of the other free nations, and so make her contribution to the building of a new world order. . . .[67]

Unfortunately the plan had to be accepted or rejected as a whole, and negotiations with the Indian leaders failed. As to the interim period before the establishment of the new constitution, there was no definite proposal. Desiring during that interval a truly national government representing a free India which could mobilize the country for war, the Congress insisted, as the basis of negotiations, that there be a cabinet government with full power, and not merely a continuance of the Viceroy's Executive Council. Azad and Nehru stated categorically that Cripps had said at the outset that he envisaged a national cabinet with the Viceroy as a constitutional head like the King in the United Kingdom, subject only to the reservation on defense. Cripps, however, claimed that he had made it clear at the beginning that it was impossible to make the important constitutional changes which such a cabinet would require. He refused to give the assurance requested that the Viceroy would voluntarily undertake not to exercise his powers of interference and veto, and stated that the Viceroy would function as a prime minister, the only change being the addition of popular representatives to the Viceroy's Executive Council. It has been suggested that Cripps may have given his informal personal assurance with the hope that he could exercise his influence to secure in practice what he could not constitutionally guarantee, but hesitated at a formal assurance

[67] *Int. Conciliation,* #381, pp. 311-315, New Delhi broadcast of March 30, 1942; *New York Times,* March 31, 1942, p. 15.

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about the Viceroy. In his last letter, Cripps wrote that there was no possibility of forming a national government with a cabinet of Indian leaders untrammeled by any control by the Viceroy or the British government, as this would mean the rule of a tyrannical majority, but he admitted in Parliament that he had never once discussed the minority question with Congress leaders![68]

Defense was the main problem, the chief issue being the division of responsibility between the commander-in-chief, then Sir Archibald Wavell, and the Indian Defense Minister in the Viceroy's Executive Council. It seems that a workable understanding for the duration of the war could have been achieved, but past distrust proved too strong. The Congress wanted an Indian minister with effective control over the military, as the only way of arousing India's masses to offer resistance to aggression and because it suspected that at the end of the war Britain would utilize her military control to perpetuate her hold on India.[69] On the other hand, the British probably distrusted the ability of the Indian leaders and were unwilling to arm the masses of India.

As to the proposed constitution itself, the Congress recognized that self-determination for the people of India had been accepted in principle for an uncertain future, but it believed that the accompanying provisions and restrictions were such that real freedom might become an illusion.

To have the ninety million people of the Indian States treated as commodities at the disposal of their rulers seemed entirely undemocratic. Furthermore, the provision for the secession of any unit from the federal union appeared to be a subtle encouragement to the Moslems and princes to tear apart the Indian union. The Hindustan *Standard* wrote: "Under the scheme, there is no longer to be India. India is to break

[68] *Int. Conciliation*, #381, p. 329, April 11, 1942, Letter from Azad to Cripps; April 10, 1942, Letter from Cripps to Azad, p. 327; *India To-Day*, vol. 3, No. 9, December 1942.

[69] *Int. Conciliation*, #381, pp. 333-335, Cripps broadcast, April 11, 1942, and *ibid.*, p. 326; "New Light on the Problem of India", *Amerasia*, August 1943, p. 255.

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into three distinct units, Hindustan, Pakistan and Princestan." The British rejoined that this was not an illustration of the divide and rule principle because any withdrawing province would have all the powers of the Indian union and would be no more subject to British control than the union itself.[70]

Among the underlying reasons for the failure of the Cripps mission was the fact that the proposals had emanated from the distrusted Churchill Cabinet, which included as Secretary of State for India, Mr. Amery who, according to that great moderate leader Sir Tej Bahadur Sapru, had done greater harm to India than any other secretary of state since the mutiny, when the office was created.[71]

On August 8, 1942, as it had already done in 1940, the Congress passed a resolution expressing its anti-fascist sentiments and offering full coöperation in the war through armed force or otherwise, provided there was a national government of the Indian people so that they could have a real share in the defense of their country. If this offer was rejected, Gandhi was authorized to start full mass civil disobedience whenever he thought it advisable.[72] Gandhi appealed to the Viceroy for an interview to explore the possibility of averting a crash, but Mr. Amery called him an "arch-saboteur" and charged the Congress with indirectly aiding the Japanese invaders. While awaiting the Viceroy's answer, Gandhi was suddenly imprisoned by order of the Executive Council concurred in by all its eleven Indian members.[73]

The Government of India had resorted to force to frustrate the civil disobedience movement, and a new era of repression began. Hundreds of Congress leaders were jailed under Rule 26 of the Defense of India Rules. Later the highest judicial tribunal in India, presided over by an Englishman, declared the Rules went beyond the powers conferred upon the central gov-

[70] *Int. Conciliation*, #381, pp. 306-307.

[71] Singh, "Storm Over India", p. 62.

[72] Cmd. 6430, Appendix 3.

[73] Many Indians assert that the Indian members of the Council are mere creatures of the Viceroy and do not represent the people of India.

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ernment, since "there is no power to detain a person because the government thinks that he may do something hereafter or because it thinks that he is a man likely to do it. There must be suspicion based on reasonable grounds that he is actually about to do it." After this decision, the Viceroy issued an ordinance retroactively validating such arrests. This was also held *ultra vires* by the Calcutta High Court on the ground that the Viceroy had no express power to repeal or amend an act of the central India legislature. Nevertheless, when the Indians involved in the particular case were then released, they were immediately rearrested by executive order![74]

On February 10, 1943, Gandhi started his twenty-one day fast in protest against his imprisonment, but the Viceroy successfully risked Gandhi's death and became convinced that there was nothing to fear from the Congress or the masses of the people. He refused to allow anyone to see Gandhi, not even the leader of the Moderates, Chakravarti Rajagopalachari who had opposed civil disobedience.[75] The latter had talked with Jinnah who had held out a prospect of settlement of Hindu-Moslem differences, but this could not be effected without a conference with Gandhi. Thus the British blocked the possibility of that very agreement which they had demanded as a prerequisite to fundamental constitutional changes.

The Divergent Viewpoints

The British have stated that they do not oppose the establishment in India of political freedom as complete as that of other British Dominions *after the war,* but contend that the present is not the time to make great constitutional changes. Gandhi has replied: "This is the psychological moment for the recognition of Indian Independence, for then and only then can there be irresistible opposition to Japanese aggression. It is of immense value to the Allied cause if it is also of equal value to India."

[74] *India To-Day*, vol. 4, No. 5, August 1943; *Amrita Bazar Patrika* (Calcutta), April 23, 1943.

[75] *India To-Day*, vol. 4, No. 1, April 1943.

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The Congress Party has been denounced on the ground that there is little Indian patriotism and that such political unity as exists was really created by Great Britain. The Indian peasants, it is asserted, are not politically conscious, are not interested in democracy and independence but only in improving their own economic situation. They voted for the Congress Party in 1937 because of the religious appeal of Gandhi's name. Although it is a great political organization backed by the money supplied by rich Hindu industrialists, the Congress represents neither the agricultural masses nor India, but only the majority of politically conscious Hindus in British India.[76] In rebuttal, the Congress points to the record and to its program of agrarian reform and argues that the fact that the nationalist movement is supported by industrialists, bankers, workers and peasants is a sign of its genuinely national character, and that it is the League which is the organization of wealthy Moslem landlords and plays upon religious emotion to prevent the Hindu and Moslem peasants recognizing the identity of their interests.

The Congress has been accused of exploiting Britain's peril, of anticipating violence in the wake of civil disobedience and of seeking power for its own sake,[77] but to this Gandhi replied: "I do not want to help the Japanese—not even for freeing India. I want India to oppose Japan to a man." [78] The British insist that the Indians have agitated for totalitarian control and have obstructed reasonable and practical suggestions for solving constitutional problems by gradual stages, but Indians answer that in granting successively greater degrees of self-government, the British have acted only in response to continual pressure, and that Indian self-government is now necessary to arouse the masses into active support of the Allied cause.[79]

[76] Matthews, Herbert L., "India", *New York Times Magazine*, Aug. 8, 1943, p. 12; Lytton, Lord, "United States of India", *Free World*, August 1943, p. 119.

[77] Cmd. 6430.

[78] *Harijan*, May 31, June 14, 1942.

[79] Schuster and Wint, *op. cit.*, p. 80.

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But, say the British, the impressive record of Indian service in the field, supported by great industrial activity in war production, proves that India is already genuinely belligerent both in spiritual hostility to the Axis and in action on many fronts. Spiritual opposition to the Axis is admitted, but the enlisting of only one and a half million troops from a population of four hundred million is considered a poor showing, and the present military production is believed to be far below what it could be with the efforts of a united India behind it.[80]

Upon retiring in July 1943, Lord Linlithgow said, "There is nothing to stop India's leaders from considering and devising an alternative" (to the Cripps plan),[81] but Indian leaders have thought that the relegation to the background of Cripps, who represented a temporizing influence in the British Cabinet, and the appointment of General Wavell as Viceroy were deliberately calculated to impress on India and the rest of the world that Britain was not prepared to modify her present policy and that the deadlock would continue at least for the duration of the war.[82]

Many Indians, however, thought that the rejection of the Cripps proposals was a mistake, and they are anxious for the inauguration of fresh efforts looking toward a government of all parties and religions as a step in the direction of a federal union. They seek mediation by a third Power to induce Britain to grant some measure of real power to India at once. But under the Molotov-Churchill Agreement, Russia has agreed not to interfere with the "internal affairs of the British Empire";[83] although China sympathizes with Indian aspirations, she will not take the initiative, preferring to follow the lead of the United States;[84] and the American "hands off" attitude seems

[80] Stanley, Henry, "India in the Fourth Year of War", *Free World*, August 1943, p. 123; "Destiny of India", *Amerasia*, April 1, 1943, p. 34; Bisson, T. A., "India To-day and India To-morrow", *Amerasia*, November 1940, p. 421.

[81] "India", *Time Magazine*, August 16, 1943.

[82] Stanley, "India in the Fourth Year of War", p. 124; Matthews, "India", p. 16.

[83] *New York Times*, June 11, 1942.

[84] Matthews, Herbert L., "Chungking Despatch", *New York Times*, Dec. 6, 1942, p. 5.

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apparent from the State Department warning to the armed forces in India not to interfere or participate in internal affairs.

When Rajagopalacharia was refused permission to see Gandhi on behalf of Jinnah, the Moslem leader accused the British of trying to keep Moslems and Hindus apart and said: "Why should not the country say 'Unite and drive the British out.' It's no use appealing to other nations of the world."[85] But most Indians do not openly adopt this attitude and seek to coöperate with the British. The important question is whether General Wavell will take steps now to form an Indian government representing the main parties, and will delegate to it that degree of power which both the Congress and the League can approve.[86] If this is done, it may still be possible for the statesmen in the several groups to reach an effective and peaceful solution which will work to the advantage of India, the United Nations and the ideals for which we fight.

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WASHINGTON, D. C.

[85] *Amrita Bazar Patrika*, April 26, 1943; *India To-Day*, vol. 4, No. 2, May 1943.

[86] Nehru, "India's Day of Reckoning", p. 188.

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JOEL BARLOW: TRAFFICKER IN TRADE AND LETTERS

AMERICANS have thought of the generation of the Revolution as essentially involved in a desperate struggle between conservatives and democrats. But when most of the significant figures are placed in the context of their own concerns, they appear, and quite irrespective of their differences of political philosophy, as economic men with the characteristic stamp of the late eighteenth century. Each was a combination of business speculator, land agent, statesman, politician and philosopher. Generally of respectable middle-class origin, they were refined and sophisticated men. They were Americans of course, but no more so than the English were Englishmen and the French were Frenchmen, for all were self-conscious citizens of the western world. They moved with ease in the social and economic life of their respective nations and across national boundaries, for the economy of the world was then cosmopolitan to a degree. Its dominant note was foreign commerce and speculation, and this of necessity made them adept at manipulating—and cross-fertilizing—politics and finance. Often the distinction between these activities became dim; indeed, at times there was none. The shrewdness of a Benjamin Franklin was the shrewdness of this type brought to its supreme development.

Less prominent, but of far more dramatic significance was Joel Barlow (1754-1812), the distinguished American poet of the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary era. The itinerary of his life reads like the pilgrim's progress of the commercial cosmopolite. Born in New England, active in American politics and speculation, busy in economic and imperial ventures in England and France, pursuing commercial opportunities over the whole of Europe, negotiating in Africa, he finally died in Poland on a routine mission of trade and diplomacy.

Barlow received the typical respectable education of the day. Of Connecticut Puritan yeoman stock, he was trained at Yale

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in the customary mixture of Calvinist theology, Lockian philosophy and classical literature. He began life by trying in quick succession, and sometimes jointly, a variety of occupations for which his poverty and versatility were equally responsible.[1] After serving as an army chaplain during the War of Independence, Barlow was lawyer, publisher, printer, storekeeper, and agent for discontented ex-army officers. Throughout his life he wrote the poems which, peculiarly enough, became the foundation of his fame.

Land speculation, the dominant enterprise of the developing country, inevitably attracted him. Lack of capital was no bar, if one were adventurous enough and had the talent of a negotiator and publicist. It was in keeping with his character and the nature of the business that Barlow should presently appear on the administrative board of a company that threatened to maintain its land claims against state authority by force of arms and, if need be, to establish a separate state. All means, apparently, were fair. In 1786 he joined several associates, all recipients of the master of arts degree from Yale College, in writing a series of anonymous satires in the newspapers attacking competitors and critics of his concerns. The objects of the satires were in fact substantial, highly conservative citizens, but they were described as "anarchists" and demagogues, who raised the "DEMOCRACY of *hell!*" and threatened civil war.[2]

These bold ventures, however, brought him little pecuniary success; but a "constructive" epic poem, *The Vision of Columbus,* in 1787 revealed talents that fitted him for a larger rôle in finance and politics. It portrayed the great development and prospects of America as part of God's plan of making "the spirit of commerce" the civilizing agent of the world.

[1] For Barlow's beginnings see Theodore Albert Zunder, *The Early Days of Joel Barlow* (New Haven, 1934).

[2] Robert Morris who was with a competing group of Pennsylvania speculators was included among the "anarchists". *The Anarchiad,* edited by Luther G. Riggs (New Haven, 1861), pp. 69, 77. For the relevant material see Leon Howard, *The Connecticut Wits* (Chicago, 1943), pp. 172-177; Julian P. Boyd, *The Susquehanna Company* (New Haven, 1935), pp. 43-47.

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The seraph informs Columbus in the "vision" that after him would come Cortez and other "ruffians" who, allured by gold, would wreak destruction on peaceful peoples, but

> Such impious deeds, in Heaven's all-ruling plan,
> Lead in disguise the noblest bliss of man.
>
> . . . . .
>
> And buried gold, drawn bounteous from the mine,
> Give wings to commerce and the world refine.[3]

The poem's authorized dedication to Louis XVI, its impressive list of subscribers, headed by the King with twenty-five copies and George Washington with twenty, and its British edition attested to Barlow's great gifts of salesmanship and diplomacy. Although the epic brought him little money, it gained for him something of an international reputation as a literary figure. This made him especially useful to a group of speculators who were in need of a foreign agent; and he quickly attracted the attention of the Scioto Associates, one of the manifold promotions of the greatest enterpriser of the day, Colonel William Duer.[4]

As secretary of the government board disposing of public lands, Duer arranged for the sale of 3,500,000 acres of western lands to his own Associates at approximately sixty-six and two-thirds cents per acre in specie or in the heavily depreciated continental certificates of debt at par. But until the payments were made, the grant remained merely a preëmption right. Duer expected to pay the government through sales to wealthy Europeans abroad, who held large quantities of the debt certificates. Such foreign operations were considered legitimate by enlightened Americans, for anything that brought money and men to America would develop the nation's resources and increase its commerce.

Barlow, then a minor official of the Ohio Company, was just the man for the job, or so at least thought the Reverend Manasseh Cutler, Duer's influential fellow promoter of both

[3] *The Vision of Columbus* (Hartford, 1787), pp. 84, 244.

[4] For the company's operations, see J. S. Davis, *Essays in the Earlier History of American Corporations* (Cambridge, 1917), vol. 1, pp. 124-150, 213-253.

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organizations. The poet was given a sizable share in the Scioto company, armed with letters from General Washington to prominent Frenchmen and sent abroad during the summer of 1788.[5] In Europe, Barlow faced stiff competition; so in 1789 he obtained the assistance of William Playfair of Edinburgh, scientist, engineer, statistician and follower of Adam Smith.[6] Barlow had sized him up as "a bold and enterprising spirit", with good imagination and the advantage of some years in business in Paris, where he had become acquainted with many people of property.[7] Together with prominent French officials and merchants, the two men organized an incorporated subsidiary—*Compagnie du Scioto*—to raise funds for the purchase of the mother company's lands. They issued a glowing prospectus which omitted the pertinent fact that the Scioto Associates so far owned not land but merely preëmption rights.

For a few months the new company enjoyed prosperity—on paper. Barlow wrote home, in the winter of 1789-1790, that the company had great expectations since prosperous Europeans would migrate to America in order to escape the disorders of the Revolution. "Many respectable and wealthy families are . . . making their purchases and are going in the spring; among them are several noblemen and members of the National Assembly." Should the first hundred people be happy there, "the stream of immigration would be irresistible." Business was good and a profit of $1,200,000 might be expected in a short time.[8]

Barlow, however, sent no funds, and this first business expedition was a fiasco. When the stranded nobility began sending back complaints, Barlow even feared for his life. He had al-

[5] *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745-1799*, edited by John C. Fitzpatrick (Washington, 1931-1941), vol. 29, pp. 503-504, 506-508.

[6] Playfair prepared an annotated edition of the *Wealth of Nations*.

[7] To Benjamin Walker, Dec. 21, 1790, in "Selections from the Gallipolis Papers", edited by Theodore T. Belote, in *Quarterly Publications of the Historical and Philosophical Society of Ohio*, April–June 1907, p. 72.

[8] To Mrs. Barlow, Jan. 1, 1790, in M. Ray Adams, "Joel Barlow, Political Romanticist", *American Literature*, May 1937, p. 115; to Duer, Nov. 29, 1789, in Belote, *loc. cit.*, pp. 58-60.

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ready appealed to Duer to have Alexander Hamilton, then Secretary of the Treasury, ease the terms of sale to the Scioto Associates. Hamilton, desiring to advance large enterprises, recommended in his first Report on the Public Credit that the price for public lands be reduced to twenty cents an acre. At the same time, he granted an indefinite leave of absence to the naval officer of New York, Colonel Benjamin Walker, to investigate Barlow's activities in Paris in behalf of the Duer group. The upshot was that both Playfair and Barlow decided in 1791 to leave France temporarily, each accusing the other of causing the debacle.[9]

Although he held land claims in America, Barlow was now penniless in London. His next step was to join a group of reformers in London, "composed in good part of American citizens who for commercial or political traffic or both" were "sometimes resident in England and sometimes in France."[10] To one of that group—Thomas Paine—he was especially attracted. There seemed little doubt that the man who had stirred the American people to independence with his *Common Sense* would now with his *Rights of Man* stir England and the rest of the world to follow the example of Revolutionary France. He was the idol of all English reformers; and soon the French Assembly would award him French citizenship, and four departments of France would vie with one another to elect him a deputy to the National Convention.

From Paine Barlow could learn much, and he did. *The Rights of Man* became his political bible. It epitomized the enlightened sentiment of the middle class in the whole civilized world. It was a glowing appeal for the destruction of the complex of feudal institutions which interfered with the free

[9] Playfair continued an adventurous career including journalism in support of the British government's policy of opposition to the French Revolution. Though a sympathizer of the Revolution during the company's operation, he turned to denouncing the movement in general and Paine in particular. He accused Paine of being irreligious and seditious. Worst of all, Paine was guilty of bad arithmetic in his calculations of the eventual financial bankruptcy and downfall of England. *Playfair's Answer to Thomas Paine's Decline and Fall of the English System of Finances* (London, 1796).

[10] Charles Burr Todd, *Life and Letters of Joel Barlow* (New York and London, 1886), p. 87.

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functioning of "society". "Society" was composed of individuals bound together for the welfare of all by pecuniary interest functioning through voluntary contracts between man and man. Government was distinct from society and a necessary evil, to be limited ideally to the maintenance of order. So conceived, *The Rights of Man* was a plea against the aristocracy of blood and for a republic of commerce relieved of the burdens of parasitic king, aristocracy, national church, royal monopoly, or anything else that might interfere with the equal rights of all to acquire wealth.[11]

Barlow hailed Paine as the greatest man of the age. He was much impressed, too, by the rise to power in France of two fellow Duer agents, Brissot de Warville, the politician and journalist, and Etienne Clavière, the learned refugee Swiss banker and economist.[12] This inseparable team had the gift of giving projects of commercial expansion and conquest the fair appearance of peace and universal liberty. Paine, after all, was primarily a pamphleteer who announced the grand political philosophy of a commercial civilization. Brissot and Clavière were shrewd politicians and hardheaded business men able to turn that philosophy to practical ends. They had been engaged, before the French Revolution, in schemes for developing interest in American trade and investment along with "republican" political reforms.[13] To this end they had issued in 1787 *De la France et des États-Unis,* describing the effects of the American Revolution on Europe in general and France in particular, and especially the new commercial prospects, including financial operations, which the Revolution opened to Frenchmen.

In the summer of 1788, a group of Dutch and French bankers, and their resident American associates, sent Brissot to the

[11] Joseph Dorfman, "The Economic Philosophy of Thomas Paine", in POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, September 1938.

[12] From Clavière's extensive library, J. B. Say, who was his secretary, first learned of the *Wealth of Nations.*

[13] Eloise Ellery, *Brissot de Warville* (Boston and New York, 1915), also Frederick L. Nussbaum, *Commercial Policy in the French Revolution* (Washington, 1923).

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United States to investigate the possibilities of speculation in the public debt and lands. After making arrangements with a Duer group, he hurried back in less than six months to attend to business and to witness the historic opening of the Estates General that marked the beginning of the French Revolution. Brissot quickly rose to political power as head of the revolutionary faction (Girondists) representing the upper middle class, which opposed government interference with business. With him rose Clavière who had suggested the issue of assignats and later became minister of finance. Through all their feverish political activities, they did not lose sight of their business ventures. Late in 1791 the team issued a revised edition of their first treatise and a new book, *Nouveau Voyage,* on American conditions, in the form of a series of letters from Brissot to Clavière. The material consisted chiefly of familiar American promotional and advertising literature written for European consumption.[14]

Barlow immediately translated the latter book and, judging by his appraisal of Brissot in the introduction as an accurate, sober observer, he was pleased with the praise of Scioto Associates. That company had been accused of selling lands it did not own, of giving exaggerated accounts of their fertility, of deceiving emigrants, and of sending them where they might be butchered by Indians. This, Brissot argued, was false. Of course French aristocrats who emigrated with the foolish idea of forming a monarchy would be sadly deceived. Seeking to fly from the equality of rights in France, "they would fall into a society where this equality is consecrated even by the nature of things; where every man is solicited to independence" by the very ease of supplying his wants.[15]

Some foolish critics of investment and migration to the United States, so ran the argument, warn that the West may

[14] Compare Letter XXVIII of *Nouveau Voyage*, vol. 2; and Benjamin Rush, "An Account of the Progress of Population, Agriculture, Manners, and Government in Pennsylvania, in a Letter to a Friend in England", reprinted in *Essays, Literary, Moral and Philosophical* (Philadelphia, 1798), pp. 213-225.

[15] Barlow translation, *New Travels in the United States of America* (London, 1792), pp. 476-477.

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separate from the Union. As a matter of fact the two sections are bound together by a common interest in opening an extensive commerce with South America, and in pushing beyond the Mississippi. Spain, in adhering to the narrow policy of preventing this expansion, has acted unwisely. It fears the communication of those principles of independence which the liberty-loving Americans preach wherever they go. But already an American commercial settlement west of the Mississippi, though under Spanish auspices, marks the beginning of the conquest of Louisiana. Within the next century the whole continent will be united "under the reign of liberty which leads to universal harmony." [16]

This prospectus was but the practical elaboration of the economic-political doctrine of commercial individualism set forth in *De la France,* which Barlow also translated. Monarchical government must become enlightened on the "science of commerce", heretofore neglected because of aristocratic prejudice. This "science" teaches that prosperity and national glory rest upon commerce, that monarchies must refrain from arbitrary interference, including price fixing, and must establish entire liberty of commerce, both externally and internally, so that merchants may have the hopes of prosperity which "in republics incline them with ardor to every kind of commercial enterprise." In short the authors contended that commercial liberty is the very heart of liberty. Liberty is "the choice which every one may make of that which is most agreeable to him." [17]

All this and more Barlow could appreciate thoroughly, for he was about to embark on the most critical period of his career in politics and finance, a phase that embraced simultaneously that of pamphleteer and political adviser on the one side and merchant and soldier of fortune on the other. With the methods and success of Paine and the two Frenchmen to inspire him, he sent forth in 1792-1793 his famous *Advice to the Privileged Orders.* Its guiding premise is—again—that hu-

[16] *New Travels,* pp. 168-169, 480, 483.

[17] Barlow translation, *The Commerce of America with Europe* (1794, New York edition, 1795), pp. 3, 135-136, 160-162.

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man liberty is based on free commerce. The "spirit of commerce", by making nations advantageous to each other, eliminates war and induces people to "change the form of their governments, that society may be restored to its proper foundation." [18] Like Paine's *Rights of Man,* the *Advice* calls for the elimination of all feudal vestiges interfering with "nature's plan". Barlow regards as "feudal" anything that interferes with "freedom of trade" whether it be cumbrous legal procedure or undesirable trade acts. "Feudalism" destroys man's emulative instinct to obtain the good opinion of his fellows by exercising his physical and moral power in accumulating wealth.

Along with Brissot and Clavière, and all the other physiocratic writers, Barlow argued that since land is the productive element, taxes should be derived directly from it. Excise, customs and similar levies are "surreptitious" and destructive. The middle class, as embodying the men of commerce, is the class in which "the semblance of nature most resides." That class must force the extremes in the "wretched scale of rank" —the improvident mass at the bottom and the idlers at the top —to conform to the system of free commerce. The author pointed to America where government had been stripped of its impurities by the revolution. The Americans believe that the state should be managed as simply as a family, except that it requires more hands. The states decide boundary claims on the basis of simple convenience; all questions of land are settled as merchants might settle the course of exchange between two commercial cities. But in "feudal" Europe agriculture and commerce are considered degrading, lest idle nobles forget themselves and engage in "contaminating" occupations to the destruction of all social distinctions.

France, the *Advice* goes on, by destroying "feudalism" has exalted the idle duke to a useful merchant. Wealth is now devoted to enterprise which becomes honorable in its own right. To safeguard this system, all that is needed is an ele-

[18] "Advice to the Privileged Orders in the Several States of Europe Resulting from the Necessity and Propriety of a General Revolution in the Principles of Government", in *Political Writings* (New York edition, 1796), pp. 152-153.

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mentary education, which implements man's natural right to the means of subsistence. Barlow pointed, as proof, to the inexpensive public-supported schools of Connecticut. Neither extreme poverty nor extraordinary accumulations existed there, and the few criminals were Europeans.[19]

These arguments of the *Advice,* which of course the privileged orders of Europe were in no hurry to accept, are applied to colonies in an eloquent public letter to the French National Convention in 1792. Beginning with Adam Smith's individualism, based on the distinction between society and government, Barlow proceeds to the conclusion that the French do not need a king. He then gently transfers the argument to the desirability of France's surrendering her colonies. Though the mother country may desire their welfare, it cannot know their wants as well as they can. Whatever solid advantage may flow to her from their controlled trade will necessarily flow to her from free trade. The cost of maintaining the trade monopoly will always exceed the profits.[20]

The French Convention accepted Barlow's philosophy of individualism but not in its application to the colonies. It showed its appreciation of his sympathetic attitude toward the Revolution by making him a citizen of France, and he in turn accompanied a French commission for organizing the annexed Duchy of Savoy. From this vantage point, he called on the people of nearby Piedmont, in a public printed letter, to overthrow their king and welcome the French armies of "liberation" on pain of fearful slaughter. France, armed with the "panoply of reason", was waging a war in "defense of human nature". It was a horrible lie that the French Revolution threatened the destruction of private property; on the contrary so sacredly did the French regard property, that they assumed the burden of the immense debt contracted by the wicked court. What then did the French armies bring as the principles of the French Revolution? They brought to the freed peoples the essentials of happiness; namely, security

[19] *Advice,* pp. 23, 68, 76-77, 95, 97, 102-103, 120, 132, 134-135.

[20] "A Letter to the National Convention of France", 1792, in *Political Writings,* pp. 194-195.

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against war, control of the fruits of their labor, and "a free circulation of the objects of commerce." Barlow pointed to the depressed situation of Savoy under its royal master. The province had good river communications with France, but the king shackled its commerce and thereby discouraged its agriculture and other industrial pursuits.[21]

This appeal to the people of Piedmont was no more directly effective than his *Advice to the Privileged Orders*. Neither did the people of Savoy show their appreciation of his presence when they refused to elect him as a deputy to the National Convention, although he was the "administration" candidate. But he had a rôle to play in schemes of colonial expansion dear to Brissot and his friends. These were the spectacular ventures to seize the great Spanish colony of Louisiana. The imperial promoters were a motley group and included a number of prominent English reformers, such as Thomas Cooper and Barlow's close friend, Mary Wollstonecraft, and her faithless lover, Captain Gilbert Imlay, who had served as an officer in the Revolutionary War and who advertised the potentialities of the West with fine maps and a romantic novel.

The "reformation" of Louisiana would be of enormous advantage to France and the Revolution. The familiar arguments of the great benefit of colonies to a nation's commerce and industry were sketched. New Orleans would provide an excellent haven for privateers preying on enemy commerce. American citizens should execute the coup, and this would bring the United States to the side of France in the war for universal liberty against universal despotism. Barlow was to take general direction of the plan and manage the funds supplied by the French government, as he was "a true friend of liberty, a philosopher, and pure in his morals."

The execution of Brissot on charges of counterrevolution and the suicide of Clavière resulted in some changes in the project. Barlow and Mark Leavenworth, another Yale graduate, frankly referring to themselves as "entrepreneurs", proposed to the new government of Robespierre that they seize Louisi-

21 "A Letter Addressed to the People of Piedmont", 1792, in *Political Writings*, pp. 212-214, 221, 228, 234.

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ana. They would take care of expenses in return for the property of the Spanish crown in the colony. After France had accomplished her revolutionary mission, her soldiers, who otherwise might become turbulent, could be given lands in the country. Both troops participating in the expedition and some discharged later in France might have the opportunity to share in the distribution.[22]

But the French government, sensitive to the attitude of the United States, was not seriously interested. Barlow showed no nationalistic scruples in assigning Louisiana to France rather than to America, because from his commercial, cosmopolitan point of view it made no difference. Was he not a citizen of both countries?

In the meantime, despite these setbacks, Barlow was rapidly accumulating a large fortune from "commerce and speculation". He had hardly finished the *Advice* when he was off to the continent, on a mysterious trip involving, it appears, wartime smuggling and similar operations on a grand scale. Henceforth he was constantly moving through the ports and cities of war-torn Europe on obscure "business". There were substantial rewards waiting for those who could bring supplies through the British blockade or, for that matter, flout French regulations. Robespierre's government might think his prices higher than those of other "importers", but it did a large business with him.[23] Since he viewed filibustering expeditions as an aspect of commerce, it is not surprising to find him associated in these more peaceful ventures with his collaborators of the Louisiana schemes. He had interests even in privateering ventures.

22 "Imlay's Observations", in *Report of the American Historical Association*, 1896, vol. 1; "Documents on the Relations of France to Louisiana, 1792-1795", in *American Historical Review*, April 1898, pp. 491-510; *Four New Letters of Mary Wollstonecraft and Helen M. Williams*, edited by Benjamin P. Kurtz and Carrie C. Aubrey (Berkeley, 1937), pp. 61, 67.

23 *La Commission des substances de l'an II. Procès-verbaux et actes*, Pierre Caron, editor (Paris, 1925), pp. 88, 102, 662-663.

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It appears also that he did well in purchasing commercial claims of American citizens against the French government.[24] The result was that, while in 1792 Barlow lived in poverty, four years later he was worth $120,000.[25] He was a made man. So close was he to the French Directory that Washington's administration decided to take advantage of his double citizenship, and of the good relations between France and Algiers, to have him negotiate the ransoming of American seamen enslaved by the Algerians.[26]

Beginning in 1798, however, Barlow found his principles and interests jeopardized by the strained relations between his two countries over French "interference" with American commerce, especially the carrying trade. It was no easy task to placate both sides. In pamphlets to the American people and letters to American friends, he attempted to place the blame on the United States and England. France had vindicated her principle of commercial and civil liberty, but England's interferences with neutral trade, especially her utilization of the tyrannical doctrine of contraband, had forced France to take retaliatory measures. Since America unfortunately acquiesced in British actions, France sought to affect America's vital pecuniary nerves so that it would assert its own rights against England. The United States, however, had an instrument for forcing commercial law and peace on the world without a navy; namely, by taking advantage of its debtor position to seize the private debts owed abroad as a fund to compensate her citizens damaged by the English regulations.

At the same time, though with less warmth, Barlow and his business associate, Fulwar Skipwith, the American consul general in France, appealed to the French authorities to follow the

[24] It was charged though never clearly substantiated in 1803 that Barlow had received "advance" information of the inclusion of the settlement of such claims in the treaty ceding Louisiana to the United States. Monroe to Madison, Dec. 17, 1803, in *The Writings of James Monroe*, edited by S. M. Hamilton (New York and London, 1898-1903), vol. 4, p. 120.

[25] To Mrs. Barlow, July 8, 1796, in Todd, *op. cit.*, pp. 110, 297.

[26] Timothy Pickering to Colonel David Humphreys, June 18, 1796, in Frank Landon Humphreys, *Life and Times of David Humphreys* (New York and London, 1917), vol. 2, p. 247.

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principle of free trade by prohibiting French privateering and by respecting all neutral flags. If France allowed neutrals to be the carriers of English commerce, England's wealth would be reduced through the loss of the profits of freight, and she would be weakened in her marine by the encouragement of foreign shipping. Since France could not effectively carry her own goods, she should let neutrals do so. Besides, the drain of manpower for ships and privateers weakened France's agriculture and manufactures, which were the real sources of her wealth.[27]

An even better way of handling England was suggested by Barlow's versatile friend Robert Fulton. The inventor had been living with him since his arrival in France in 1797, and Barlow not only invested his money and time in Fulton's various inventions, but seconded his friend's efforts to obtain government aid. Among these inventions was the "submarine bomb" or "torpedo", more properly described as a mine. Enough of these placed conveniently in the waters frequented by the British navy would end the tyranny of Britain. Napoleon tested it, and found it unsatisfactory (as incidentally the British government did on trying to neutralize it, by enticing Fulton with sufficient pecuniary rewards). Such sad experiences, along with an accumulation of approximately $200,000, induced Barlow to leave for his native land. France had become unsupportable "from the follies of the many and the rogueries of the few."[28]

[27] *Letters from Paris to the Citizens of the United States* (London, 1800); Richard Hildreth, *History of the United States* (New York, 1860), vol. 5, p. 56.

Skipwith, after suffering financial reverses, went to West Florida, then under nominal Spanish authority, to recoup his fortunes. He participated in the insurrection of 1810, and when the insurgents, mostly American and British citizens, proclaimed an independent state, he became the head. This independence was short-lived, for the American government, which also claimed the territory, ignored Skipwith's pronouncements on the rights of man and revolution and sent troops to restore order. Isaac J. Cox, *West Florida Controversy, 1798-1813* (Baltimore, 1918), pp. 433-434.

[28] To Abraham Baldwin, 1804, in Leon Howard, "Joel Barlow and Napoleon", *Huntington Library Quarterly*, October 1938, pp. 37-38.

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He built the first magnificent estate in the environs of Washington; turned out poetry and anonymous articles in support of President Jefferson and his political heir, President Madison; became a bank president and gave considerable attention to Fulton's interests as well as to his own, in fine arts, canal construction, steamboats, and in the "torpedo". His assets continued to mount rapidly. In 1812 he listed among his holdings $115,540, in bank and corporate stocks, and estimated land claims at $175,000.[29]

Many of his activities, artistic and pecuniary, Barlow found worthy of government encouragement, even if this meant some modification of his earlier formulation of the doctrine of freedom of commerce. In oration and pamphlet, for example, he preached that though the duties on imports had been originally established to meet the public debt charges, the redemption of the public debt should not necessarily entail the reduction of the duties. Surplus revenues should be devoted to public works and higher education. The funds should first be used for roads and canals to connect the interior with the sea. Such expenditures would increase the value of public and private property. They would directly stimulate the sale and value of public lands. Not the least of the public works that the government should promote was Fulton's "torpedoes", for "God has given them to us as a weapon to free the seas from naval tyranny and the attacks on American commerce."

All such government activities would be guided by a publicly supported, but not governmentally controlled, National Institute or University to be established in Washington, with—incidentally—Barlow at the head. It would manage a host of activities—from the army and navy officers' training schools to the operation of the mint. Fine arts were to be encouraged as favorable to republican manners and discipline. By multiplying people's wants, and diversifying objects of emulation, the arts would stimulate industry. To repeat the statement of the earlier epic, "imaginary wants must be increased in order to inspire a passion for commerce." Of course, gross sensual luxuries were undesirable, as leading to poverty and other ills, but

[29] Adams, *loc. cit.*, p. 141.

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these could not be checked by direct governmental action without running the danger of restraining wealth and civil liberty. Government might indirectly achieve the desired effect by encouraging a taste for the more elegant luxuries—the fine arts—for these excite passions which the means of each individual prescribes.

Finally the "moral sciences", especially economics, should receive considerable attention. No one denies their importance, but "the science of political economy as well as the whole science of government is in its infancy." Researches in this field "are so vague in their nature and have been so little methodized as scarcely to obtain the name of science." [30]

How true this was Barlow himself soon illustrated in negotiations with Napoleon's Minister of Foreign Relations, the Duke of Bassano. President Madison had sent him to France in 1811 as special envoy to induce the Emperor to remove restraints on the freedom of American merchants and reduce, if not abolish, customs duties on American goods. Barlow tried to convince the Duke that such actions would not interfere with Napoleon's "continental system" but on the contrary would give activity to neutral capital, with all its manifold blessings. With the confidence of American merchants restored, France and her allies would be able to obtain food supplies and be relieved of their accumulated stores of export commodities. The Duke, however, was equally adept at the manipulation of the concepts of economics. He even returned Barlow's own arguments in the *Advice*. The author-business man had denounced customs imposts as burdens borne ultimately by the depressed mass of consumers. The Duke blithely argued that the duties, which covered mainly colonial luxuries, simply raised their price without affecting either profits or the amount of trading.[31]

[30] *Oration Delivered at Washington, July 4, 1899, at the Request of the Democratic Citizens of the District of Columbia* (Washington, 1809); *Prospectus of a National Institution to Be Established in the United States* (Washington, 1806); *The Vision of Columbus*, p. 243.

[31] "Message from the President of the United States, Transmitting Copies and Extracts from the Correspondence of the Secretary of State and the Minister Plenipotentiary of the United States at Paris, May 26, 1812", in *Annals of Congress*, vol. 24, appendix, pp. 1958, 1969, 1971.

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After months of disputation in Paris on what constituted "perfect reciprocity" the discussion was interrupted when Napoleon left on his proposed conquest of Russia. He found time to invite Barlow to meet him in Vilna, for further negotiations. Barlow hastened to Vilna. Napoleon soon was too busy retreating from the Russian winter to attend to this matter. Barlow joined the retreat, and took ill. As he lay dejected, whatever admiration he may have had in the past for the modern Cortez, Barlow was in no mood to view him as an agent of Providence. Then it was in December 1812 that he penned his best poem, "Advice to a Raven in Russia". The scavenging bird is the "best friend" of the tyrant: one feeds on the other's destruction. Winter has frustrated both.

> The [soldier's] frozen orb, preserving still its form,
> Defies your talons as it braves the storm,
> But stands and stares to God, as if to know
> In what curst hands he leaves his world below.[32]

Barlow died on Christmas Eve, near Cracow. The American poet-adventurer found a lonely grave in the soil of Poland.

. . . . . .

The character of Barlow, as it emerges from the story of his practical affairs, is unclear and complex. It is not, however, the complexity of the pioneer thinker who struggles with problems too fundamental for simple solution or even simple statement. It is the complexity that comes from constant and resilient adjustment to changing circumstance. In the nature of things, speculative enterprise in an age of social upheaval partakes of the discrete and opportunistic. And the attempt to articulate such interests in terms of a more or less consistent set of principles must lead to watering and tacking. We need not be surprised that such an attempt will reveal rather the nature of the immediate interests than the philosophy used to defend them.

Yet Barlow, although not a profound man, was not a dishonest one. Sanguine, able, industrious, he was surely avid for power, competence and position. He moved in circles

[32] The poem is printed in Leon Howard, "Joel Barlow and Napoleon", p. 50.

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where prestige depended upon material success and a cultivated ability. To attain success he strained ability to the utmost. As a sophisticated and cultivated man, he found a convenient correspondence between his economic ventures and the climate of opinion. His living experience made it habitual for him to think of natural "society" as being essentially "a company of merchants" writ large.[33] He never ceased to be the literary man; he never gave up his avocation of poet and publicist. And, what is socially and politically significant, he somehow fitted his enterprises into the spirit of the age. Hence, running through all his "philosophy" and explanations there is a broad acceptance of the prevailing doctrines of natural rights; the natural rights of man and the natural rights of the business man.[34]

JOSEPH DORFMAN

[33] *Advice to the Privileged Orders*, pp. 122-123.

[34] This interpretation of Barlow may run counter to the accepted tradition of most of the Jeffersonians, but the difference in analysis arises primarily from the failure of students of the era to take into account the economic structure of the period and integrate it with the purely political aspects. There is also need for a reinterpretation of the social philosophy of the historians of the period, notably Charles A. Beard who, it seems to the writer, has been misunderstood by both his admirers and critics. See the review of Charles A. Beard and Mary R. Beard, *The American Spirit*, vol. IV of *The Rise of American Civilization*, by Joseph Dorfman, in *American Economic Review*, vol. XXXIII, September 1943, pp. 644-647.

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REVIEWS

Challenge to Freedom. By HENRY M. WRISTON. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1943.—x, 240 pp. $2.00.

Dr. Wriston's book is a strong tract in favor of the freedom of the individual against the all-inclusive state and the experts who function in its name. The book gives off sparks. It is admittedly a partisan rather than a judicial document. Many who feel, as this reviewer does, that it fails to tell all the story will still approve its purpose, which is to remind us that, from the standpoint of history, individualism, with its emphasis on civil rights, was a revolutionary and liberating force, and to impress upon a forgetful people that there can be no freedom unless the indvidual is free. It shows how wrong was Vice-President Wallace when he declared that we have been overemphasizing political democracy, "bill-of-rights democracy", as he termed it.

Dr. Wriston's method is to consider some popular slogans, which have been given wide currency by those who would save us through statism. He analyzes the true inwardness of such phrases as mature economy, bold social engineering, full employment, security, privilege. He correctly points out that we can have security if we are willing to pay the price in terms of liberty and lowered standards of living over the years.

Dr. Wriston is a liberal in the true sense. His book helps to restore the proper meaning to this term which has so deviously been assumed by those, quite illiberal at heart, who in the name of "social engineering" would take charge of our lives. He revolts against a mechanistic and materialistic society governed by experts, impatient of popular control, who fundamentally have little faith in the people.

The danger in Dr. Wriston's book is that, despite qualifications inserted here and there, it tends to cultivate a dangerous complacency and a psychology of drift. If the liberalism, in which he so ardently and wisely believes, fails to analyze and rectify the forces in our large-scale industrial society which tend to obstruct the free play of individualism in the mass of the people, it will inevitably succumb to systems which promise, however erroneously, greater satisfactions to the individual. The problem of reconciling our modern economy with the desire of people to participate must be solved. If one believes in private property and private enterprise, as I do, then one

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must see to it that the opportunity to own property and to exert enterprise must be open to all who can qualify.

To achieve freedom some intervention by the state is necessary in a society of such large-scale proportions as ours today. But America needs to understand better the ultimate destination to which statism, under the leadership of the planners with a capital P, will lead us, and to realize that it is a move backwards in history and not forward. This however is only half the job. Liberals in the true sense (not those who have stolen a good word to describe another philosophy) should be very busy to discover the points at which state regulation should be applied to promote rather than retard their philosophy of the good life.

There is all the difference in the world between state control as the collectivists conceive it and state control as the true liberal views it. After the war we shall have to decide whether the force of the state is to be exerted in favor of regimentation under government or for the purpose of releasing the individual in a fair field. Which view we adopt will determine not only how much the state is to intervene, but the methods and goal of its intervention. Unfortunately liberalism seems to be sterile at this point, its energies all being drained off in a sort of rear-guard action. What is required is constructive attack which is the best defense of our liberties.

The benefits of liberalism are not accepted as generally as they were when the idea was new. There are reasons for this and they are not to be found merely in the preaching of those tainted by Karl Marx. We need to understand more completely why liberalism declined; why it permitted a soil to develop which was receptive to collectivism. With this knowledge before us we shall know better what is necessary to reëstablish it as the accepted philosophy of Americans. The genius of America is individualistic, not laissez faire. Liberalism implemented with a program will win the day in America.

HAROLD W. DODDS
PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Society and Nature: A Sociological Inquiry. By HANS KELSEN. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1943.—viii, 391 pp. $4.00.

This book deals with the origin and character of the concept of causation. It is developed in a manner that will be of interest not only to philosophers and intellectual historians, social psychologists and ethnologists, but to all social scientists who are capable of being

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fertilized by the creative, and hence difficult, thought of others. In topic or in treatment, it may be placed among such varied traditions as those represented by Granet and Cornford, by Tyler and Mannheim, Levy-Bruhl and Wundt, or by Dewey and George Mead. It is nevertheless a many-sided book that can stand up alone, and does so very well indeed.

Stripped of the subtle statement and suggestive documentation which he brings to it, Dr. Kelsen's major thesis may be presented in the following propositions:

Man does not possess an innate notion of causality. "Primitive" peoples do not interpret events according to this principle; they conceive of nature according to the principles which regulate their interhuman conduct. One such principle is the idea of *lex talionis*, the norm of retribution. "Nature" is not abstracted, as a domain of necessitous and impersonal causation, from social meaning. Nature is a part of society. Things are viewed as though connected as persons are connected; they are in social relationship.

Primitive man does not have a consciousness of ego. His view of his world cannot, therefore, be based upon ego-analogies and projections, but upon "tu analogies". He acts and feels toward plants and inanimate things as toward his fellow men. Believing that members of these categories act according to identical principles, he treats things as prescribed by the rules of social conduct. He is not a "natural man" but, in the strictest sense, a "social" man, his view of "nature" being thoroughly "sociomorphic" (not anthropomorphic). He therefore does not entertain conceptions of any supernatural beings but rather of superhuman ones.

Lacking ego-consciousness, and hence the bases for ego-projections, he cannot be said to "personify" things. The data of the theory of animism are accounted for by an alternative hypothesis. A great deal of the magic of primitive peoples is merely the operation of the thoroughly social character of their mentality. They do not have a "pre-logical" mentality; they do, however, entertain a type of knowledge and belief that are "pre-causal": reality lies in the relations of men, or of men and spirits; but not those of men and things.

The modern concept of nature, and the idea of causation which it involves, developed from the social principle of retribution. Nature is thus separated from society in human conception. This separation reaches its widest gulf in the world of Hume. "Contemporary science" attempts to break down this dualism; it conceives society as a part of nature, both being lawful in the sense of statistical regularities of high probability.

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The larger portion of the book is concerned with how "primitive man"—or as many ethnologists would now prefer, "pre-literate man"—interprets his world, although Dr. Kelsen does bring his theme through the Greek period and into modern times. He takes a position on most of the moot questions which surround the topic of primitive mentalities. Although many American ethnologists will perhaps not agree with all that he writes, it must be recognized that Dr. Kelsen has gone to the data upon which the major alternative views are based and that his reinterpretations of these data are cogent. His apparently random selection of primitive data and some of the inferences which he draws from them are at times dubious, but fortunately such elements of his argument are not crucial to his main thesis. What he has to say is not only full of facile insights; it is productive of a radically social conception of mind that offers a fresh challenge to all those who hold contrary views.

C. WRIGHT MILLS

UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Der Fuehrer: Hitler's Rise to Power. By KONRAD HEIDEN. Translated by Ralph Manheim. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1944.—viii, 788 pp. $3.00.

Heiden's book is to some extent a new edition of his earlier *Geschichte des Nationalsozialismus* (1933) and *Hitler, das Leben eines Diktators* (1936). Additional sources of biographical information have been unearthed, and in particular the accounts of the Geli Raubal incident and of the 1934 blood-purge have been amplified. The volume will add to Heiden's merited reputation as the most painstaking and objective biographer of the Nazi leader. It is refreshingly free of propagandistic guesswork, and is in every respect worthy of serious consideration. Perhaps the critic might legitimately find fault with some of the author's efforts to dramatize his material for popular consumption (in particular the *Protocols* seem to have been overworked a bit), but readableness has been achieved without too many serious concessions to what is adjudged to be current taste.

In part, however, the book is also a history of events preceding the rise of Hitler to full power in Germany. The materials upon which any chronicle of those happenings must be based have never been systematically assembled, and there is hardly a field in which the inquirer must be so wary of subjective impressions. It is therefore no wonder that this part of Heiden's treatise is no flawless achievement. Let us take as a convenient illustration the treatment of the

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critical months which intervened between the opening of the Young Plan conferences and the formation of the Bruening Cabinet. Heiden is correct in stating that as the discussion progressed German industry revealed more and more irritation over the dimensions of the reparations burden, and that this feeling deepened the natural rift between industrialists and spokesmen for labor. But as a matter of fact this was by no means the whole point. Attention was fixed rather upon the necessity for building up German capital reserves, now that the effects of a lax and unimaginative financial policy were evident. So dependent was Germany at this time on short-term foreign credits that Schacht's ill-timed decision to confront the Young committee with far-reaching political demands led to a flight of capital, engineered by Paris, and to a fatal weakening of Germany's whole position. This event shocked Germany even as, incidentally, it strengthened the erroneous and eventually almost fatal belief that the Allies could uphold the status quo with economic sanctions.

Because the government clearly saw that reforms were imperative, the President made his assent to Reichstag action on the Young Plan contingent upon a balanced domestic budget. The Hermann Mueller Cabinet tried hard to meet this condition, and in particular favored a compromise measure to revamp the financial structure of the unemployment insurance fund. But Mueller's Social Democratic Party could not agree to support this measure, as Stampfer (*cf. Die 14 Jahre*) clearly shows. It was for this reason that the government fell and not because, as Heiden contends, recourse to Article 48 was denied. The truth of the matter is that the bourgeois parties would have greatly preferred to have the powers granted under that Article in the hands of Social Democrats. Once these were out, the next Chancellor inevitably had to be a Center Party man. That is why Bruening was appointed. It is true that General von Schleicher had already toyed with the idea of a qualified dictatorship. But it is equally true that, as Heiden does not state, he had concluded that Bruening would never be a dictator.

Many portions of Heiden's narrative are excellent. Thus, for example, he summarizes the history of the Schleicher chancellorship very ably, indeed, dispelling legends which have gained wide currency. His discussion of Communist policies — for one cannot, it would appear, speak of a policy—seems quite objective But one has a feeling that any account of such matters must be tentative until further documents and memoirs have cleared the air. We do not, to offer an instance, have any straightforward account of the negotia-

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tions which preceded the passing of the Enabling Act in 1933. Yet by this Act German democracy signed its own death warrant. What Heiden has provided is a rough draft, and it is hardly his fault that nothing better is for the moment possible.

Similarly the history of the conflict of ideas which preceded and to some extent followed the rise of Hitler is richer and more complex than this book indicates. The trouble was that National Socialism gradually became confused with ideas which more or less resembled it. Thus the notion that Socialism must become "national" was widely discussed before the close of 1917, and the idea of a Third Reich had been popularized by Moeller van den Bruck and others. Even *Quadragesimo Anno*, the Papal Encyclical on the social order which Heiden also fails to interpret correctly, was mixed up in people's minds with some of Hitler's famous "25 points". No doubt we shall sometime see that this mélange of ideas was less a consequence of the general politico-economic situation than of a widespread loss of confidence in basic moral judgments. Heiden himself is of that opinion, if his final Postscript is any criterion. Yet he does not approach the matter with the sureness of touch which characterizes, for instance, the recent essay of Helmut Kuhn (*Freedom Forgotten and Remembered*).

Heiden also has lengthy passages on the actions and attitudes of governments other than those of Germany. What he writes is often brilliant and sometimes telling. But here also one does not sense either that the whole truth has been seen, or that it is at present conceivable that the story can be written with any finality. What Lord Rothermere said, for example, was infinitely less important than what the Admiralty thought; and we have as yet no adequate information as to what it thought.

Nevertheless the book is of good quality. It will compensate for the hours of malaise which the reader has doubtless spent trying to derive from many recent books about Germany something half as valuable as the paper on which they were printed.

GEORGE N. SHUSTER

HUNTER COLLEGE

The Growth of American Thought. By MERLE CURTI. New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1943.—xx, 848 pp. $5.00.

Professor Curti has written a profound and scholarly history of American intellectual development. It is solidly founded on extensive researches into previously untouched sources. An important

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supplement to the pioneering volumes of Parrington, Beard, Brooks, Mumford and Gabriel, it is at the same time broader in scope and more ambitious in design.

The work is systematically organized along topical lines. Seven principal stages in the growth of American thought are distinguished—the colonial era, the revolutionary era, the early national period of patrician supremacy, the age of the democratic upheaval, the Civil War, the age of big business and science, and the modern era of uncertainty and pessimism. Professor Curti's central purpose seems to be to describe the growth of American thought in all of its manifold aspects. Therefore, not only is the thought of literary men analyzed, but also the ideas of hundreds of scholars, scientists, educators, public men and theologicans. Not only are formal literary productions discussed, but also common and popular sources of American ideas, such as the dime novel, the almanac, the catalog, the Fourth of July oration, and the election day sermon. Not only is the intellectual élite studied, but also all other classes, sects, groups and nationalities in American society. The volume emphasizes the great extent to which American culture in the past has been diffused by various popular instrumentalities to the masses. In fact, the author seems to find one key to the understanding of American intellectual development in the constant widening of the opportunities of the common man (p. 573).

The author's method is functional. He seeks to explain the growth of American thought in terms of the conditioning forces in American society. Ideas are related, wherever possible, to specific interests. There is a constant emphasis on the relationship between thought and the social milieu. Too often in the past have historians dealt with ideas as if they were disembodied spiritual entities, mysteriously arising in an ideological vacuum. This book brings intellectual history down from the empyrean and comes to grips with the social forces that condition human thought. Not that it overlooks the importance of non-material influences. Much space is devoted to the rôle of the supernatural Christian heritage in coloring American thought patterns. But here, too, the attempt is made to relate these emotional attitudes to their function in the existing social system.

There are many elements of strength in this book. It devotes much-needed attention to the effects of the development of natural science and machine technology on American ideas, a factor which Parrington all but overlooked. It gives more space than any other general intellectual history to the significance of education in mold-

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ing the American mind, describing the common school awakening, the high school movement, and the remaking of American higher education by Charles W. Eliot and his contemporaries. It discusses at greater length than any other comparable volume the importance of the great impersonal agencies, institutions and organizations of American intellectual life, such as the press, the public library, the lyceum platform, the scientific foundation, the scholarly society, and the publishing industry. It devotes especial attention to the ideas and intellectual patterns of the succession of American western frontiers. It consistently places American intellectual development in its world framework, showing how ideological currents from Western Europe have invariably agitated the American intellectual stream. It discusses the history of the several specialized disciplines and social "sciences" in the United States. It recognizes the importance of the Negro, the Indian, and the various European immigrant minorities in the evolution of American thought patterns. It makes fruitful use of popular folk materials commonly overlooked by intellectual historians. It analyzes the rôle of popular American rituals and symbols, such as Uncle Sam, Brother Jonathan, the flag, the national holiday, and the cult of the Constitution. The author presents his material in a clear, readable prose. There is a sixty-page bibliographical section which should prove to be a useful guide for all future students of the subject.

When all of this is said, it is still necessary to note certain weaknesses in the work. Most important of all, it lacks a great unifying theme to knit its materials together. The facts are arranged in striking patterns, there are many shrewd generalizations that display keen insight, and yet the book is on the whole descriptive rather than boldly interpretative. Because of this absence of a fundamental thesis, there is a certain disjointedness, and portions of the work become almost encyclopedic in presenting facts, dates and names. The author cautiously weighs every scrap of evidence pro and con on almost every problem before him, often hesitating to draw any final conclusions. This is of course a tribute to his intellectual honesty and his scientific scholarship. But this hesitant approach makes it difficult for the reader in certain instances to grasp his fundamental ideas. Finally, the work does not seem to pay sufficient attention to the influence of significant individual intellects. The treatment of Emerson, for example, is much too sketchy. The individual always remains a shadowy phantom in this volume; he rarely emerges as a flesh-and-blood personality. Because of this, the mo-

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tives of many, whose ideas are described, are not adequately explained. Of course, this limitation is more or less implicit in the author's method, which leads him to emphasize broad social forces rather than individual minds, while Parrington's biographical method made these personalities the very framework through which he pictured the operation of social forces. Curti's method is superior for the analysis of the institutionalized forces in American intellectual history, while, on the other hand, Parrington's method enabled him to present a clearer picture of the personal contribution of many Americans.

It is easy to point out minor flaws in any pioneering work of such vast sweep as this. The important thing is that the book is a remarkably successful survey of the growth of the American mind. It is rich in information, thorough and original in scholarship. In these critical times, no more important volume could be recommended to the attention of the thoughtful American.

SOLOMON WILLIS RUDY

THE COLLEGE OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK

The American: The Making of a New Man. By JAMES TRUSLOW ADAMS. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943.—ix, 404 pp. $3.00.

The task which Mr. Adams has set himself in this, his most recent, volume is the search for an answer to Crèvecoeur's oft-quoted question, "What is an American?" It will be admitted that there is nothing particularly novel in such an inquiry. Every thoughtful student or writer of American history in its broader aspects has either consciously or unconsciously faced the same problem, many times. The author makes it clear from the outset that he does not propose to write another narrative history of the United States and he pauses occasionally to remind the reader, and to reassure himself, of his intent. Yet he finds it impossible to analyze and portray the American character without introducing a considerable amount of factual material. This is all to the good, however. Mr. Adams knows a great deal of our history and, while his conclusions in regard to "the American" are penetrating and suggestive, the volume will interest many readers primarily as a running commentary on the significance of important incidents and trends in our past.

Some persons will object that the book lacks proper chronological balance, inasmuch as almost two thirds of the entire space is devoted to the period preceding 1789. This emphasis may be accounted for,

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perhaps, in two ways. In the first place, much of Mr. Adams' earlier and best work was devoted to the colonial and Revolutionary periods and he reveals himself to be much more at home here than in the nineteenth century. It might be argued, moreover, that the fundamental characteristics of the American took shape during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which are therefore especially relevant to the writer's thesis. However that may be, the first two thirds of the volume are much more satisfactory than that part dealing with the period after 1789. When the author enters the nineteenth century, the pace is quickened, there are more frequent errors of fact, and his judgment seems more superficial. He gives the impression of one who has wearied of his task and desires to conclude it as quickly as possible.

It must be confessed that the reviewer finds the obiter dicta dropped by Mr. Adams in his search for the American much more valuable than any final portrayal which emerges. The author would doubtless agree, for in the Epilogue he virtually admits failure in these words: "Perhaps we have not been able to paint a clear portrait of the American. We have been able to put in a touch here, a touch there. There is no *one* American. There are tens of millions of them. Yet possibly from all we have found, we do get some idea of what *the* American, the real one, is."

What sort of person, then, is tentatively presented by Mr. Adams as his "American"? He is an individualist, who demands freedom of opportunity, and who is resentful of interference in the shape of conventional restraints. He believes in equality, but has a keen sense of self-interest and sometimes displays a disregard for law. The American is a dreamer, with a passion for "bigger and better" things, but has been prodigal and wasteful of his natural resources. Mr. Adams stresses the loneliness of his frontier environment which has made him hospitable and generous. The distance which has separated him from Europe has fostered in him an isolationism, manifesting itself in a mistrust of foreigners, especially during colonial times. The author repeatedly stresses land hunger and the frontier as powerful factors in molding the American character. The major emphasis is upon physical environment and the volume is disappointing in the slight attention devoted to intellectual, artistic and literary aspects of American culture.

Mr. Adams appears to have written this book in a spirit of relaxation. Drawing upon his extensive knowledge of American history, he gives the reader the benefit of points of view derived from years

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of writing, travel and reflection. Perhaps this somewhat easygoing approach has been responsible for a number of errors of fact which, while not particularly serious in themselves, have needlessly marred a book which is on the whole very well worth reading.

WAYNE E. STEVENS
DARTMOUTH COLLEGE

This Is Congress. By ROLAND YOUNG. New York, Alfred A. KNOPF, 1943.—xv, 267, vi pp. $2.75.

Overshadowed by a dynamic chief executive and an ever-expanding administration, Congress has to a very considerable extent been ignored by students of government during the past ten years. The tremendous shift in the balance of power among the three branches of the government and particularly between the President and the Congress has nevertheless occasioned a certain degree of uneasiness even in scholarly circles. This has resulted not merely in the series of studies of Congress now under way at Columbia University, and the appointment of a Committee on Congress by the American Political Science Association, but also in the ever-increasing number of magazine articles and books relative to our national assembly which has been coming from the press. Of these, one of the most significant is Mr. Young's book.

Formerly Secretary of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, the author has had an unusual opportunity to observe the inner workings of our national legislature. That he has made excellent use of his opportunity will be obvious to everyone who studies his conclusions. Something of Mr. Young's approach to the subject and something of his penetration are revealed in the questions which constitute the titles of many of his chapters: "What Is Congress Supposed to Do?", "Who Thinks Up the Laws?", "Who Has the Power to Do What?", "How Do Bills Ever Get Passed?", "How Does Congress Know What's Happening?", "How Can Congress Spend the Money?" In bold, broad strokes Mr. Young has painted a picture of both the folklore and the power structure of Congress—and in so doing has made a significant contribution to the literature of the subject, a contribution which is in no way diminished by the fact that the volume is written in an extremely lucid style, a style which occasionally even sparkles.

A final chapter, entitled "The Future of Congress", suggests a number of reforms in organization and procedure, to wit, a reduc-

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tion of the number of committees, a legislative cabinet, closer liaison between the executive and the legislature, and a streamlining of the present budgetary procedure. These suggestions are all provocative. In the twenty-seven pages devoted to their exposition, however, it has not been possible for the author to analyze at any length the possible results of the reforms he has suggested. Valuable as these proposals are, consequently, there still remains to be worked out that fully rounded, fully integrated program of legislative reform which is so imperative if our national legislature is to be revitalized. Any such program of reform must of necessity consider not merely the implications of the changes proposed upon the particular branch of the legislature concerned, but the effect they may have upon the relation of the two Houses of Congress to each other, and upon the relation of the Congress to the President. In the final analysis the problem of Congress is merely one aspect, albeit an exceedingly important aspect, of the problem of maintaining balance and efficiency in the American governmental system.

SCHUYLER C. WALLACE

American Heroes and Hero-Worship. By GERALD W. JOHNSON. New York and London, Harper & Brothers, 1943.—284 pp. $3.00.

Much has been written about the utility of history. The claim is often made that society by studying its past can secure directives for future conduct. Mr. Johnson believes in this, though not in orthodox fashion. He is impressed by the view which he quotes from the late William A. Dunning that it is not the truth but what people think is the truth that influences the actions of men. He therefore has a thesis that the principal lesson from history is that when historians have ascertained what they think is the truth, and publicists have plotted therefrom the course which events should take, probably the opposite or at least the unexpected will happen. From this irony of history Mr. Johnson takes comfort. In his eyes comfort is particularly necessary at this juncture of world affairs and to share his comfort he writes this book.

Just now, according to the author, the United States is on the verge of assuming the responsibility for the peace of the world. This is coming about not because of any desire on the part of this nation but because it has the most guns and the greatest power. According to history this cannot succeed unless one adjusts the commonly held view of history by considering the theory of irony. This theory Mr.

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Johnson sets out to demonstrate by describing the evolution of heroes and hero-worship in this republic. Heroes are created by popular demand whenever the times require them and by this process they are often constructed from the flimsiest materials. This is but one way in which a "view of the past" is created "that is wholly at variance with the factual record", from which process arise "the ironies of history, which may be the despair of conscientious historians, but which the layman who studies them is likely to find productive of as much delight as dismay" (p. 15).

The author assembles illustrations from the careers of various American heroes ranging from Du Pont de Nemours, who came to America to promote agrarian republicanism and founded a great industrial dynasty, to Woodrow Wilson, who labored for a new world order, only to see it rejected by his own people. "Afraid of a new order created by Wilson, [they] entrusted the making to Hitler!" (p. 270). His list includes Hamilton and Jefferson, Van Buren and Clay, William Henry Harrison, Thomas E. Watson, Bryan and Roosevelt. In each case he shows how fate played some scurvy trick either with their reputations or with their careers, producing an ironical problem of interpretation to plague truth-seeking historians.

Through these examples, the author attempts to show that new responsibilities create new talents unsuspected or hitherto undreamed of. "Intuitive perception sometimes may overleap scientific method and arrive sooner at the truth" (p. 92). "This disorderly aspect of human existence is a severe trial to tidy minds", but the author believes that "it is not dismaying, but rather comforting to remember that American history has always been a mocker of tidy minds, flouting the rules of logic and puckishly upsetting the dictates of common sense" (p. 22).

Read this book, if you like, for any comfort it may give, but more particularly read it because it is stimulating and clever. It is well written, adorned with many vivid touches including the priceless description of a particular Frenchman as one who "hoped like an American." It is a very personal book and its judgments are personal. Its thesis cannot be proved or disproved. It is very plausibly presented, and whether one agrees with it or not depends largely upon the reader's temperament. This reviewer detected no flagrant errors of fact or interpretation and temperamentally is inclined to agree with its main ideas. Many will not, however, for it will be strong medicine for those in the historical profession who are determined to maintain that search of the past will provide a clear picture of the

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future. It will likewise serve as a corrective to those victims of the new pessimism, so un-American, who view the future with alarm. Mr. Johnson believes that, as of yore, Americans may still consider themselves as sons of the morning and still face the future confident in their power of intuitive perception, as Jefferson once said, "puzzled and prospering".

ROY F. NICHOLS

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

American Political Parties: Their Natural History. By WILFRED E. BINKLEY. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1943.—xi, 407, xii pp. $3.75.

This is a narrative history of the political activities of party leaders, emphasizing the intricate political relationship of geographic sections, social groups and economic interests during the century and a half of national life. The approach is at once intelligible to those who are born to a knowledge of the American way of politics, for this conception of the group composition of our parties and of the importance of group diplomacy is acceptable to those who know the actual working of democracy in the United States. This account is a history of politics as practiced since 1789. The period prior to the Constitution is scarcely touched in the narrative or in the bibliography, and, surprisingly, the author states that when the national government was launched the appearance of parties was "an utterly unexpected development" (p. vii).

The author undertakes to describe and explain American political parties, or, as he says, to write "a natural history". He believes that "the romantic interpretation" of politics began to pass into eclipse some thirty years ago. He puts aside "party mythology" in favor of a realistic treatment of men, motives and measures. In providing historic basis for such a treatment, he properly gives high place to James Madison for his observations. Although the titles of the fifteen chapters indicate a pattern familiar to every student of American history, yet platforms, formal statements of principles, conventions, elections, even the Congress, are given less attention than the arrangements made by managers, agreements of nominees, adjustments of presidents, and the motivations and interests of candidates and voters. Each individual is presented as concerned more with the struggle for political power than with the formulation, development and advancement of programs. Highest praise is again and again given the politician rather than the statesman.

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This reviewer finds that the study is based upon more than a hundred monographs, half as many shorter papers, and a judicious selection of general works published within the last quarter-century. Earlier studies have been used, notably H. J. Ford's *Rise and Growth of American Politics* (1898), and W. G. Sumner's little known and penetrating *Politics in America, 1776-1876* (1876). Little reliance has been placed upon gossip and books of contemporary comment, but exceptions are found in references to Cleveland (pp. 310, 312), Hughes (p. 347), Lodge (p. 348) and Hoover (p. 352). Use has not been made of such works as E. I. McCormac's *Life of James K. Polk*, R. G. Wellington's *Political and Sectional Influence of the Public Lands*, and J. W. Gannaway's important paper on "Real Party Forces".

Always interesting, sometimes exciting, this book is, on the whole, well balanced and devoid of bias. Personal characterizations which are often confined to descriptive adjectives accord with prevailing scholarship. Exceptions may be found in the case of Cleveland (p. 310), Theodore Roosevelt (p. 338), Wilson (pp. 370, 371). Adverse judgments, sometimes positive to a point of dogmatism, are usually acceptable. But a reading of H. A. Notter's *Origins of the Foreign Policy of Woodrow Wilson* would have tempered the generalization on Wilson's "astounding social conversion" (p. 364). The treatment of Jacksonian Democracy and of the Whigs is superior; the presentation of the years 1890-1920, the least satisfactory. Use of G. H. Knoles's *The Presidential Campaign and Election of 1892* would have clarified the western aspects of that contest. It is doubtful whether the vote for Bryan in 1896 showed that he had lost both agrarians and industrial workers in greater New England. In particular does the treatment of the Progressive movement, in origin and in death, require correction and further development. The story of the campaign of 1912 is inadequate and misleading; the account of Hughes's campaign of 1916 is inaccurate, and the facts are available. No use has been made of Lynn Haines's *The Senate from 1907 to 1912*, the *Letters of A. P. Gardner* (1918), and, most remarkable of all, N. W. Stephenson's *Nelson W. Aldrich*.

The point of view of the author and the general nature of his presentation may be judged from a reference to Lincoln, and a summary of the situation at the end of the survey. Of Lincoln he writes (pp. x, xi), "Lincoln's method is by no means unique, but conforms to the practice of all the other national leaders, since each in his own day had to discover the points of agreement, the centripetal ideas,

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that would give cohesive force to a multi-group combination." Of the situation in 1943, the author writes (p. 389), "There would now seem to be no other way to a permanent Republican Party revival than deliberately to outbid the Democrats for the middle- and lower-income groups. This is the inescapable lesson of one hundred and fifty years of American party history."

It must be said that the natural history of parties has yet to be written, for party must be clearly defined and party organization given primary place in any such treatment. What is needed is an opening of party archives and a synthesis and analysis of the masses of information as to the personnel and sources of party strength. Then the life of party may be described, and the history of that life written. Elaboration of this view may be found in "The Place of Party in the Political History of the United States", in the *Proceedings of the Pacific Coast Branch of the American Historical Association*, 1928, pp. 11-36.

Professor Binkley's book is an important and stimulating study. The manuscript had the critical reading of a number of scholars, notably Charles A. Beard, and it was awarded the Alfred A. Knopf (1942) Fellowship in History.

EDGAR EUGENE ROBINSON
STANFORD UNIVERSITY

American Constitutional Development. By CARL BRENT SWISHER. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co. 1943.—xiii, 1079 pp. $7.50.

Professor Swisher, author of an excellent biography of Mr. Justice Field and an even better life of Chief Justice Taney, as well as numerous studies which have appeared in professional journals, now has the distinction of presenting the first constitutional history of the United States covering the entire period of its existence. This fact in itself would not make the book notable were it not for its many good qualities. It is no mere formal analysis of judicial decisions, but a presentation, with sure grasp and maturity and impartiality of judgment, of the social forces which shape constitutional principles. Moreover, the author has a knack of exposition which greatly aids the lay reader in comprehending subject matter of considerable intrinsic difficulty.

Apart from a few typographical slips overlooked in proofreading, the reviewer has noted no positive errors. Every page indicates that Professor Swisher has selected his material from an ample mass of scholarly information, and has a reason for each inclusion or exclu-

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sion, as well as for his plan of organization. If a reviewer is not altogether satisfied with the results, this evidence of careful procedure should warn him that in such matters of judgment agreement is not to be expected.

With this acknowledgment the present reviewer offers the following comments, not so much as pointing out errors as by way of indicating certain characteristics of the book under examination which may give users pause.

Approximately two thirds of the book is devoted to the years since the Civil War. This is the period neglected by previous writers, and is naturally the period of chief interest to students of contemporary problems. Hence the apportionment of space seems justified. Nevertheless it cramps the story of the first century, and leads to questionable omissions. There is only slight suggestion of the debt of American constitutionalism to antecedent thought and experience, and the regrettable impression is perpetuated that it was an almost indigenous product. Nor is there any account of the genesis of our dual system or explanation of the principle governing the distribution of powers which is perhaps the chief characteristic of the Constitution and the clue to a vast segment of constitutional history. There is scanty notice of the conflicting theories of the nature of the Union, and of the clashes which eventually resulted in the triumph of nationalism. Seemingly by deliberate intent little is said of Calhoun's theories, apparently because, representing a position now discredited, they have lost importance, if not interest. The same attitude is taken with regard to the theory of secession. Indeed, throughout the work there is little attention to the development of theories as such, and stress is laid upon those events which established principles of present-day significance.

However, this is not always done consistently. For example, one would hardly discover in the account of the debate over the acquisition of Louisiana, or of the later discussion of the principles applicable to the territory acquired from Mexico, or in the mention of Supreme Court decisions before 1850, that most of the problems raised by the Insular Cases at the end of the century had been faced before.

As an illustration of the avoidance of the history of the development of constitutional doctrines, the treatment of due process will serve. Its transformation from a procedural to a substantive concept, and the great debate over judicial usurpation which has resulted, are not mentioned. Yet this topic falls within the period

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which receives chief attention. In general, however, the author avoids technical discussions, which may in part explain this omission. Topics are often treated with little regard to the continuities. Much detail is given in some discussions which, as the author admits, have but an attenuated relation to constitutional history, while others with perhaps equal or greater intrinsic significance are slighted. An example of the latter class is the long struggle of organized labor against the anti-trust laws; several of the leading cases in this phase of history are relegated to footnote references without analysis.

Thus there is considerable unevenness of emphasis throughout. Whole chapters in the latter portion, while readable, interesting and devoted to topics of significance, give little more attention to the constitutional aspects of the subjects than would be expected in general histories.

The omissions and questionable stresses of this volume may not be noted by college students or casual readers, but, in the reviewer's judgment, a very promising work can be improved upon revision.

THE OHIO STATE UNIVERSITY HOMER C. HOCKETT

The Philosophy of Thomas Jefferson. By ADRIENNE KOCH. New York, Columbia University Press, 1943.—xiv, 208 pp. $2.50.

The author of this stimulating study, which was awarded the Woodbridge Prize in Philosophy at Columbia, is anxious that Jefferson be conceded the title of philosopher. She believes that to deny the title to a man so vitally interested in exploring ideas is "to argue adherence to a prejudiced definition of the term." Even in Professor Gilbert Chinard, whom she singles out from students of Jefferson for special praise, she sees a predilection for a formal tradition which causes him to deny Jefferson the humbler status of *philosophe*. Others, who have concentrated on his public life, have left his intellectual activities pretty much alone.

It must be admitted that most of the students who have viewed Jefferson from the vantage point of history have failed adequately to explore his mind. To them, and certainly to this reviewer, Miss Koch has performed a genuine service. In a way that they might not want and probably would not be able to do, Miss Koch has analyzed his thought in categories, under the major headings of ethics, philosophy and ideology, and theory of society, with numerous subheadings under each of these. She has combed his writings and

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found many admirable passages. She has even been enterprising enough to note the comments that he transcribed in his own books.

Whether or not she proves her case for him as a philosopher depends upon the definition. She disclaims the attempt to put him among the masters and the great system-makers. She shows that he thought much about almost everything, that his thinking was not chaotic but well articulated and essentially consistent, that he had a distinctly philosophical mind. She recognizes, also, that he was more interested in the practical uses of thought than in thought itself. She seems most successful in just those fields in which Jefferson was most concerned about applications—in the first and last of her major sections rather than the second. He still seems unreal in pure philosophy, and it still seems doubtful if his apparent acceptance of French ideology and Desutt de Tracy was as thoroughgoing or as meaningful as Miss Koch thinks. It seems, rather, that we are left in much the same place that many of us were in the beginning. We know that Jefferson had a philosophical mind, and that he was deeply thoughtful in all of the many fields in which he was a statesman, but we believe that he was essentially a practical man, after all.

We are not looking at precisely the same picture, however, for Miss Koch has definitely enriched it. A few examples may be cited, though others that are equally good could be found. She has clarified Jefferson's attitude toward Stoicism and Epicureanism, and has explained why deism rather than atheism developed in Protestant countries and appeared in him. She has strongly emphasized the moral and physiological basis of his thinking, and has illuminated his ideas about human nature and his doctrine of natural rights. Whether or not Jefferson can ever be classified exactly, it is important to know just what he thought about many things. Anyone who wants to find out can turn to this book with profit.

CHARLOTTESVILLE, VIRGINIA DUMAS MALONE

Slaves Need No Leaders: An Answer to the Fascist Challenge to Education. By WALTER M. KOTSCHNIG. New York, London and Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1943.—xv, 284 pp. $2.75.

Dr. Kotschnig, now professor of comparative education in Smith College, was for several years general secretary of the International Student Service at Geneva. In this volume he is concerned with education in the strategies of democratic advance, of fascist reaction, and of international reconstruction and organization after the war.

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Part I is a review of national policies in education from 1919 to 1939, followed by an account of "The Fascist War on Education" after 1939. Between the wars gradual, if halting, incomplete, and even confused, democratization characterized educational change in England and France, in Russia, and in the United States, though the democracies failed both to capitalize education as a constructive force and to guard adequately against its menace if misused. In Germany and Italy democratization was reversed and education transformed into an anti-intellectual instrument for racial propaganda and the militarization of the "master race".

The present war is, then, "a clash of mutually exclusive worlds of thought and aspiration", a struggle between those who would develop and those who would destroy "the heritage of Jerusalem, Athens, and Rome". Using such data as are available, Professor Kotschnig describes two phases of "The Fascist War on Education". In Denmark, Holland and Belgium, although the Nazis have encountered stiff resistance in their effort to remold education along anti-intellectual lines, the educational systems have not yet been destroyed. In the case of Slavic populations, however, buildings, equipment and personnel have been ruthlessly wiped out, for, comments Professor Kotschnig, "slaves are more useful if they are skilled, but they must not partake of an education which might prepare them for leadership" (p. 99).

Part Two is concerned with reconstruction, for which basic principles are first laid down. If "education by itself will never create either a new social or international order" (p. 122), nevertheless "any slighting of education, in the broadest sense as an instrument for the improvement of international relations, may well defeat again the best-intentioned plans for reconstruction in the political and economic field" (p. 121). Any peace likely to endure must be based on mutual understanding and coöperation—even of Germany, Japan and Italy—rather than on prejudice and force. Equality of opportunity — varied according to ability and the occupational needs of society, and accompanied by guidance and placement service—and a balance of intellectual and manual activity are strongly endorsed. Systematic education for understanding and support of an international order is emphasized as essential to peace and security.

Educational reconstruction in Europe is then related to relief and rehabilitation policies and considered in terms of physical equipment, teaching personnel, problems of physical and vocational education, and the special cases of Germany and Russia. While Professor

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Kotschnig's analysis of German character yields some hope for the regeneration of Nazis, it also makes clear the difficulties in the process. He holds out hope for the ending of Russian intellectual isolation and for Russian coöperation in the establishment of collective security. Proposals for the further democratization of education in England and the United States are reviewed, with attention to child and youth services, vocational education and work experience, guidance and placement, adult education, and education for international understanding and coöperation.

The need for an international educational authority, under the United Nations and whatever permanent organization may be established, is forcefully advanced against the background of earlier successes and failures. Specific suggestions for its organization and responsibilities are offered.

Professor Kotschnig's book is important and challenging to students of education, but its basic points are directed rather to the thoughtful public. It is that public which needs to realize "the moral and intellectual values which are in jeopardy", to be aware of the needs of education in post-war reconstruction, and to recognize that any effective program for international organization must be supported by a realistic program for curbing mis-education and developing informed world citizenship.

ERLING M. HUNT

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

The British Commonwealth at War. Edited by WILLIAM YANDELL ELLIOTT and H. DUNCAN HALL. New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1943.—xiv, 515, x pp. $5.00.

This book is composed of various contributions which attempt to give a survey of Great Britain and her Dominions at war. Though the different chapters, each one written by an expert in the field discussed, are of unequal value, some of them outdated and others only sketchy, they nevertheless offer an interesting picture of the mobilization of democracy for war, and thus present the possibility of comparison of mobilization for war in the British democracies and in the United States. The book does not deal at all with the British colonial empire, and the chapter on India is much too brief to be of any real value. Thus the book is confined to the measures adopted in Great Britain and in the Dominions, especially in Canada. In addition the book contains a chapter on wartime administration in

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Germany and Great Britain by Dr. Heinrich Bruening, the former German Chancellor and an expert in the field of public administration.

It is to be regretted that the colonial empire has not been included at all. For the great contribution which Britain has made to the spread of liberty throughout the world since the seventeenth century, and to the cause of world peace in the great crises provoked by Napoleon's ambitions and German plans for world hegemony, was possible only because Britain was a world-wide empire. Without that for him unfortunate circumstance Hitler would have achieved the realization of the most daring German dreams in 1940. It was then not the stand of the English people on the British isle, it was the cohesion of the empire around its strategic hub, the Middle East; it was the unswerving loyalty of its peoples and allies which thwarted Hitler's and Mussolini's expectations. Like the Russian empire, the British empire emerged from its mortal crisis not weakened but immensely strengthened, liquidating not itself, as the Fascists had hoped, but its own inclination to cynicism, to renunciation and self-abandonment.

It is important to remember the fact that, outside the Dominions which are independent nations and India, the British empire is relatively smaller than most other empires. It contains only 60 million inhabitants as against 46 millions in the mother country, while the French empire counts 64 millions in the colonies as against 42 millions in the metropolis, the Dutch empire 60 millions as against 8 millions in the Netherlands, and the Portuguese empire over 10 millions in the colonial possessions as against 7 millions in the mother country. Compared with the population of the Chinese empire or the vastness of the Russian empire, the British colonial empire seems slight. Yet its contribution to the war effort was very great: without Gibraltar and Malta, without the Sudan and Tanganyika, without Trincomalee in Ceylon and the imperial alliances with Egypt and Iraq, the United Nations never could have hoped to win the war. The British empire has developed in the last century the greatest flexibility in its relations among its component parts, so flexible and varied that to the more logical and rigid mind of continental European observers the empire seemed disintegrating. Yet in the two greatest wars of history it has shown a surprising vitality and cohesion.

Nevertheless the fear that the imperial ties might become too loose may not be unfounded. The great task before the international

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world today is the quest for integration, for common action, for greater coördination. The British empire has developed, not only in the present Dominions but also in India and soon in other parts of the empire, to a situation in which common action and a common policy for peace are in no way guaranteed, but in which each part of the empire may go its own way, thus endangering the common interest of peace and liberty. The development of the British empire led to a point where clearly defined commitments of its members to come to each other's assistance were lacking, thus being logically weaker as a potential force for unity and peace than the old League of Nations. It is true that in the case of the British empire traditional loyalties replaced legal ties, and that these traditional loyalties proved stronger than any legal covenants. The result of the election in the Union of South Africa in July 1943 was perhaps the best possible testimony to the strength of traditional loyalties. After World War II, when many experiments will be made with new and untried legal ties, covenants and associations, it will be the more important to strengthen the existing and well-tried organs of coöperation and united action like the British, French and Russian empires. They have stood the test of trial.

It is interesting to note that this coöperation was discernible even without the stress of war. The policy of appeasement followed by the government of Neville Chamberlain was not a British policy, but a policy supported wholeheartedly and agreed upon by the Dominions and the whole commonwealth. And when under Winston Churchill a new spirit animated the British people, then again the Dominions fully shared in the "glorious resilience and flexibility of our ancient institutions", as Mr. Churchill put it. Thus the collaboration, as the result of ancient institutions and loyalties, became a fact in spite of the lack of legal ties. Yet it demanded "endless patience and a degree of political maturity and wisdom" which is probably found nowhere else, outside Britain.

The problem before the British empire is the same as that before the international community as a whole, namely, to create a situation in which no member of the community can remain neutral in respect of the fate of other members. The empire will perhaps have to find more definite legal ties after World War II, giving to its moral strength a foundation in law. To a certain extent it will have to reverse the trend of the last decades. Probably the methods it will adopt will serve as an example to the international community as a whole. These important and most timely questions are discussed

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with great lucidity and incisiveness in the chapter "The British Commonwealth of Nations in War and Peace", written by H. Duncan Hall who is specially qualified for it: he is an Australian who has served for twelve years with the secretariat of the League of Nations in charge of liaison with the British Dominions. It may be worth while to reprint this chapter, bringing it up to date, as a special booklet. It will be found most helpful by all those who are studying the functioning of the international community after this war and its various problems. One may not always agree with Mr. Hall and may think him too optimistic about the future of the British commonwealth and of international coöperation, but his discussion is always suggestive. Though technical at times, and scholarly throughout, this essay is written in a style which would appeal to the general reader to whom it should be made accessible.

HANS KOHN

SMITH COLLEGE

Total War: The Economic Theory of a War Economy. By JOHN BURNHAM. Boston, Meador Publishing Company, 1943.—339 pp. $2.00.

Dr. Burnham's volume is a valuable addition to the growing literature of war economics. There are, in the main, three approaches to the economic aspects of warfare. First, there is ample opportunity for the economic theorist, whose abstractions from concrete phenomena are concerned with the operations of the price system under wartime conditions and with the manifold problems which the general pattern of war finance creates. In this field Pigou's studies have set a standard which is still unexcelled. There is, second, need for realistic analyses of the concrete wartime policies of specific countries with due emphasis upon institutions, historical background, and the national character, which may diminish the usefulness of certain policies and enhance that of others. Apart from these aspects of war economics there is some limited opportunity for the elaboration *in abstracto* of a set of economic policies which are recommended without much regard for institutional factors.

Dr. Burnham's main concern is with this aspect af the matter. It is the purpose of the study "to suggest how much more can be done to win this war than is now being attempted." Consequently the book is not so much "The Economic Theory of a War Economy" but rather an outline of policies advocated by the author. Dr. Burn-

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ham is aware of the fact that some of the measures which he proposes are not politically feasible. He believes that "our efforts at industrial mobilization for war have been half-hearted and poorly planned" and is in favor of a more severe curtailment of civilian consumption. In this connection the author criticizes our willingness to permit retail stores "to sell more goods during the first year after Pearl Harbor than they had sold in any preceding year of our history."[1] He wants to have prohibition readopted during this war since "it is much easier to enforce prohibition measures in time of war than in time of peace because they have an obviously patriotic appeal at such times. Tobacco, coffee and tea are also considered harmful by nearly all medical authorities and are certainly not necessary to the health of the people. They ought to be given up temporarily."

Dr. Burnham is averse to rationing and believes that "the United States will probably not suffer from any food or clothing shortages so serious that they cannot be ended by higher prices and adequate taxation." He holds that the political obstacles to high wartime taxes are overrated and that "a great liberal political leader, like President Roosevelt, is in a position to explain the real issues of this question to the people over the radio." His tax program includes income tax rates which would yield 30 to 40 per cent of a national income of $100,000,000,000 and a general sales tax productive of another 20 to 25 per cent. "To raise such a sum would require an average sales tax of about 60 percent on all consumers' goods and services."

HENRY W. SPIEGEL

DUQUESNE UNIVERSITY

Amphibious Warfare and Combined Operations. By LORD KEYES. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943.—101 pp. $1.50.

Although delivered in 1943, the six lectures which make up this small book mention only incidentally the Allied landings in North Africa—the first example (in modern times) of a large-scale seaborne invasion of enemy shores. It seems a case of Hamlet with Hamlet left out. The operations discussed range from 1759 to the Dieppe raid in 1942 (which the author terms "an ill-conceived and

[1] Retail store sales rose from $54,200,000,000 in 1941 to $56,200,000,000 in 1942, but the index of wholesale prices rose from 87.3 to 98.8 and that of the cost of living from 105.2 to 116.5.

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ill-fated enterprise"). In three of them the author himself played a leading part, but otherwise it seems a haphazard selection. It is fair to say that in his use of the term "Combined Operations" he tends to confuse two different things: (1) a large-scale sea-borne invasion; (2) a small local operation, or a hit-and-run affair—such as a Commando raid.

This confusion is no incidental fault of treatment. With an outstanding record as a fearless and energetic leader, Admiral Keyes is all for bold and daring actions of detail: he is definitely a soloist, with a preference for separate and independent actions. With little sense of proportion, such enterprises are played up as undertakings of "decisive" importance—and he tends to ignore the problem raised by the over-all conduct of a war. He is fiercely impatient when these larger necessities do not make way for the local and rather isolated affairs his heart is set on.

After Dunkirk, Mr. Churchill brought him forward from retirement to become Director of Combined Operations; in this new post, during the following year or so, Admiral Keyes organized and brought into being the Commandos. During this time, he submitted a "plan in outline" which the enthusiastic Mr. Churchill declared "would electrify the world and alter the whole strategic situation" in the given area. (A thoroughly alarming comment; it brings back the Churchill of 1915.) The electrification, however, had to await the study of those responsible for such items as troops, ships, equipment and supply; and in the end the Chiefs of Staff "decided that the odds were 3 to 1 against it and it was finally cancelled, although I, the officer selected by the Prime Minister to command it, . . . was confident of success. . . ." Later on, Admiral Keyes ceased to be Director of Combined Operations.

The main point of this final chapter is a miscellaneous denunciation of the system of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, which the author scorns as "a limited liability company". He stands up to the end for the one-man system of personal intuitions—against the general solution worked out in Britain and America which puts the actual conduct of the war under the heads of all three Services working in close coördination. The "limited liability company" has no doubt nipped in the bud many schemes to electrify the world by dashing exploits of *petits pacquets*. It has, however, got well under way our far-reaching counteroffensive in the Pacific. It has achieved the sea-borne invasions of North Africa, Sicily and Italy: all three brilliantly successful, and involving complexities of tech-

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nique and matériel that are pretty clearly outside Admiral Keyes's horizon.

His efforts to discredit this institution serve instead to bring out the more clearly the faults and dangers it was designed to prevent: the net result is to extol the very thing he attacks.

At an early stage in the war, an insider in London complained bitterly to the author, "We politicians bear all the responsibility, but the Chiefs of Staff have all the power." It is a thoroughly reassuring disclosure, and explains in no small degree Mr. Churchill's success in building along sound lines throughout the bitterly trying period from June 1940 to October 1942. Let us hope that the Allied Chiefs of Staff had the deciding voice when it came to deciding whether or not to undertake the invasion of the Continent, and that the conduct of that fateful operation will remain wholly in their hands.

It is to be noted that, in regard to that undertaking, Englishmen and Americans have from the very first floundered in a similar confusion of thought: they have consistently confused Commando raids with the wholly different task of a large-scale continental invasion. Ever since the assault on Russia in 1941, they have assumed without question that the large forces required for invasion were already at hand, marking time, in England. The vast publicity given the Commandos (which no doubt had sound reasons behind it) has been in no small degree responsible for that illusion. Transferred eagerly to Russia, this whole set of fallacies has misled and embittered Russian opinion, and has established there the unquestioned conviction that Britain (and America) were holding back. This falsehood, in turn, has been vigorously exploited both in America and Britain—for party purposes, from ignorance, and inability to stand out against catchwords—and in large part merely to serve the personal opportunism of innumerable commentators and columnists. Its evil effects can never be wholly undone.

Today we know that thousands and thousands of the troops necessary for the great adventure are still awaiting their turn to reach embarkation points on this side of the Atlantic; and that American shipyards are still working—on 24-hour shifts—to complete the last échelon of new landing craft essential to the plan.

Never has a confusion of ideas—one quite gratuitous and unnecessary—built itself up into so formidable an influence upon the general conduct of a war.

T. H. THOMAS

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

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The Spanish Labyrinth: An Account of the Social and Political Background of the Civil War. By GERALD BRENAN. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, the Macmillan Co., 1943.—xix, 384 pp. $3.50.

This is the most satisfactory book on modern Spain among the many that have appeared out of the passions of the political strife and civil war of the last two decades. Mr. Brenan, who has actually lived on the land in Spain, knows the Spanish agrarian problem—basic to all other Spanish problems—better than most foreigners, and, because he is a foreigner, is more objective about all Spanish problems than most Spaniards can be.

His book is a careful historical study of the elements, economic, social and political, that have grown up to make the internal situation in Spain one of the most difficult and complicated among those of modern nations. It begins with several chapters devoted to the history of the *ancien régime* in Spain from 1874 to 1931, and the history is sound. It is impossible, indeed, to understand the present in Spain—that is, since 1931—without a pretty thorough understanding of the economic, social, political and ideological alignments that developed among the Spanish people during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Mr. Brenan has gone to great pains to find the facts as to the historical background of the Spanish present, and his surveys of the emergence and rise of the Catalan problem, the struggle of liberalism with a reactionary church, the rise of syndicalism and the efforts of the military *juntas* to suppress it, and the dictatorship of Primo de Rivera are as adequate and as sound as it seems possible to make them in such a short compass.

The second part of the book is an analysis of the condition of the working classes, basic to which are the poverty of the Spanish soil for the agrarian workers and the advent of industrialism in such cities as Barcelona and Bilbao for the urban proletariat. Geography and the historically derived social conditions in Spain being what they are, it is easy to see why the peculiar doctrines of syndicalism, anarchism, and what came to be called anarcho-syndicalism should have had such a deep and powerful appeal for the Spanish people. But the more profound aspect of the Spanish working-class movement, and one which non-Spaniards might well make a special effort to understand, is its character as a sort of evangel, a sort of gospel of human welfare that is almost a religion, that has come to supplant Catholicism in the hearts of the masses of workers. It is a move-

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ment, an ideal, that must be understood—and respected—if contemporary Spain is to be understood.

The fact seems to be that modern Spain is divided between two irreconcilable groups of interests, those represented by the reactionary, post-medieval vested interests of aristocracy, church, military and monarchy, on the one side, and those represented by the agrarian workers, the industrial proletariat and the lower middle classes on the other. The republic of 1931 was essentially an institution set up to resolve the conflict between these two sets of interests and to bring Spanish social and political institutions more nearly abreast of the times by a democratic method. The reactionary vested interests naturally saw no good in it, and the civil war of 1936-1939 began as a war to destroy the republic and to guarantee the privileges of the reactionary interests. This book, however, stops there, having given a very satisfactory survey of the history of the republic and its efforts to solve the Spanish problem.

Basic to that problem are about three major conditions in Spain, without a rational accommodation of which the Spanish problem can never be solved, by Franco or anyone else. Most important is the fact that the Spanish soil is simply incapable of supporting both peasant and aristocrat. One or the other of them will have to make some sacrifice if the agrarian question is to be answered. The second, and increasingly important, factor is the growth of regionalism, most especially in Catalonia and the Basque provinces, but with an increasing intensity in other regions like Galicia, Aragon and Valencia. And these regionalisms must be satisfied before Spain can have peace—perhaps, as Pi y Margal first suggested, by a federalism patterned after that of the United States. The third great factor is Spanish individualism and egalitarianism, which make it appear hardly possible for Spain to find its salvation in any ideology that fails to take both these characteristics into account.

The author of this book seems to think that some sort of socialism for Spain is the answer that must eventually be found. As he says (p. 226), "if within the next two centuries there is a happy and peaceful future awaiting Spain, one may predict that it will be in a weak and paternal Socialist régime, giving ample regional and municipal autonomy: a régime not unlike the system under which Spain lived in the early seventeenth century." With this we are inclined to agree.

MAX SAVELLE

STANFORD UNIVERSITY

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The Russian Enigma: An Interpretation. By WILLIAM HENRY CHAMBERLIN. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1943. —viii, 321 pp. $2.75.

William Henry Chamberlin has probably done more than any other American author to interpret the Soviet Union to the English-speaking world. His *Russian Enigma* is particularly welcome at a time when the retreat of the German armies on the eastern front has greatly contributed to the confusion of American opinion on the Soviet experiment. Mr. Chamberlin has an intimate first-hand knowledge of Russia, and his latest book, like his earlier writings, discloses familiarity with Russian history, keen sympathy (untinged, however, with emotional exaggeration and sociological dogmatism) with a country where he spent a number of years, and, above all, those rare qualities of common-sense judgment, courage and sterling honesty which are not often found in recent books on the U.S.S.R. Between the covers of a small and readable volume he has succeeded in presenting a remarkably comprehensive picture of Russia's transformation since 1917, drawn against the background of history. His discussion provides much illuminating information on Russian land and people, the origin and the character of the revolution, the evolution of Soviet ideology, Stalin ("The Man and the Legends"), government, economic structure, foreign policy, the purges and the army. A chapter on "The Supreme Struggle" gives a masterly survey of the Soviet-German war, while the two closing chapters deal with the sources of Russia's strength and her probable place in the post-war world.

Mr. Chamberlin shares the prevalent view that close coöperation between the democracies and the Soviet Union is highly desirable, but he also believes that "enduring friendship" cannot be built "on the basis of falsehood and propaganda." He puts his finger on the fundamental difference between this country and Russia when he observes that "the American has always known the minimum, the Russian the maximum of state compulsion in daily life." "The heritage of tsarist absolutism", writes Mr. Chamberlin, "has achieved a curious yet logical mating with the new absolutism that is implicit in any system where an omnipotent state takes over the whole economy, where every individual becomes dependent on the government for his livelihood. Out of the Russian revolution has emerged what may well be the strongest and what is certainly the most complete and consistent type of totalitarian state."

Commenting on current developments, Mr. Chamberlin wisely remarks that "the whole German-Soviet war, officially christened in

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Russia the Great Patriotic war, is certainly the least accurately known of all the great conflicts of modern history." The author ascribes Russia's power of resistance, which came as a surprise to many observers, to the following five reasons, although he would not commit himself as to their relative importance: (1) "strong revival of nationalism and other conservative changes of the last decade"; (2) "revolutionary dynamism" similar to the one that inspires Hitler's legions; (3) "superior military and economic preparedness" inherent in the nature of a totalitarian state; (4) "certain natural features of Russia, vast size, large population, rich and widely dispersed natural resources"; and (5) the fact that "the Soviet Union was fortunate in being drawn into the war [much against Stalin's will] at a time when Great Britain was already a full-fledged combatant and the United States was clearly steering its course towards intervention." It is the reviewer's belief that future historians (provided, of course, that historiography independent of official inspiration will survive in the post-war world) will put the chief emphasis on the last two causes listed by Mr. Chamberlin. It must not be forgotten that the new Russian nationalism, as Mr. Chamberlin makes it clear, antedates the war by several years and that in view of the absence of free press and free expression of opinion in Russia there is no way of determining whether this nationalistic revival is genuine or just another synthetic product of the propaganda machine. This is not a mere academic question. "A Communist Party that is taking on more and more the functions and psychology of a combination Rotary Club and National Association of Manufacturers, under Soviet conditions, is not likely to be a torchbearer of international revolution [writes Mr. Chamberlin]. . . . On the other hand, the new Russia that is emerging before our eyes is brimming over with nationalistic pride and self-assertion. When it is a question of strategic frontiers, of strictly Russian national interests and prestige, Stalin may be a harder bargainer than Lenin."

MICHAEL T. FLORINSKY

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

What To Do With Italy. By GAETANO SALVEMINI and GEORGE LA PIANA. New York, Duell, Sloan and Pearce, 1943.—xxii, 301 pp. $2.75.

At the foot of their last page the authors of this book wrote the date July 8, 1943. That was less than three weeks before the fall of Mussolini, which precipitated a flow of events the outcome of

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which remains the future's secret. The main value of the book, therefore, consists in its being a document that illustrates the moderate Leftist, republican and anticlerical view of the Italian question on the eve of the liquidation of Fascism. Messrs. Salvemini and La Piana were filled with pessimism for the future of their native land, and, although one can hardly imagine a worse plight than the one into which Italy has fallen, probably the course of events since July has surprised no one more than these émigré writers.

They were confidently expecting British Tories, American State Department "reactionaries" and the Vatican clericals to produce a Darlan "to save what can be saved of Fascism." The man, they thought, had actually been chosen; he was Count Grandi. The King and even the Duce himself were privy to the scheme and approved it. That the King might use Grandi (as he may well have done) to unhorse Mussolini, and then put in his own man Badoglio, who alone could deceive the Germans, was a possibility that did not occur to Salvemini and La Piana. They were cocksure in prophesying, but they had no prevision of the course of events. Much of their book became obsolete, indeed, before the ink on it had dried.

But that is not to deny it a certain positive value. The authors present some just criticism of blundering Allied propaganda in Italy, especially of that which issued from the British Ministry of Information. The dominant theme of this propaganda was Italian cowardice; yet it was punctuated by flattery of potential Italian Darlans, by appeals to revolt against "the one man", and by arrogant threats of fire and slaughter if the contemptible cowards did not rise heroically and overthrow their German masters. Another merit of the book lies in its shrewd observations on the corruptive influence which Fascism exerted on Italian religion. Under the guise of teaching Catholicism—not as a religion believed to be true but as an important element in the national patriotic myth—Fascist educators succeeded in perverting Italian Catholicism and in paganizing Italian youth.

That is not to say Salvemini and La Piana have essayed the rôle of defenders of the faith—far from it! They are hardly less hostile to the Vatican than to Mussolini and his now scattered band of henchmen. They want a thoroughly secularized, anticlerical and republican Italy; they loathe its Catholic royal house. As Mussolini sought a Fascist Catholicism, they seek a "democratized" Catholicism; no more than the Duce have they any use for religion except as a tool for fashioning the kind of political order that pleases them, and the order they desire is opposed to much in Italian traditional

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ways of life and thought. It is perhaps significant that they have addressed themselves to the question "what to do with Italy", rather than what Italy herself may elect to do.

Their book is written in animated style and with some very penetrating insights, but its value as an objective account is diminished by the failure to discriminate between royalist conservatives and traditionalists on the one hand, and Fascists on the other. Not all on the Right are Fascists. The gulf between Badoglio and Mussolini is probably wider than the gulf between Mussolini and Sforza, or Salvemini himself. Fascism was not a "conservative" reaction but a revolution of nihilism. Not to see that is to run the risk of making serious errors in political judgment. Salvemini and La Piana have done precisely that.

ROSS HOFFMAN

FORDHAM UNIVERSITY

Czechoslovakia in European History. By S. HARRISON THOMSON. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1943.—viii, 390 pp. $3.75.

This admirable volume comes as a most welcome addition to works in English on Czechoslovakia. It is not a "history" in the orthodox or detailed sense but rather an attempt to show how the lands of the Bohemian Crown together with Slovakia and Ruthenia came in the end to have a common destiny. The book is as skilfully contrived as it is attractively printed. The author sketches the emergence of a powerful Bohemian kingdom under the Přemyslids and traces its fortunes through the Middle Ages. "The Emperor", he writes (p. 20), "never maintained a representative in Bohemia who could in any way exercise any influence in internal affairs or could legally bring any pressure upon the ruler in the exercise of his sovereign rights." After 1526 the Hapburgs soon trampled upon the ancient liberties of the kingdom, yet they found it politically most valuable to them and were able "to use their strong legal position as kings of Bohemia in order to extend their influence into the Empire" (p. 41).

The problem of Czech-German relations which runs as a thread through the book is singled out for special treatment in chapters vi and vii. In comparison with special studies such as Miss Wiskemann's *Czechs and Germans,* Professor Thomson's pages would seem to be the more distinguished for insight and ripe judgment. To some degree they confirm Palacký's statement that "the essential

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content of Czech history is a perpetual struggle between the German and Slav elements," and it is perfectly obvious where the author's sympathies lie. He gives pungent quotations from medieval texts protesting against the arrival of the German "vultures", and yet one can find numerous pages where the cultural contribution of the German element receives fair recognition. (See, for example, pp. 96-97, 101, 111, 132.) Professor Thompson recognizes that the problem is not that of a crude and simple incompatibility; he points out that the *Landespatriotismus* of both Czechs and Germans long settled in Bohemia has at times led them to unite in protest against the newcomers — the *alienigenae*. "Whenever the Czech-German question has become acute," he writes, (p. 114), "the precipitant has come from outside."

The book has an excellent chapter on the Czech national revival and an essay on the Slovaks which must be considered an indispensable reference on the subject. About one third of the volume deals with the period from 1914 to 1942. Full justice is done to the "majestic figure" of Masaryk. We are given an account of the acquiring of independence, of solid internal growth, and of the broad lines of foreign policy. The last days of the Republic are described with general restraint, though one can appreciate a passage such as the following: "The mission of Lord Runciman is one of those sordid affairs best openly admitted as such and then forgotten. Czech opinion recognized it for what it was—ill concealed blackmail—and was indignant" (p. 335).

It would have been possible to write a book with the same title which would have contained a good deal more diplomatic history, but one need not reproach the author for failing in what he did not intend to do. A linguistic map would have been a useful addition to the two very clear ones which the volume contains. There is an excellent bibliography with a large proportion of works in Czech. Fertile in suggestions and eminently readable, this volume gives evidence on every page of the competence of its author. As a corrective to that school which focuses its attention upon western Europe and which reads its history in the light of the Rhine policy of Louis XIV or Napoleon III, it should be judged one of the most useful studies to appear in recent years. The present reviewer ended his reading with an idle speculation: if only this book had been written ten years ago and those in high places had pondered its contents!

ERNEST JOHN KNAPTON

WHEATON COLLEGE

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Europe and Italy's Acquisition of Libya, 1911-1912. By WILLIAM C. ASKEW. Durham, Duke University Press, 1942.—ix, 317 pp. $3.50.

The Tripolitan war of 1911-1912, a link between the Agadir crisis and the first Balkan war, is an important episode in the unfolding of Italian policy as well as in the tangled story of European diplomacy. These two aspects, especially the latter, are the subject of the present monograph. Italy, centrally situated in the delicate European power balance, was a particularly sensitive focus of competing forces, which fact adds interest to the study of her foreign policy.

The lack of the Italian documents is an unavoidable handicap in the treatment of such a topic. But the official publications of other countries together with the extensive literature, Italian and other, on the subject make it unlikely that further disclosures will change the essentials of the picture.

Italy had been slow in realizing colonial ambitions, chiefly "because of her inherent weakness after the achievement of unification" (pp. 3, 267). Although she considered Tripoli her special preserve ever since the establishment of the French protectorate over Tunisia, thirty years elapsed before she took possession. The second Moroccan crisis decided her to cash the blank check that she had meanwhile obtained from the Powers. The main portion of the book is devoted to a study of the dealings of the various European chancelleries as the result of the outbreak of war and while the war lasted.

Despite the blank check, the general reaction was one of annoyance, for the war introduced a disturbing element in the unstable European equilibrium. Italy's allies, especially Germany, were put in an embarrassing position by her attack on Turkey which they were seeking to draw within their orbit. Relations were particularly difficult with Austria-Hungary who strenuously opposed any Italian action in the Adriatic or the Aegean. The Entente on its side was anxious lest the *tour de valse* come to an untimely end. Franco-Italian relations soon became strained, but Russia was consistently friendly to Italy. She thought of exploiting the situation to her own advantage, in which endeavor she did not always see eye to eye with her associates. The author gives a good analysis of the stresses brought out within each system of alliances. On her side, Italy was cautious in judging how far she could play the possibility of raising complications by the threat of action in the Straits. It was in the end fear of such complications, in the Balkans, which induced the

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Powers to urge Turkey to yield and persuaded her to do so in order to concentrate on the coming Balkan storm.

The generally accepted views of the policy of the various Powers are confirmed in this book, which will serve as a useful reference. It presents a complete treatment of a specific topic, and can be recommended for its thoroughness and fairmindedness. One should not criticize an author for not doing that which he does not intend to do, but a discussion of the relation which the episode bears to the larger subject of Italian foreign and colonial policy, before and after the war itself, would have enhanced the value of his treatment.

RENÉ ALBRECHT-CARRIÉ

QUEENS COLLEGE

Free China's New Deal. By HUBERT FREYN. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1943.—xviii, 277 pp. $2.50.

This book might appropriately carry the title "China Invictis", for its pages describe important wartime developments which, taken in conjunction with the indomitable spirit of the Chinese people, justify the conviction that China will emerge triumphant from its present ordeal to take its proper place among the great nations of the earth. Other writers have dwelt upon the heroism of China's poorly equipped armies, upon the tragic sufferings of the civilian population, upon the inspiring leadership of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek and his brilliant wife, or upon the ideological conflict between the Kuomintang and the Chinese communists. Mr. Freyn has chosen to pass over these more dramatic aspects of China's struggle and to tell the story of China's resources and Chinese resourcefulness: two factors without which heroism, suffering and leadership might well have been of no avail.

At the end of October 1938, after the fall of Hankow and Canton, Japan's military leaders and the greater part of the neutral world regarded the conquest of China as an accomplished fact. The Chinese, however, had only begun to fight. Driven from their rich coastal lowlands and from their recently developed industrial cities, the Chinese government and upwards of fifty million civilian refugees withdrew before the advancing Japanese war machine into the mountainous and undeveloped provinces of the west, there to continue their struggle for national independence and, even in the midst of war, to build for the future. The Old China of Treaty Port days was, indeed, dead; but New China was being born.

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Thoroughly appreciating the difficulties of the task confronting the Chinese people and their government—a task which he likens to "lifting itself by its own boot-straps"—Mr. Freyn analyzes the problems of wartime reconstruction, first topically and then regionally. In Part I of his book, "National Resources and Their Use", he deals successively with Agriculture and Animal Husbandry, Mining and Mineral Resources, Industrial Development, The Chinese Industrial Cooperatives, Communications, Foreign Trade, Government Finance, The Land Problem, Price Movements and Living Standards, and Democratization and Centralization. Part II, "Modernization in the Provinces", traces province by province the success with which the program has been carried out by the various local governments and concludes with a brief chapter on the Post-War Outlook.

Despite a wealth of factual material—some derived from the Chinese Ministry of Information and the rest accumulated by the author during the seven years of residence and study in China—the book is no mere compilation of facts. It is an appreciative and sympathetic study of a nation in travail; and the broad understanding by which the study is enlightened may be attributed as much to the experiences of the author's early life as to his first-hand knowledge of China. A Czechoslovakian by birth and an officer in the Austro-Hungarian army during the first World War, Mr. Freyn came to the United States in 1923. In 1932 he graduated from New York University, where he had majored in Economics. Two years later he received his Master's degree in Chinese from Columbia and was given a scholarship at Yenching University, Peiping, for the study of Chinese language and civilization. Trained in Economics and already well advanced in the study of Chinese, he therefore arrived in China with an even more valuable qualification for studying China's efforts toward national reorganization: a background of experience in the wartime disorder and post-war reconstruction of his native land.

It is unfortunate that the publishers have failed to provide the book with any maps. Yet even this shortcoming does not keep it from being one of the most valuable recent publications on the subject of present-day China. If Mr. Freyn's survey finds the market that it deserves, the reading public will be far better informed than it now is with respect both to China's wartime achievements and to the even greater tasks that will confront the nation at the end of the war.

G. Nye Steiger

Simmons College

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The Duke: Being an Account of the Life and Achievements of Arthur Wellesley, 1st Duke of Wellington. By RICHARD ALDINGTON. New York, The Viking Press, 1943.—x, 405 pp. $3.75.

The Duke of Wellington is an excellent subject for a biographer. He had a strong personality and decided opinions; his life was crowded with achievements; and long before his death in 1852 he had acquired a unique position as a national institution—a sage and an oracle whose advice was sought on all sorts of questions.

Mr. Aldington became impressed with the grandeur of "the Duke" early in the present century while attending a school which overlooked the park of Walmer Castle, Wellington's residence as Lord Warden of the Cinque Ports. The author feels that "the Duke" has been disparaged by writers of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries—a fact attributed to Napoleonic propaganda—and the purpose of the book is to redress the balance. But the bias is not obtrusive. Mr. Aldington presents a well-organized and well-written account of the life of the Iron Duke from the cradle to the grave, with only a relatively brief amount of space given to the ancestry and early surroundings. Stress is laid on Wellington's military achievements, his integrity, straightforwardness, and robust common sense. That "the Duke" failed to appreciate impacts made upon his countrymen by new democratic ideas and by the Industrial Revolution is largely ignored; and Mr. Aldington misses the point that Wellington's failure to appreciate the need for reform rather than Napoleonic propaganda is responsible for current views on him as a statesman.

Those who are familiar with Philip Guedalla's *Wellington* will get little that is new either of fact or of interpretation in Mr. Aldington's *The Duke*. Both authors have relied on printed sources, used *Hansard* sparingly, and neglected manuscript material, among which in available collections the Peel Papers are especially rich in Wellingtoniana. Mr. Aldington has also overlooked the recently published *Correspondence* of Wellington's alter ego, Charles Arbuthnot.

The omission of a serious discussion of Wellington's attitude toward social, economic and colonial reform constitutes a blemish in this book which purports to be a full-length biography. The author is accurate in details of Wellington's life but unfortunate in some of his obiter dicta. It will be news to many that "the communists of 1871 went down before the Prussian bayonets" (p. 268), and that "The English cut off King Charles I's head for making a collec-

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tion of pictures and projecting a palace by Inigo Jones" (p. 283). Although Mr. Aldington can be convicted of sins of omission and commission, this book has solid merits in both style and content; in the latter because Wellington was more than a die-hard Tory. He had a warm human heart; he hated war; he was responsible for some of the best parts of the peace settlement with France, 1814-15; he was an honest man; and, despite a myopic view on many issues, he was both a great English patriot and a great European.

PAUL KNAPLUND

THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN

From Economic Theory to Policy. By E. RONALD WALKER. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1943. — vii, 273 pp. $3.00.

This book is concerned with the central problem of the relation of theory to reality and to policies seeking to maintain or modify existing economic structure. The basic premise is that theory is an indispensable tool both for understanding and explaining the here and now, and for advising policy-makers on how best to reach certain defined good ends or avoid possible evils. "The chief function of economic theory emerges as the *classification* of the observable facts according to a significant scheme." The categories of the scheme must be given practical application for understanding specific conditions. "In this descent from generalities to particulars, which constitutes the application of theory to practice, the rôle of theory inevitably appears as the provision of a significant list of *things to look for*."

The problem becomes one of how to make theory realistic—that is, capable of accurately calling attention to the most significant factors in specific situations. Consideration of the problem in this way leads Dr. Walker into a discussion of the relation of economic theory to other sciences, since some of the basic premises on which any economic theory must operate derive from the work of psychologists, sociologists, and others. In addition, realistic economic theory must cope with the dynamic character of those conditions out of which the more purely economic premises grow.

Dr. Walker illustrates the problem in relation to the writings of various economists from Malthus to Schumpeter, and presents an exposition of what he calls "theoretic blight", a disposition, common

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to theoreticians, to satisfy their souls with the logical symmetries of favored theoretical systems whether or not supported by empirical evidence—in fact, a disposition to avoid rigid empirical tests for fear that the theoretical system may have to be reconstructed. What is required is a theoretic method; that is, a method of analysis and synthesis which is self-corrective in terms of the tests which it applies to its own development and its relation to the economic facts it attempts to explain.

Dr. Walker undertakes to set forth some advance steps in the "theory of economic development", but, in the judgment of this reviewer, he does not make any very substantial progress in developing a methodology for economic theory. He does not succeed in coming to grips with the relation between cause-effect and means-end premises of social analysis, and he sips but does not drink deeply of the institutional waters. His discussion would also benefit from a more explicit recognition of the relation between the principles explaining an existing system and the principles of evolution from one system to another. There is a vast difference between explaining the automobile as it is and explaining the principles controlling its evolution into something else.

Dr. Walker is employed by the Department of War Organization of Industry in Melbourne, Australia. Consequently he has some very interesting things to say about the place of the economist as adviser to the policy-maker and administrator. He has found, for example: "There is one trait, however, which is common to all executives who seek advice; namely, an appetite for definite conclusions rather than for a nice balancing of all the relevant considerations which make decision difficult." There probably has been no example of mass organization of economic theory applied to practical problems to compare with our Office of Price Administration. When, and if, the history of that agency is adequately written, one of its most interesting chapters will have to do with the policy consequences of first placing the economists in executive positions and then displacing them with business men with marked "appetites for definite conclusions" and a vast impatience with the careful exhausting of various alternatives to inflationary rulings in the effort to maintain price control.

Dr. Walker's thesis is of great importance to the politician and the administrator, but his writing is for, and will chiefly be read by, the professional economist.

HARVEY PINNEY

WASHINGTON, D. C.

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Technology and Livelihood: An Inquiry into the Changing Technological Basis for Production as Affecting Employment and Living Standards. By MARY L. FLEDDÉRUS and MARY VAN KLEECK. New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1944.—vi, 237 pp. $1.25.

This excellent book, by such competent observers as Miss Fleddérus and Miss van Kleeck, brings together, in one volume, some of the most pertinent facts about our industrial economy. It describes the effects of technology on employment and living standards and indicates clearly the problems we face in adjusting our society to the forces of the machine age. The book is divided into two sections. Part One, consisting of 145 pages, records the nature of technological change in the basic industries, including the mineral industries, agriculture, construction, transportation, as well as those based upon electrical and chemical processes. Part Two, consisting of 58 pages, deals with the problems of the changes in labor requirements and employment opportunities resulting from the use of the machine. An Appendix of 27 pages contains a memorandum by Miss Fleddérus on optimum productivity in the workshop, prepared for the Department of Industrial Studies of the Russell Sage Foundation, and a synopsis of each chapter of the book and a memorandum on the sources of information and the scope of the inquiry.

A substantial portion of Part One consists of quoted matter drawn from a wide range of authoritative writings but principally from the reports of the National Resources Committee. This study (in the words of the authors) "is an introductory exploration to prepare the way for further investigation of the problems involved in full utilization of new productivity for living standards." The burden of the message which this book carries will be understood from the following statements in it:

> What is overdue is the study of methods of progressive social adjustment which technological change requires (p. 36).
>
> The totality of man's life in the community, whether local, regional, national, or world-wide, must be recognized as the framework within which specific problems for research are to be formulated. The community, which includes man and his environment, is more than the sum of its parts. No one part can be truly understood except in relation to the whole. The nature of the new technology has resulted in the necessity for integration of all branches of production through a unifying social objective which directs production toward such material and cultural standards in the community as will prove to be most favorable for the creative life of all its members. Social research must achieve a similar integration (p. 192).

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The authors challenge, and in the reviewer's opinion quite properly, the generally accepted belief that the creation of new products and new processes will, of themselves, assure sustained production and full employment (p. 168), particularly since "the trend in business recurrently is toward restricted and retarded production" (p. 169). In fact the results of this study are a challenge to both the economists and business men to study and to try to understand what the reviewer has frequently referred to as the operating characteristics of the national plant as a whole. Some studies already made indicate that one of the important impacts of technology and the business processes on our economy has established the relative claims of capital and labor to the goods produced in nonworkable proportions. This should receive serious consideration in our studies of postwar economy, particularly in view of the fact that our present enormous burden of debt will make these proportions still more unworkable.

This and other maladjustments in our economy are clearly indicated when we begin to study the relation of technology to the social process as a whole. The plea of the authors that all branches of production should be integrated in their operations toward the attainment of a unifying social objective should not go unheeded. It is highly important that this process we call civilization should be so organized and operated that it is most favorable for the creative life of all members of society. This has been our great failure and it is hoped that the fascist forces of reaction will not prevent our creating "the necessary social design which would guide production for the general welfare" (p. 192).

This book should be widely read and it is hoped that the wisdom of its observations will result in the support of continued studies of the problems which the authors have posed for us.

WALTER RAUTENSTRAUCH

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

British Finance, 1930-1940. By WALTER A. MORTON. Madison, The University of Wisconsin Press, 1943.—xii, 356 pp. $4.00.

Professor Morton's chief interest, in this analysis of a decade of British financial policy, lies in the material which it offers for an evaluation of the policy of cheap money as an instrument for the control of business depression. As a background for this analysis, he devotes nearly one third of the text to a careful description of the events leading up to the suspension of gold payments by Great

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Britain in September 1931. Contrary to many opinions, the author finds evidence that the policies followed by France and the United States were not responsible for the difficulties of England; moreover, the immediate reason for the British suspension of gold payments was not the over-valuation of the pound sterling, but the illiquidity of British banks. Suspension was probably the least of several possible evils; the author points out that, for example, the policy of drastic deflation proposed in the interests of laissez-faire would have led to large-scale intervention in economic life by the state.

The middle section of the book is devoted to the international aspects of the situation which followed the suspension of 1931. Foreign exchange, foreign trade, gold movements, and invisible items are examined in some detail. The resulting conclusion is that suspension of gold was beneficial, not because it gave rise to a depreciation of the pound, but because it created a sterling group of nations within which trade relations were relatively stable. The abandonment of the traditional free-trade policy of Great Britain, as a part of this development, caused a shift in British industry, both geographically and industrially, which gave a temporary stimulus to new construction of factories and housing.

The course of domestic finance in the thirties is described in the final third of the volume. Monetary policy, banking, government finance, and investment are considered with frequent reference to the political situation which conditioned them. Although Great Britain was the first of the great Powers to abandon the gold standard and adopt a policy of low interest rates, it did not resort to pump priming, and was one of the last countries to permit state interference with economic processes. The author can find no evidence that the cheap money policy was a prime factor in the recovery of the thirties, but concludes that "The British recovery was the result of favorable natural and psychological forces which created the housing boom, a changing structure of industry, the development of electricity, railways, and other industrial activities that promoted heavy new investment."

This is a careful and thoroughly documented work in a highly controversial field. Although the author's conclusions may seem overly cautious to some enthusiastic disciples of the newer schools, even they will find it useful as a summary of recent events. The intelligent layman with some knowledge of finance should also find it profitable reading.

MARGARET G. MYERS

VASSAR COLLEGE

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The Structure of Morale. By J. T. MACCURDY. Cambridge, at the University Press; New York, The Macmillan Company, 1943.—vi, 224 pp. $2.00.

This book consists of the material of lectures given at the Psychological Laboratory in Cambridge (England) to officers and training regiments as well as A.T.S. groups receiving instruction, chiefly in technical methods of selection and training of personnel. The author makes no attempt to define morale. Apparently the reader is to assume that "good" morale has something to do with courage, and "bad" morale with fear. The subject is approached indirectly, i.e., by way of an analysis of human reactions to danger. Depending upon the character and the degree of danger, as well as upon certain individual or social circumstances, the reaction to danger will be either courage or fear.

Part I, entitled "Fear", offers the distinction of passive and active adaptation to danger. It is entirely concerned with the problem of how to combat the rise of fear. With its timely illustrations it should be of greatest value to wartime (military or civilian) trainees.

Part II, entitled "Morale", considers some specific social and national components of morale. Starting with a brief analysis of the "Basic Principles of Social Life" the gist of which is that man is a social animal, the author works himself quickly to the important subject of "Variable Morale" (chapter iv). Variability of morale is described as an alternation between two extremes: a *sauve qui peut* attitude, as against a loss of all regard for personal safety caused by loyalty (to a group or nation) that outweighs personal consideration. The discussion of this subject leads directly to the problem of leadership. Though hardly original, the author's remarks about the functions as well as different types of leadership are a valuable part of the study, especially in view of its close contact and familiarity with recent military experience and problems in England. A chapter on "National Objectives" provides the introduction to an interesting comparison between the bases and structures of morale in the principal nations engaged in the present war. In his speculations about the conditions for a collapse of morale in Germany, the author has made allowance for recent changes in that country's armed forces—measures to secure greater organizational and operative flexibility, a reform in the functions and attitudes of the German officer, also a conditioning of troops to retreat action—i.e., changes which must be expected to diminish the vulnerability of German military

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morale to prolonged warfare, reverses and defensive operations. Partly for this reason, and partly for reasons which have to do with the shifting of a relatively high share of Germany's psychological and material burden of war upon the home front, the initial breakdown of morale is predicted to occur among the civilians. Though this prediction may prove to be sound, the reader will find, with regard to the underlying reasoning, very little that was new or startling at the time the book was written (1942). No allowance is made for the possibility of a continuation of the willingness to fight out of fear of the consequences of collapse.

In Part III, entitled "Some Problems in Organization", the author, a psychologist, reveals a keen awareness of the significance of the political and technical aspects of organization. It is pointed out that morale and organization are intimately connected. Morale is meaningless, or at least ineffective, unless it promotes action. No meaningful action can be undertaken without organization. Furthermore, there may be a correlation between the objectives or ideals of a nation and the kind of organization it adopts: its peculiar type of organization may be an expression of its ideal. So, just as the outlook of a country may determine its particular kind of morale, so may it condition its organization (p. 141). But in the development of this important subject there are shortcomings resulting from the author's failure clearly to define morale. In many instances, so, for example, in his chapter on "Departmentalism and Careerism", dealing with such topics as individual or group self-seeking (focalized loyalties, obstructionism, ambition for money or power), he does not really concern himself with problems of morale, but rather with those referring to patriotism. These two concepts are by no means synonymous. The war morale of a person or group may be "good" without there being much that deserves to be called patriotism, i.e., devotion to one's country in terms of personal effort and sacrifice.

A clarification of the concepts of morale and patriotism (the latter term does appear in the book), and an attempt to show the relationship between the two subjects involved, would mean a substantial improvement of the study. But as it stands, the book represents a highly readable and stimulating piece of work, showing great economy of style, a keen sense for what is of practical importance, and leaving a desire for similar studies as regards the United States.

WALTER EGLE

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Gideon Welles: Lincoln's Navy Department. By RICHARD S. WEST, JR. Indianapolis and New York, The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1943.—379 pp. $3.50.

Except for Edward Bates, Gideon Welles is the last of the major figures of Lincoln's cabinet to be the subject of a biography. For this reason, if for no other, the present volume would be welcome. But it has other considerations to its credit. It is well grounded in scholarly research and enriched by new materials that enlarge our knowledge of Welles's career and improve our understanding of the problems that confronted him as Secretary of the Navy during the war years. Furthermore, the book is readable and timely. On the other hand, little can be said in appreciation of the author's account of Welles's secretaryship under Johnson, for this important phase of his record and his nine years of retirement are dismissed in a concluding chapter of eighteen pages. Herein lies the major fault of the biography.

The author has focused his attention primarily upon Welles's conduct of the Navy Department between 1861 and 1865. His narrative demonstrates with additional evidence that the task facing the Secretary from the outset was one of impressive proportions. Problems of defense and reinforcement of navy yards and posts at the South called for prompt and decisive action that strained to the limit the meager resources at his disposal. His department was small and moribund; many of its personnel, ashore and afloat, were disloyal, incompetent or superannuated; the fleet was badly scattered and hopelessly inadequate for extensive blockade and combat operations. But Welles did not falter. Though he looked like a somber, fussy, old deacon, and was in many respects, Professor West shows him to have been a strong, courageous and methodical administrator, capable of reorganizing and expanding his department and fighting forces under pressure. A shrewd judge of men and a stern taskmaster, he did not hesitate to shelve elderly officers, to advance others of superior caliber and to discard seniority in favor of competence as the basis for choosing squadron commanders. From the start Welles recognized that the development of a tight blockade of the Confederacy was the navy's chief function in the conflict and he stuck grimly to that undertaking until it was an accomplished fact. At the same time his supervision over the river campaigns and expeditions against Southern ports was constant and exacting. He gave stanch backing to John Ericsson's work on ironclads and kept a

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sharp eye on contractors and others bent on fleecing the government.

According to Professor West's narrative, the respect in which Welles's administration was most deficient was in its failure to effect strategic planning in conjunction with the War Department. Such planning, he says, was "almost nonexistent", and as a consequence combined operations suffered in execution. For this shortcoming Lincoln and Stanton were probably mainly responsible, since Welles at least saw the need for it and desired cabinet coöperation, but the Secretary's crotchety and suspicious temperament, his jealous concern for the navy's interests and his extremely critical attitude toward his colleagues were in themselves no doubt obstacles to joint planning.

A. HOWARD MENEELY

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BOOK NOTES

An important contribution to the history of American taxation is made by the excellent account of the development of excess profits taxation in the United States during the first World War in *Excess Profits Taxation*, by Kenneth James Curran (Washington, American Council on Public Affairs, 1943; vii, 203 pp. $3.50; $3.00). Professor Curran gives a step-by-step description of the enactment of the several excess profits tax laws in the period 1917-21, with references on each point to the original sources, chiefly the *Congressional Record*, the House and Senate *Reports*, the *Hearings*, the statutes, and the Treasury rulings. He also notes the attitudes of various groups toward the tax, and devotes separate chapters to administrative problems and fiscal aspects. The development of the declared-value excess profits tax and the capital stock tax in the inter-war period is described, as well as the Vinson-Trammell profit-limiting provision. A short chapter on the present excess profits tax is added, "merely . . . to sketch briefly its nature and the important changes made during the first two years. . . ." The book is a model of scholarly documentation and painstaking research. It is hard reading chiefly because the subject is difficult, and the author does not evade the difficulties. The book is one for the public finance specialist. Aside from the opening and concluding chapters, remarks on excess profits taxation in general are few, and are confined to comments on particular provisions of the revenue acts. These comments are usually detailed enough to let the reader see what the main points at issue were, and they reflect careful thought and often acute analysis of the intricate problems posed, but in places the treatment omits some of the chief considerations (in the discussion of borrowed capital, for instance) or is so condensed that the reader with no background in excess profits taxation will find it difficult. No comparisons are made with the excess profits taxes of other countries, and no extended economic analysis of the tax is presented. The brevity of the treatment accorded to the economic aspects of the tax may lead to false inferences; the statement that the government "in effect subsidized"

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expenditures on advertising and personnel relations (p. 138) needs to be qualified by pointing out that it does not pay to incur the expenditures just because of the high tax unless the increase in receipts flowing from the expenditures takes effect after the tax has been repealed. The concluding chapter summarizes the findings, and an extensive index adds greatly to the usefulness of the book.—CARL S. SHOUP.

In times of frequent and unpredictable mutuation when political systems are both in danger and in doubt, it is fitting that serious observers of representative government have attempted to understand the shortcomings of our form of democracy. William H. Nicholls and John A. Vieg in a brief volume—*Wartime Government in Operation* (Philadelphia, The Blakiston Company, 1943; xiii, 109 pp. $1.50)—have explained the deficiencies of wartime legislative and administrative programs in terms of the attitudes and machinery existing under our pattern of government. They have done far more than merely study present policies, for their work centers attention on failings which have characterized the nation at all times and are now accentuated by martial upheaval. Rather than an analysis of the reciprocal effects of agricultural and labor policy as the key to an understanding of our war mobilization and stabilization programs, as is claimed on the flyleaf, such policy has been used to illustrate a more profound process. The "polarization of labor policy in the Executive branch and farm and food policy in the Congressional branch . . . [indicates] a failure to bridge the gap created by the separation of powers" (p. 73) and exposes a hiatus which is not confined to the labor or farm programs. In the legislature there has been a lack of independent judgment on the part of the Congressmen, and nonrecognition of the executive rôle. The clustering of special interest groups, the network of standing committees and the archaic seniority rule have vitiated lawmaking. Administrative action has suffered also from indecision, excessive pyramiding, retention of "loyal" but inadequate bureaucrats, and disrespect for Congress. The public has been too apathetic and its various interest groups have made disproportionate clamor. The authors propose a joint committee on the conduct of the war, a bipartisan legislative cabinet, a legislative veto, a general welfare lobby for the public and a reinvigoration of party government, particularly by increased use of the caucus. The value of their specific suggestions, and indeed of the entire study, lies not only in the practical diagnosis of state structure

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in wartime but also in the objective analysis of perennial shortcomings of legislators, administrators and citizens. It is to be hoped that this dissection of governmental operations will be continued at greater length.—RITA DAVIDSON, Washington, D. C.

The extraordinary enlargement of the American army during the present war has raised many problems of military law. That is why *The Army and the Law* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1943; viii, 203 pp. $2.75), originally written by Professor Garrard Glenn in 1918, and now presented in a revised and enlarged edition by Professor A. Arthur Schiller, is of great value. The book deals only with the army in its relation to the common law. The author first analyzes the constitution of the present-day American army and the military law and military courts. He goes on to show that it is for the common law court to decide, in the particular case, whether the military court has jurisdiction or the commander has power to act. He discusses carefully writ of habeas corpus, action for damages against an officer of the military court, claims for damages of an inferior against a superior, and concurrent jurisdiction of courts-martial and common law courts. Several chapters deal with the army in its relation to the enemy, with military government in occupied territories, with the soldier's relation to the civilian in time of peace and of war. A concluding note gives a bibliography of recent books and articles on martial law. Problems of constitutional law are considered and comparisons with British law are made. A full list of cases is given to illustrate each legal problem, and the more important cases are discussed in the text. Many highly practical problems, such as trading with the enemy, punishment of enemy prisoners of war for war crimes, the plea "act of state" and the "plea of superior command", are analyzed. Although the author does not want to go *ex professo* into international law, the nature of his subject, nevertheless, makes excursions into international law and its literature frequently necessary. It is, as a whole, an excellent and up-to-date study, as useful to the specialist in military law as to the general lawyer, and by no means without interest for the international lawyer.—JOSEF L. KUNZ, University of Toledo.

The liveliest stretch of Supreme Court history belongs to the period when Andrew Jackson's appointees took over the work of interpreting the Constitution. If Alexander A. Lawrence's *James Moore Wayne: Southern Unionist* (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1943; xiv, 250 pp. $3.00) is no great addition to the library of the historian of that period, it is at least an

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honest job of research in scattered correspondence, personal reminiscence, and public encomium. It elaborates, with Southern piety, the human interest of one who was neither a great man nor a great lawyer (p. 215). Even second-rate figures have their usefulness, however, for political and constitutional issues may be understood better when given a personal setting. If Mr. Lawrence's antiquarian endeavors fail to contribute many of the interesting results possible in this sort of work, part of the explanation lies in the unfortunate disappearance of the bulk of the Wayne papers; for the rest, the author must take responsibility for not integrating his material with all available monographs on the Constitution and the politics of the pre-Civil War period. For example, an affectionately drawn picture of the Georgia or, more specifically, the Savannah social scene in the early nineteenth century is not in itself any substitute for a careful political analysis of Wayne's early career, though it might have been a convenient device through which to reëxamine some of the material in U. B. Phillips's *Georgia and States' Rights*. Instead, we have only a fair account of the Georgia Congressman who was rewarded by Jackson with a place on the Supreme Court in 1835. The rest of the volume is also somewhat disappointing, except as a guide to leading decisions, a pattern of "old school" gentility, and a touching description of secession as it affected a family of divided loyalties. Judge Wayne kept his post through the war years, upheld Lincoln's course of action with the firmness of one who had been described long before as "a high toned Federalist" (p. 93), and managed to recover in the North much of the popularity he had lost as one of the "conspirators" in the Dred Scott decision. Yet he was buried with respect in a Georgia plot, in 1867, having devoted the last two years of his life to assisting individual Southerners with the pardons clerk. Mr. Lawrence has not had to introduce to history any opinions of great consequence, because Judge Wayne wrote opinions less often than he concurred, and he concurred generally except when Taney's court appeared to admit too much power over commerce to the states: that is, he supported the Jacksonian concept of the police power, but he anticipated the Court of the 1880's on the commerce clause. It was this qualification which caused Judge Curtis to label him a Federalist. Yet he had been appointed by Jackson, largely as a result of his support of the administration on the Bank issue. How does one classify a judge, with any certainty that he will fit the classification for more than one line of thought?—JOHN T. FARRELL, College of New Rochelle.

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The Free Negro in North Carolina, 1790-1860 (Chapel Hill, The University of North Carolina Press, 1943; x, 271 pp. $4.00) by John Hope Franklin is a well-balanced and objective study of a subject that is often distorted with prejudice. We need such dispassionate studies of the American Negro in order to obtain a true perspective of the most important minority group within the United States today. The free Negroes in the old South were, as Dr. Franklin observes, "an unwanted people."; for they were regarded as potential insurrectionary agents, they had the reputation of being idle and of stealing, and they were hated by the white mechanics who feared their competition. North Carolina contained one of the largest free Negro populations of the Southern states, 30,463, as compared, for example, with the 773 free Negroes in Mississippi. From 1790 to 1850 the free Negro element in the state grew more rapidly than either the white or slave population. Unlike the free blacks in most Southern states, the North Carolina free Negroes were predominantly rural, a significant factor in explaining the tolerant attitude of the state toward them. But this liberal attitude began to change as early as 1827, when free Negroes were prohibited from immigrating into the state. The "Free Negro Code" was drastically modified as a result of the incendiary Walker pamphlet written by a North Carolina free Negro. Substantially complete by 1831, this code permitted the free Negro to own property, including the acquisition of slaves (until 1860), to have a jury trial and counsel, and to learn to read and write. Nor was he required to have a white guardian, as in Georgia. On the other hand, the law restricted his freedom of movement, and prohibited him from preaching, teaching slaves to read and write, serving in the militia (after 1812), carrying firearms, or buying liquor. His testimony was not valid in court against white persons. The climax of restrictive legislation was reached when the slaveholding eastern counties secured the disfranchisement of the free Negro by a vote of 66 to 61 in the constitutional convention of 1835. The harshness of the "Free Negro Code", however, was tempered by laxity of enforcement and the liberal decisions of the higher courts. Dr. Franklin's study is based on thorough research and illustrated by a valuable set of maps and appendices. An important contribution of this volume is the skillful tracing of the deterioration of the legal status of the free Negro in the most tolerant of the Southern states.—CLEMENT EATON, Lafayette College.

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Come Over Into Macedonia (New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1943; xviii, 313 pp. $3.00), by Harold B. Allen, is an expert and first-hand account of relief and rehabilitation in Macedonia, following hard upon the war of 1914-1918. Mr. Allen has essayed a biography of his ten years of work with the Near East Relief, one of the first and most important of recent American organizations to venture into foreign philanthropic and educational activities. The author's remarks are of dual significance: they serve as a history of Greek Macedonia during one of its most crucial periods, and as a guide for American agencies that are already preparing for similar work in post-war Europe. Mr. Allen has had a wealth of experience; he served as a director of rural education in Greece, Albania, Bulgaria, Syria, Turkey and Palestine. In 1935 he made a study of agricultural conditions in Cyprus for the British government. There are nineteen chapters, the first "An Old Problem in New Greece" and the last "The Hope of Things to Come", adequately surveying the nature, problems and objectives common to work of this kind. Under the heading of rehabilitation Mr. Allen would include not only the essentials of life but education—agronomy and recreation—for the remote areas of Macedonia. The philosophy, implicit and explicit, throughout is that of "self-help"; beginning with a careful and intelligent appraisal of the situation, taking into account the background, customs and temperament of the people, Mr. Allen shows the peasant how to uplift himself. Thus recognizing simple truths, much progress is made. Here is a program that is not the internationalization of W.P.A.; there is no vile corruption, cheap politics, or self-aggrandizement. Men chosen from the people themselves, their objectives being clear, set about performing their tasks with efficiency, as in any well-operated American plant. And hence the axiom is manifest that foreign relief and rehabilitation do not require the politician or the theorizer, but the guidance of a business mind. The book contains some regrettable shortcomings. First, where the attempt is made to provide a short historical background it has been so over-simplified that it borders on falsification. Second, where literary finesse is attempted the result invariably is disappointing. Third, transliteration of modern Greek causes the author to produce some curious words, such as "eikon" (p. 142) for the more simple "icon". Shortcomings of this nature should not discourage the specialist and the student. There is much to be learned by those who will guide post-war relief. — STEPHEN G. CHACONAS, State Teachers College, Plattsburg, N. Y.

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Stephen Duggan has told the story of the Institute of International Education and its contribution to the "recent expansion of international cultural relations" in an informal volume of reminiscences, *A Professor at Large* (New York, The Macmillan Co., 1943; xviii, 468 pp. $3.50). Director of the Institute since its inauguration by the Carnegie Endowment in 1918, at the instance of Elihu Root and Nicholas Murray Butler, as an organization to "develop good will between the American people and the citizens of other countries" through "educational agencies in the narrow academic sense", the author is able to combine a sketch of the Institute's machinery (information service, student exchange scholarships, visiting professorships, conferences and committees, publications) with notes on the experiences and personalities encountered on numerous travels to extend the services of the Institute into all the principal countries of the world. As a chapter in the story of American philanthropy, of American education, of the American liberal faith in the constructive influence of improved intercultural relations, it is a welcome contribution. In it the author reveals himself an able administrator, a zealous democrat, and a useful ambassador of good will. This story of the Institute, however, is seriously handicapped by the author's decision to interweave its history with a good deal of miscellaneous material on the cultural backgrounds of the principal foreign countries that is neither original, nor fundamental, nor comprehensive. This material is not utilized to illustrate the problems or opportunities facing the Institute, or to provide fresh insights into national character, or to illumine the tragedy of such a venture in intercultural understanding during a period of rising tariffs, isolation, nationalism, feverish rearmament. The concluding chapter on "The United States and the Post-War World" contributes nothing to the abundant monographic material on the subject. There are several potentially important implications running through the book: that education, and especially intercultural education, does constitute a primary force in shaping world politics, and that the United States will emerge from this war as the only country with the cultural values and the resources adequate for educational reconstruction. A skeptic, however, will find nothing in these pages to overcome his doubts. Perhaps on another occasion Dr. Duggan will take up some of these larger questions. — E. McCLUNG FLEMING, College of the City of New York.

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A landmark in the historiography of the North American fur trade is provided in *Caesars of the Wilderness: Médard Chouart, Sieur des Groseilliers and Pierre Esprit Radisson, 1618-1710* (New York, D. Appleton-Century Company, 1943; xvi, 386 pp. $4.00) by Grace Lee Nute. This significance does not derive so much from the construction of the text, or even from the value of new material presented, as from the definitive character of the work performed. For several decades historians of the early fur period on this continent have been both fascinated and baffled by the vital but obscure exploits of the two French *coureurs de bois*, Groseilliers and Radisson. No two men did more in the seventeenth century to lay the foundations and determine the course of the American fur future; yet many important chapters in their careers have remained hidden, or have appeared, half-distorted, in the pages of some of the most cryptic manuscripts that have ever puzzled researchers. Now, at last, as much of the mystery as is likely ever to be revealed has been set forth in one volume and in thorough detail. The lives of Radisson and Groseilliers are dealt with chronologically in the two hundred and eighty pages of text. Every debatable point is discussed exhaustively and with ample reference to sources both new and old scattered in dozens of libraries in the cities of the United States, Canada, England and France. It is true that little has been added to what was already known, that might change fundamentally the historical position of the two men; but a wealth of detail is here presented for the first time that confirms and emphasizes preceding conclusions, and relates the topic to the contemporary scene in both America and Europe. Radisson and Groseilliers have finally been given the painstaking treatment they merited by a capable historian who has devoted years of intensive study to the task. Seventy-seven pages of appendices reproduce some of the leading documents upon which the conclusions of the author are based. Most of the judgments passed on men and events are reasonable and there is little or no trace of prejudice. The weakest features of the work are an occasional obscurity of statement and a frequent failure to show clearly how material being presented is related to the central theme. A dozen reproductions of pertinent ancient maps and pictures are typical of the various technical excellences which make the volume a highly attractive addition to the fur historian's library. — JOHN PERRY PRITCHETT, Queens College.

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Fur: A Study in English Mercantilism, 1700-1775, by Murray G. Lawson, with a Foreword by Harold A. Innis (Toronto, The University of Toronto Press, 1943; xxiii, 140 pp. $1.75), is a sound and compact monograph dealing with the fur trade in British North America, 1700-1775, in its relation to British mercantilist policies. The author has refused to allow his work to be "vitiated by the romanticism with which the mundane pursuit of fortune has been cloaked, by the debilitating restriction to local areas or individuals, by the failure to consider the economic rôle of the fur trade in the life of the country, and by the absence of any appreciation of how the fur trade of the colonies fitted into the economy of the mother country." Felts or hats made chiefly from rabbit and beaver fur became popular in England in the sixteenth century, and during the period covered by this study hatters' fur contributed some 65 per cent of the value of English fur imports and some 45 per cent of the value of the exports. The hatters managed to get ample government aid. Dr. Lawson finds that the source of American fur supply moved from New England to New York to the Great Lakes to Hudson's Bay Territory and finally to the American Northwest and Canadian Far West. Germany, Holland, Flanders and Russia were the chief export markets for furs. Portugal and Spain took the most fur hats until after 1760 when Virginia, Maryland, East India and Jamaica displaced them. The regulation of the American fur trade by individual colonies and during the period 1755-75 is examined in some detail but without uncovering much new information for scholarship. Perhaps the most startling of Dr. Lawson's conclusions is based upon the fact that from 1722 until 1775 the fur exports of all the Continental Colonies, including Newfoundland, comprised less than 3 per cent of the total value of all colonial exports to England. Fur was "of little importance to any of the individual colonial economies, other than those of Canada and New York. . . . In short, in the eighteenth century, despite the romanticism with which the fur trade has been clothed by its narrators, despite its significance in the Anglo-French struggle for the North American continent, it was actually of no real importance either to the English or the American economy." The book includes a discriminating bibliographical essay, a statistical appendix compiled from the English Inspector-General's *Ledgers of Imports and Exports*, and a suggestive foreword by Professor Innis tracing the course of the North American fur empire from the seventeenth century to date.—EDWARD P. ALEXANDER, Wisconsin Historical Society.

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Objective, moderate in statement and evaluation, and amply documented by footnotes and critical bibliography, *George Fitzhugh: Propagandist of the Old South* (Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1943; xiii, 360 pp. $3.00) by Harvey Wish satisfies the need of a comprehensive, scholarly biography of an important proslavery militant of the 1850's. Identified by birth, marriage, residence and intense loyalty with the Virginia tidewater plantation aristocracy whose way of life was on the defensive, and drawing his ideas and information about the outside world chiefly from newspapers, Tory English reviews and romantic novels, and the writings of Thomas Carlyle, Fitzhugh exercised his active, ingenious mind and facile pen from 1849 to 1872 by writing pamphlets, hundreds of editorials and articles in Richmond newspapers and *DeBow's Review* as well as other Southern and Northern periodicals, and two important books—*Sociology for the South; or, The Failure of Free Society* (1854) and *Cannibals All! or, Slaves without Masters* (1857). Hastily written, poorly organized, repetitive, and extravagant in statement and generalization, his significant writings before 1860 were a vigorous propagandist counteroffensive against modern liberalism and free society. He portrayed the chaos and failure of selfish middle-class free society, as exemplified by British industrialism, in which labor was insecure and degraded (the North would lose its favorable position in free society when cheap western lands no longer operated as a safety valve); repudiated the liberal ideals of Jefferson; championed slavery as good, normal, universal in history, independent of law, and founded on the enduring diversities of human beings; asserted the superiority of slave society to free society; and proclaimed the "irrepressible conflict" and the "house divided" dilemma in advance of Seward and Lincoln. In *Cannibals All!* Fitzhugh adopted an extreme anticapitalistic position and accepted in large degree the socialistic concept of the class struggle and the economic interpretation of history. The author presents Fitzhugh as an adroit, prolific member of a school of militant proslavery publicists in a minority section during a period of excitement and hysteria; sets forth fully the ideas of Fitzhugh; and gives evidence of but does not assess his influence upon the development of Northern and Southern misunderstanding and extremism. Fitzhugh's published opinions underwent striking changes and did not always conform to his private convictions. He showed a tendency to shape his policy to suit his editor and an agility in accepting and championing the status quo. He died in Texas in 1881, virtually unknown to the post-war generation. The reviewer questions the author's

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use of the chapter title, "Prophet of the New South"; his identification of Fitzhugh with Southern nationalism (he seemed to favor state nationalism); and his characterization of Jeffersonian liberalism as an importation from Europe.—A. R. NEWSOME, University of North Carolina.

The Conscientious Objector and the Law, by Julien Cornell, with a Foreword by Harry Emerson Fosdick (New York, The John Day Co., 1943, distributors; copyright by the author; x, 158 pp. $1.75), together with the report on conscientious objectors issued by the American Civil Liberties Union, deserves the widest attention, for it focuses much-needed light on one of the basic issues of democracy. Mr. Cornell, a lawyer with wide experience in court cases involving conscientious objectors, has written an able statement of the legal system governing this minority. He finds that, although treatment of conscientious objectors is definitely more satisfactory than in the last war, it does not by any means come up to the standards which a democracy can afford and does not compare with the progress that Britain has made in this respect in the same period and under much greater stress. The draft law itself is to blame for a great deal of the difficulty. Beyond that, the author finds, the Selective Service administration, which is largely directed by army officers, has of its own accord developed a system of regulations, controls and procedures which deprive the conscientious objector minority of many of the most fundamental rights of the Anglo-American judicial process, and the legality of which is the subject of unceasing court tests. Some two thousand certified conscientious objectors are today paying the price of this system in terms of federal prison sentences. Mr. Cornell is outspoken in his criticism of General Hershey and his army friends in Selective Service, whom he holds concerned less with the basic issues of the problem than with what they regard as good public relations, involving all too frequently such pressure groups as the American Legion. That the author has taken the occasion of this criticism to express his general hostility to the trend of government under Mr. Roosevelt is, however, not very relevant. The book could have been considerably improved with more adequate reference to source material.—ALEXANDER F. KIEFER, Bluemont, Va.

Herbert J. Liebesny's *The Government of French North Africa* (Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1943; viii, 130 pp. $1.50) is the first volume of a new publication series to be called "African Handbooks". The books are being prepared under the editorship of H. A. Wieschhoff and the auspices of the University of

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Pennsylvania's Committee on African Studies and the African Section of the University Museum. Three more already have appeared, one dealing with mineral resources, another with food, and the third with the languages and press. Later volumes are to cover labor problems, the colonial policies of the Powers in Africa, and missions in Africa. This first volume sets a high standard of terseness, up-to-dateness, detachment and scholarship. It is a straightforward account of the administrative and legal systems of Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria from the establishment of French control to June 1943. It answers authoritatively most of the questions that one would be likely to have concerning administrative bodies and jurisdictions, native relations, status of foreigners, judicial arrangements, territorial control and subdivisions, municipal administration, civil and criminal jurisdictions, religious considerations, nationality adjustments, applications of French law, and so on for all three dependencies. There is included an excellent brief guide to the relevant legal sources; and the appendix conveniently reproduces, in English, the texts of the treaties of Bardo, La Mersa, and Fez, whereby the French protectorates over Tunisia and Morocco were established. The inclusion of figures on population and language are of further interest and value, as is the simple but clear frontispiece map. Unfortunately, however, there is no index. And, as the Philadelphia lawyer, Horace Binney, once pointed out, the recollection of the appearance of a certain fact in a certain book without an index may make that fact no more available than was a certain ship's teakettle because the cabin boy knew where it was—he had seen it fall overboard.—WALTER CONSUELO LANGSAM, Union College.

New International Wheat Agreements (Wheat Studies of the Food Research Institute, Vol. XIX, No. 2, Stanford University, 1942; pp. 25-83. $1.00), by Joseph S. Davis, a recent addition to the large number of eminent contributions sponsored by the Food Research Institute concerning wheat as a basic world commodity, may prove to have a significance well out of proportion to its size. Prior to the mid-1942 Washington meeting of the five nations primarily concerned with the overseas trade in wheat, international planning was discussed largely in general terms. In contrast, the agreements stemming from the wheat conference are a specific example of international planning, and the Draft Convention which provides a detailed plan for consideration by a future international wheat conference attended by as many wheat importing and exporting countries

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as practicable has been referred to as a model to be followed with other basic commodities in the post-war world. As such, the convention warrants careful study, and this inquiry into its promises as a type of international economic collaboration is, therefore, emphatically justified. Dr. Davis sketches the background and evolution of the wheat agreements of 1942 and summarizes the interim and contingent agreements, the setup and early actions of the International Wheat Council, and the commitments contingent on specific future decisions. Chief attention is, however, given to the Draft Convention. In the conclusion, the author offers critical and constructive suggestions. The archives incident to this study are not now open, but it is highly probable that the author's preëminent knowledge of the subject has enabled him to present his summary without any errors of consequence. For the same reason, his comments on the implications of the convention for peacetime merit attention.—EVERETT E. EDWARDS, United States Department of Agriculture.

The following volumes in COLUMBIA STUDIES IN HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC LAW have recently been published, or are now in press.

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